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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the role of temporary, ad hoc commissions of inquiry appointed to 
investigate corruption in Uganda from 1999 to the present. It is based on a qualitative 
research study that involved analysing the relevant literature, official documents such as 
inquiry reports, newspaper reports and web-based materials; as well as interviews and 
focus group discussions. The study locates itself in an analysis of and inter-relationship 
between two dynamics -  of global ‗good‘ governance, and of the influence of  neo-
patrimonial politics that characterise local governance - on the appointment, processes and 
outcomes of commissions of inquiry into corruption in Uganda. In looking at these factors, 
the thesis aims at explaining why the institution of the ad hoc commission of inquiry has 
emerged as the anti-corruption ―instrument of choice‖ during this period of Uganda‘s 
history. 
 
The findings suggest that the global anti-corruption framework signified by the good 
governance agenda is hindered by various factors such as the self-interest of donors, the 
moral hazard inherent in aid and the illegitimacy of conditionality; all of which contribute 
to the weak enforcement of governance-related conditionalities. This in turn causes aid-
recipient countries such as Uganda to do only the minimum necessary to keep up 
appearances in implementing governance reforms. National anti-corruption is further 
hindered by the government‘s tendency to undermine anti-corruption by selective or non-
enforcement of the law, the rationale being to insulate the patronage networks that form 
the basis of its political support from being dismantled by the prosecution of key patrons 
involved in corruption. Thus, the need to appear to be a ―good governor‖ whilst protecting 
patrons from possible prosecution necessitates a symbolic approach to anti-corruption that 
nonetheless seems authentic. Ad hoc commissions of inquiry chaired by judges, which 
facilitate a highly publicised inquisitorial truth-finding process, therefore emerge as the 
ideal way of tackling corruption because they facilitate ―a trial in which no-one is sent to 
jail.‖  
 
Commissions of inquiry into corruption in Uganda have therefore played a complex and 
multiple role in anti-corruption and governance in Uganda. They enabled the government 
to prove its credentials as a good governor especially at a time when it was being 
discredited for its reluctance to adopt a multi-party system of government. They also 
served to appease a public that was appalled by the various corruption scandals 
perpetrated by a regime that had claimed to introduce ―a fundamental change and not a 
mere change of guards‖ in Uganda‘s politics. Nevertheless, while they enabled the regime 
to consolidate power by appeasing donors and the public, they also constituted significant 
  
xi 
 
democratic moments in Uganda‘s history by allowing the public- acting through judges 
and the media- to participate in holding their leaders accountable for their actions in a 
manner hitherto unseen in a country whose history had been characterised by dictatorial 
rule.  
1 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction and Background 
1.1 The fight against corruption  
This study analyses the role of commissions of inquiry in the fight against corruption in 
Uganda from the late 1990s to 2010. It aims at ascertaining their position in the power 
dynamics of global and national anti-corruption governance involving International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs), bilateral donors, the Uganda government and the Ugandan 
public. Thus, it examines the role of governance-related aid conditionalities and the 
attendant ―good governance‖ discourse as instruments of global governance-  and 
patronage and clientelism as instruments of domestic governance - in the appointment, 
processes and outcomes of commissions of inquiry specifically appointed to investigate 
corruption in Uganda. The thesis suggests that commissions of inquiry are a manifestation 
of the contradictions and paradoxes that bedevil global and national anti-corruption 
frameworks; thereby rendering them neither effective nor completely ineffective, but 
illustrative of the concurrent potential and limitations of governance-related aid 
conditionalities and their implementation in a ―neo-patrimonial‖ political context such as 
Uganda. 
 
The context for the study is the global fight against corruption at its local off-shoot in 
Uganda. This ―fight‖ is agreed by scholars to have taken off at the end of the cold war, 
beginning in the early 1990s. It has been spearheaded by the World Bank, donor agencies 
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such as the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as a growing number of 
international civil society organisations such as Transparency International and Global 
Integrity. Furthermore, the 1990s as well as the present decade have witnessed an 
exponential increase in the number of international treaties against corruption. Starting 
with the passing of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Anti-bribery Convention in 1997 and culminating in the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption in 2005, these treaties are helping to forge international consensus on 
corrupt practices and how to fight them. These developments have enabled anti-corruption 
to become so prominent in international law and international relations that some scholars 
such as McCoy have opined that there is an emerging global anti-corruption norm.
1
    
The present-day fight against corruption is indeed a reflection of a hitherto unseen global 
consensus on the concept of corruption and how it negatively impacts upon development. 
Prior to the 1990s, starting from the 1960s up until the 1980s, most of the political science 
and economic scholars who studied and wrote about corruption eschewed moral and other 
value-laden perspectives on corruption, excusing it as something unavoidable at certain 
stages of the development process.  Scholars who came to be referred to as ―functional-
integrationists‖ said that corruption was beneficial because it allowed the integration and 
involvement of various groups who would otherwise not be able to participate in public 
                                                 
1
 McCoy, J. (2001) ―The Emergence of a Global Anti-Corruption Norm,‖ International Politics 38:65-90 
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life by giving the citizens access to decision-makers.
2
 Thus, it could ―humanise‖ an 
otherwise impersonal bureaucracy. Other scholars, who came to be known as ―market 
revisionists‖ argued that corruption could introduce efficiency into a system where there 
was none, ―oiling‖ and ―greasing‖ the machinery of the system by cutting red-tape. 3 
By the 1990s, such ―functional-integrationist‖ and ―revisionist‖ views of corruption had 
become unpopular, as the World Bank turned its guns on corruption as the main factor that 
explained the failure of development. The World Bank‘s anti-corruption mandate has been 
questioned by some, who argue that the Bank is specifically prohibited by its instruments 
from interfering in the political matters of its members.
4
  The Bank has defended itself  by 
pointing out that it is mandated to ensure that the proceeds of its loans are used only for 
the purposes for which they are granted, and to ensure that loan proceeds are used ―with 
due economy and efficiency.‖5 Accordingly, starting in 1995, the World Bank became 
more explicit in its concern over corruption as a factor that affects the economy of a 
country and therefore as being within its mandate.
6
 
 
The mechanism through which the World Bank and other donor agencies such as DFID 
and USAID have sought to promote anti-corruption in developing countries such as 
                                                 
2
 Bayley, D. H. (1966), "The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation," The Western Political Quarterly 19(4): 
719-732. 
3
 Leff, N. H. (1964). "Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption," American Behavioral Scientist 8(3): 
8-14; Nye, J. (1967). "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis." American Political Science 
Review 61(2): 417-427. 
4
 For an early critique of this issue, see Yokota, Y. (1976) ―Non-political character of the World Bank,‖ Japanese 
Annual of International Law pp. 39. 64. See also Article IV, Section 10 of the IBRD Articles of Agreement.  
5
 Article III, section 5(b) and (c) of the IBRD Articles of Agreement.  
6
 For a historical discussion of the World Bank‘s role in curbing corruption, see Shihata, I. (1997), ―Corruption: A 
General Review with an Emphasis on the role of the World Bank ,‖ Dickinson Journal of International Law, 15: 451-
486 
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Uganda is under the rubric of ―good governance‖. This has been part of the wider agenda 
of promoting neo-liberal capitalism by ―rolling back the state‖7 through privatisation, and 
other measures to create ideal conditions for markets, investments and private property. 
The need for a secure environment for capitalism in turn generated a drive for competitive 
democracy, accountability and the rule of law, with special attention given to corruption as 
a major hindrance to these values and to development in general.
8
  
 
In resonance with these developments, there have been an increasing number of 
international and regional treaties against corruption, culminating in the 2005 United 
Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). Accordingly, in order to comply with 
international law and more importantly, to obtain loans and grants from donors, states 
such as Uganda have been taking steps to eliminate corruption. The commitment to anti-
corruption is enshrined in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) that forms the 
backbone of development policy. The commitment is exhibited through law reform, 
establishing and / or re-structuring of institutions and organisations with an anti-corruption 
mandate, as well as instituting commissions of inquiry to investigate particular scandals or 
agencies.  
 
                                                 
7
In reality, the State is not rolled back but expanded as its role changes from that of positive intervention in economic 
production to that of a regulator, with a myriad of ―independent‖ regulatory commissions and authorities regulating 
various types of economic activity. For more on this, see Majone, G. (1997). "From the Positive to the Regulatory 
State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance." Journal of Public Policy 17(02): 139-167. 
8
 See Craig D., and D. Potter (2007) Development Beyond Neo-Liberalism? Governance, Poverty Reduction and the 
Political Economy, London: Routledge. 
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Thus for example, Uganda‘s Guiding Policy Document, the Uganda Development Plan 
2010,
9
 proclaims fighting corruption as one of the government‘s priorities. A new Anti-
corruption Act that reflects the developments in international law was enacted in 2009.  
Institutions such as the Inspectorate of Government, the Directorate of Ethics and 
Integrity, the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority and the Auditor 
General, have all been established with a specific view to fighting corruption.
10
 In 
addition, despite all the existing permanent institutions, the government has on various 
occasions, established ad hoc judicial commissions of inquiry to investigate particular 
institutions or scandals in Uganda.
11
 
 
Unfortunately, despite the efforts at both international and national level, anti-corruption 
has met with limited success. Today, corruption is considered one of the single most 
serious threats to development and democracy in Uganda, a fact that is readily admitted in 
the National Development Plan 2010.
12
 Despite numerous legal and administrative 
interventions, Uganda‘s rankings in Transparency International‘s Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) have continued to be poor.
13
 In addition, rankings by Global Integrity show 
that Uganda has one of the widest implementation gaps between anti-corruption policy 
                                                 
9
 Government of Uganda, National Planning Authority; (2010) National Development Plan 2010/11-2014/15, at p. 
23.  
10
 The role of such institutions is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
11
 See for example, the Poverty Eradication Action Plan of 2002/3 discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2, at p. 40-41 
12 See Uganda National Development Plan (2010), para. 73, at p. 23 
13
 Uganda was ranked 111
th
 out of 179 in 2007, 126
th
 out of 180 in 2008 and 130
th
  out of 180 in 2009, 130 out of 178 
in 2010. The rankings are available at http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr, (last accessed 26 November 
2010).   
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and practice.
14
 Citizens and donors alike have expressed displeasure at this negative 
trend.
15
 Indeed, it would be fair to say that corruption is one of the most serious problems 
facing Uganda today.  
 
1.2 Context 
Uganda is a landlocked country in East Africa, bordered by Kenya to the East, Tanzania 
and Rwanda to the South, the Democratic Republic of Congo to the West and the Sudan to 
the North. It is a poor country with a Human Development Index of 0.5 and per capita 
income of $1,059.
16
  The population stands at approximately 32 million, of which the 
majority are young people – the median age is just 15 years. 87% of the populations live in 
rural areas where they lack access to clean water, health services and other amenities. 
Access to education has improved over the past 15 years due to the introduction of free, 
universal primary education. This has greatly improved literacy rates which now stand at 
66.8%.
17
  
 
                                                 
14
 See Global Integrity Uganda Report, http://report.globalintegrity.org/Uganda/2009, accessed 10 July 2011.   
15
 See for example, Jasper Tumuhimbise's blog  (2009). Poverty or political will? Jasper's Views: Corruption in 
Uganda. Kampala. Kadiresan, K. (2010). See also Speech by World Bank Country Manager on the occasion of the 
2010 Budget Speech. The Indpendent. ―Mr. President, you must start fighting corruption seriously,‖  excerpts from a 
Speech by the Uganda World Bank Country Manager on the occasion of the 2010 Budget Speech, The Independent, 
10 March 2010.  
16
See UNDP Human Development Report 2009, at 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_UGA.html, accessed 17 August 2010.  Compare 
Uganda to Norway, which ranks first in HDI values with a score of 0.97, and Niger as the worst with 0.3; or 
Liechtenstein which has the highest GDP per capita of  $85,382 and the Democratic Republic of Congo that has the 
lowest GDP per capita of  $298.  
17
 See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ug.html, accessed 17 August 2010. 
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In compliance with the requirements of good governance, Uganda is a multi-party 
democracy with one House of Parliament which is dominated by the ruling National 
Resistance Movement Party which has 205 out 332 seats in the House.
18
 There is a fairly 
independent judiciary, composed of Judges appointed by the President on the 
recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission and approved by parliament. There is 
relative freedom of the press and academic freedom. The country is governed by the 
Constitution of 1995, which is the Supreme Law. Other Applicable Laws include Acts of 
Parliament, Common Law and Doctrines of Equity, and customs and traditions that are not 
inconsistent with the Constitution or any other written law.
19
  
 
Over the past two decades, Uganda has encountered various corruption scandals, ranging 
from fraudulent privatisation of state enterprises and botched deals that procured faulty 
military equipment, to the embezzlement of millions of dollars earmarked for anti-
HIV/AIDS activities. Some state entities, notably the Uganda Police Force and the Uganda 
Revenue Authority, have attracted unrelenting public outcry regarding their corrupt 
organisational cultures. Uganda has continued to rank poorly in international corruption 
ratings by Transparency International and Global Integrity, a point that will be elucidated 
later on in this thesis. The present (NRM) government has often responded to such 
scandals or outcry by appointing a commission of inquiry. 
 
                                                 
18
 As of February 15, 2011.  
19
 See the Judicature Act of Uganda, Sections 14 and 15 ,Cap. 13 Laws of Uganda 2000. 
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The corruption scandals that have rocked Uganda in the 1990s and 2000s must be seen 
within the overall context of Uganda‘s post-independence history. The first few years after 
independence in 1962 were ―golden‖ ones, characterised by economic growth, expanding 
infrastructure, and relative stability in the political and social life of the country. However, 
it was not long before the façade of peace and prosperity began to unravel. In 1966, then 
President Milton Obote suspended the Independence Constitution by force, and imposed 
an un-debated and un-agreed upon ―pigeon-hole‖ constitution on the country in 1967.20 In 
1971, rising tensions amongst the ruling elite and army leaders culminated in the 
overthrow of Obote by the notorious dictator Idi Amin, who ruled the country in a reign of 
terror until 1979 when he was ousted by a combined force of Ugandan liberators and the 
Tanzania Peoples‘ Defence Forces. His regime resulted in the near total collapse of the 
Ugandan State and economy. In 1980, the country held its first elections in 18 years of 
independence, which were won by Obote‘s Uganda People‘ Congress (UPC) Party.  The 
result was bitterly contested by the Democratic Party (DP), who were widely believed to 
have been the true winners. In protest at UPC‘s rigging of the election, Yoweri Museveni, 
a member of the Uganda Patriotic Movement, formed the National Resistance 
Army/Movement, (NRA/M) and launched a guerrilla ―bush‖ war. 21 
 
                                                 
20
 The ―Pigeon-hole‖ Constitution was named thus because MPs found it in their pigeon-holes one morning and were 
immediately asked to promulgate it without any debate. See Kituo Cha Katiba (East African Centre for Constitutional 
Development), Uganda: Key Historical and Constitutional Developments, at 
http://kituochakatiba.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=80, last accessed 17 February 2011. 
21
 Mutibwa, P. (1992), Uganda since indpendence: A story of unfulfilled hopes. London, Hurst & Co.  
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Due to the fact that the ruling UPC government was preoccupied by crushing the new 
rebel movement, the next 5-6 years in Uganda‘s history were characterised by a further 
breakdown of infrastructure, economic collapse, terror and insecurity. In 1985, Obote was 
once again overthrown by one of his army generals, Bazillio Okello, during a time when 
the government had entered into ―peace talks‖ with the NRA rebels. The peace talks never 
amounted to much and in January 1986, Museveni‘s NRA marched into the capital, 
Kampala, and took over the government.
22
 
 
The NRA and its political wing, the NRM proclaimed themselves the liberators of Uganda 
and were indeed hailed as such by a war-weary and impoverished population. In Yoweri 
Museveni‘s now famous swearing in speech, on 29 January 1986 he declared a new era of 
Ugandan politics, promising a ―fundamental change and not just a mere change of 
guards.‖ His message of hope reverberated throughout the population, who rallied behind 
his reform effort.
23
 
 
Museveni was known to espouse Marxist ideology and had originally envisaged a 
Ugandan Utopia to be built upon the foundation of the NRM‘s take-over manifesto known 
as the Ten Point Programme. The ten point programme envisioned a developmental state 
playing a key role in the political, social and economic life of the country. However, the 
urgent need for donor funding to rebuild the collapsed infrastructure meant that such 
                                                 
22
Ibid.  
23
 Museveni, Y. K. (1997). Sowing the Mustard Seed. London, Macmillan.  
  
10 
 
ideals had to be abandoned in favour of neo-liberal capitalist economic reforms and the 
accompanying good governance agenda propounded by the donors.
24
 
 
Thus began the economic and administrative re-organisation of Uganda; including 
currency reform, banking reform, privatisation of state enterprises, civil service reform, 
judicial reform and constitutional reform. Uganda performed so well in this regard that it 
became a ―star pupil‖ of the World Bank and other donors. There was however, a fly in 
the ointment as the reforms were being implemented, particularly those relating to 
privatisation, when it emerged that the process was tainted by corruption. In particular, the 
involvement of the President‘s brother Caleb Akandwanaho aka Salim Saleh, as a 
potential buyer in the controversial privatisation of Uganda Commercial Bank and Uganda 
Grain Millers, were the first signs that the ―fundamental change‖ was perhaps after all, 
only ―business as usual.‖25 An investigation by a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into 
the privatisation process was critical of the government and even though it recommended 
that action be taken against Salim Saleh and others who had been implicated, nothing was 
done. More importantly, Uganda‘s donors, who at the time were funding over 50% of the 
national budget, remained silent about the evident corruption in the privatisation process.
26
 
In this way, matters were swept under the carpet. 
 
                                                 
24
 For more on this, see Mugenyi, J. (1991) IMF Conditionality & Structural Adjustment Under the National 
Resistance Movement‖ in M. Twaddle & J. Jansen, Changing Uganda, Kampala, Fountain Publishers, pp. 61-77 
25
 Tangri, R. and A. Mwenda (2001). ―Corruption and cronyism in Uganda‘s privatisation in the 1990s.‖ African 
Affairs 100(398):117 
26
 Ibid. See also, Tangri R., and A. Mwenda (2006) ―Politics, donors and the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption 
institutions in Uganda.‖ Journal of Modern African Studies 44(1): 101-124 
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At the height of the privatisation corruption scandals in 1999, it was the Police Force, 
rather than the Privatisation Unit, that became the subject of a commission of inquiry.
27
 
The Police had been seriously condemned by a previous 1986 inquiry into human rights 
violations for their role in torturing and terrorising civilians during the early eighties. 
However, the immediate basis for the inquiry was the botching of an investigation into the 
murder of popular businessman and rally driver, Gerald Kiddu. The Police inquiry was not 
the first one to be appointed by the NRM, but it was significant due to reasons that will be 
elaborated in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
1.3 Research Domain 
From 1986 when it took power until the present, the NRM government has appointed over 
40 commissions of inquiry to investigate various matters. Of these, 15 were appointed to 
investigate corruption.
28
 Of those that were appointed to investigate corruption in public 
authorities, the Police Force, the Ministry of Defence purchase of military helicopters,  the 
Uganda Revenue Authority and the Ministry of Health mismanagement of the Global 
Fund were concerned with corruption in public bodies. The inquiry into the Ministry of 
Education Mismanagement of Universal Primary and Secondary Education Funds has just 
begun at the time of concluding this study.  
 
                                                 
27
 Whether or not the appointment of the inquiry was intended as a diversionary tactic can only be a matter of 
speculation. The possible reasons for the inquiry are discussed in Chapter 5. 
28
 See Appendix for a list of inquiries in Uganda 1962 to present-day. 
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Commissions of inquiry have attracted widespread public attention and debate in the 
media and other public fora, and have become a significant component of corruption 
discourse in Uganda. The process of inquiry, and in particular, the Commissioners‘ cross 
examination of public officials, has captivated the public due to the sensational revelations 
of corruption in government and the public interrogation and shaming of government 
officials, a hitherto uncommon event in Uganda. Inquiries have become a key feature of 
corruption-related debate and discussion, and even popular culture. Because of the furore 
they generate, commissions of inquiry have been momentous events in Uganda and a 
study of the role they have played thus far is called for.   
 
The hypothesis that is investigated in this study is based on previous scholars‘ analyses, 
many of which have denigrated inquiries as symbolic apparatuses appointed by 
governments to ‗white-wash‘ their image, to forestall criticism, ‗reassure the public that 
something is being done,‘ buy time and breathing space following a scandal;‘ or to find 
scape-goats and apportion  blame.
29
  However, more nuanced analyses such as Gilligan 
and Pratt, as well as Ashforth‘s; view them as instruments for the reproduction and 
legitimation of the state‘s power in the aftermath of a crisis achieved by investigation, 
documentation and archiving. In particular, Ashforth calls for a reading of inquiries that 
                                                 
29
 Prasser, S. (1982). "Public inquiries: Their use and abuse," Current Affairs Bulletin 68(9): 4–12; Sedley, S. (1989), 
"Public Inquiries: A Cure or a Disease," Mod. L. Rev. 52: 469; Hart, J. (1995), "Presidential Lightning Rods: The 
Politics of Blame Avoidance." American Political Science Review 89(4): 1021-1022; Drewry, G. (1996), "'Judicial 
Inquiries and Public Reassurance'." Public Law: 368–83. Wells, C. (1999), "Inquiring into Disasters: Law, Politics 
and Blame." Risk Management 1: 7-20 Elliot, M. (2002). "Public Inquiry: Panacea or Placebo?" Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management 10(1): 14-25.  
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stresses the symbolic and ritual aspects of their work.
30
 Sulitzeanu-Keanu says 
legitimation is achieved through a ―providing confirmation‖ role, when the public 
―agrees‖ to demote the importance of the scandal on the public agenda through the 
government‘s willingness to undergo a negative authoritative evaluation.31  
 
However, many of these analyses of inquiries are located in ―developed countries,‖ with 
so-called ―modern‖ democracies. It is therefore justifiable to test the legitimation 
hypothesis in a ―developing‖ setting such as Uganda, where democratic governance is so 
fraught with problems that it has been described as a ―neo-patrimonial‖ and ―semi-
authoritarian.‖32  Given the significant political, social and economic differences between 
the UK and Australia whence the legitimation hypothesis has emerged and Uganda, it is 
highly likely that testing the hypothesis will offer only part of the picture. Hence it is also 
necessary to formulate research questions that will aid a broader and deeper exploration of 
the topic at hand.  
a) What role has the global anti-corruption framework, and in particular, the good 
governance agenda, played in anti-corruption and the appointment, process and 
outcome of Ugandan commissions of inquiry into corruption? 
                                                 
30
 Gilligan, G. P. and J. Pratt, Eds. (2004). Crime, Truth and Justice : Official Inquiry, Discourse, Knowledge. Devon, 
Willan Publishing.  
31
Sulitzeanu-Kenan, R. (2006). "If They Get it Right:An Experimental Test of the Effects of the Appointment of UK 
Public Inquiries." Public Administration 84(3): 623-653; Sulitzeanu-Kenan, R. (2006). Blame avoidance and the 
politics of public inquiries in the UK, 1984-2003. PhD Thesis, Division of Social Sciences, Wolfson College, 
University of Oxford.  
32
 Tripp, A. M. (2010). Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime. Boulder, Co, Lynne Reinner 
Publishers. 
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b) How has the local political context in Uganda, described as ―neo-patrimonial,‖ 
affected anti-corruption in general and in particular the appointment, process 
and outcome of commissions of inquiry in Uganda? 
c) ―Why Commissions of Inquiry,‖ that is to say; what is it about the institution of 
commissions of inquiry that make governments resort to them during times of 
crises in governance?  
d) Given the complex dynamics of global and local governance; what role have 
commissions of inquiry played in anti-corruption and governance in Uganda?  
 
1.4 Justification for the research study 
Over the past two decades, there has been an outpouring of research on corruption, its 
causes, manifestations and impact. There is consensus that corruption has a negative 
impact on governance and democracy, economic and human development.
33
 It delays and 
distorts economic growth, rewards inefficiency, short-circuits competition, and takes 
resources way from the poor to the rich, exacerbating inequalities. It slows down 
investment,
34
 fuels inflation,
35
 fosters income inequality, 
36
 lowers the quality of public 
infra-structure,
37
 and generally distorts the rule of law and democracy.
38
  
                                                 
33
 Boswell, N.Z. and S. Rose-Ackerman (1996) ―Corruption and Democracy,‖ Proceedings of the Annual Meeting 
(American Society of International Law) 90: 83-90 
34
 Campos, J.E., D. Lien , et al (1999) ―The impact of corruption on investment: predictability matters,‖ World 
Development 27(6): 1059-1067 
35
 Al-Marhubi, F.A., (2000), ―Corruption and inflation,‖ Economics Letters 66(2): 199-202. 
36
 Gupta, S., H. Davoodi, et al (2002), ―Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty?‖ Economics of 
Governance 3: 23-45 
37
 Gupta S., H. Davoodi, et al (2001), ―Corruption and the provision of health care and education services,‖ in: Jain, 
A.K. (2001) The Political Economy of Corruption, Routledge, London. 
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Furthermore, corruption is morally disapproved in most societies. Green emphasises that 
its moral wrongfulness lies in the fact it violates everyday norms against cheating, 
stealing, deception and disloyalty. Corruption is reprehensible because it involves public 
officials abusing their positions of public trust by acting in their own interests. Those who 
voluntarily assume public office, and then set aside public trust for private advantage, 
engage in morally reprehensible conduct striking at the roots of fairness and democracy.
39
  
 
Moreover, corruption has been described as a special sub-category of white collar criminal 
behaviour that involves the unlawful or criminal misuse of power.  This use of power as 
an instrument of crime is cause for concern and should attract powerful stigma. When 
power itself becomes the instrument of criminality, it should warrant much more 
disapprobation.
40
 Indeed, Green and Ward opine that corruption is state crime that 
victimises people indirectly and without their knowledge. It is a ―victimless crime‖ 
because of the fact that there is usually no complainant to push forward a criminal case.  
Their analysis resonates with Bayart‘s, who opines that the state in some African countries 
                                                                                                                                                               
38
 Azfar,O., Y. Lee, et al (2001), ―The causes and cpnsequences of corruption,‖ The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 573(1): 42-56. See also: Anderson C.J. and Y. Tverdova (2003) ―Corruption, political 
allegiances and attitudes towards government in contemporary democracies,‖ American Journal of Political Sciences 
47 (1): 91-109. 
39
 Green, S. (2007), Lying, Cheating and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White Collar Crime, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. See also Lowenstein, D. (1985) ―Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics‖ UCLA Law 
Review 32: 784:807 
40
 Zimring, F.E. and D.T. Johnson (2005) ―On the comparative study of corruption,‖ British Journal of Criminology 
45(6):793-809. 
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has become criminalised to such an extent that it is actively involved in promoting and 
perpetuating criminal activity.
41
 
 
Corruption is a violation of human rights. Kofele-Kale advocates for a right to a 
corruption free society as an individual and collective right.
42
 Similarly, Kumar talks about 
the fundamental right to corruption-free service.
43
 These perspectives that link corruption 
and human rights emphasise the manner in which institutionalised corruption dilutes 
human rights, creates mass victimisation and threatens the rule of law. Moreover, some 
scholars such as Meron and Donnelly argue that human rights has now acquired the status 
of jus cogens or international customary law, which, unlike treaty law, is universally 
binding upon all states.
44
 Bantekas takes it even further by arguing for the re-
conceptualisation of corruption as a Crime against Humanity, in view of its devastating 
effects on the poorest sections of society. He maintains that corrupt acts by Trans-National 
Corporations (TNCs) and governments are covered by the ICC Statute, Article 30(2) (b) 
which provides that criminal intent exists ―in relation to a consequence, [where] that 
person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary 
course of events.‖  He avers that such ―‗doles eventualis‘ suffices to hold the members of 
government responsible for crimes against humanity perpetrated against their own people 
                                                 
41
 Green, P. and T. Ward (2004) State Crime: Governments, Violence and Corruption. London, Pluto Press. See also 
Bayart, J.F., S. Ellis et al (1999) The Criminalisation of the State in Africa, Oxford: James Currey. 
42
 Kofele-Kale, N. (2000) ―The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an Individual and Collective Human Right: 
Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime under International Law,‖ International Lawyer 34(1):149-178 
43
 Kumar, C.R. (2003) ―Corruption and human rights: promoting transparency in governance and the fundamental 
right to a corruption-free service in India,‖ Columbia Journal of Asian Law 17: 31-72 
44
 Meron T. (1989) Human Rights and Humanitarian Law as Customary Law, Clarendon Press: Oxford; and 
Donnelly, J. (2007) ―The relative universality of human rights,‖ Human Rights Quarterly 29(2): 281 
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in peacetime by placing them in conditions of life, which in the ordinary course of events 
would deprive them of access to sufficient food and medical care.‖ Accordingly, 
embezzlement and procurement fraud should be seen as crimes against humanity due to 
their devastating effects on human rights.
45
 
 
Thus, due to the negative impact of corruption upon society, it is important to conduct 
research that will enable further understanding of the phenomenon and the formulation of 
solutions. Concomitantly, a study on corruption-related inquiries is justified because most 
analyses of anti-corruption efforts have focused on evaluating permanent Anti-Corruption 
Commissions in various countries, to the exclusion of temporary ad hoc inquiries.
46
 An in-
depth, analytical study on judicial inquiries into corruption in Uganda is therefore called 
for, not only because of the current importance of corruption on the agenda of both global 
and local governance, but also due to the importance of the institution of the commission 
of inquiry in governance. 
 
                                                 
45
 Bantekas, I. (2006) ―Corruption as an international crime and crime against humanity: an outline of supplementary 
criminal justice policies.‖ Journal of International Criminal Justice 4(3): 466-484 
46
  See Doig, A. (1995). "Good government and sustainable anti-corruption strategies: a role for independent anti-
corruption agencies?" Public Administration and Development 15(2): 151-166; Fombad, C. M. (1999), "Curbing 
corruption in Africa: some lessons from Botswana's experience." International Social Science Journal 51(2): 241; 
Heeks, R. (2007) "Why Anti-Corruption Initiatives Fail: Technology Transfer And Contextual Collision," In 
Corruption and Development: The Anti-Corruption Campaigns, ed. S Bracking, 258-272, Palgrave Macmillan; Doig, 
A., D. Watt, et al. (2006). "Hands-on or hands-off? Anti-corruption agencies in action, donor expectations, and a 
good enough reality," Public Administration and Development 26(2): 163-172; Doig, A., D. Watt, et al. (2007). "Why 
do developing country anti-corruption commissions fail to deal with corruption? Understanding the three dilemmas of 
organisational development, performance expectation, and donor and government cycles," Public Administration and 
Development 27(3): 251-259. 
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1.5 Scope and objectives the study 
The focus of the study is the role of commissions of inquiry appointed on an ad hoc basis 
to investigate corruption in the Ugandan public sector between 1999 to present. Inquiries 
before that date have been omitted because of the centrality of the concept of good 
governance to this analysis, a concept whose prominence began in the late nineties.
47
 
Inquiries that were appointed to investigate matters that were not specifically corruption 
scandals have also been omitted, as have those into private sector or para-statal entities 
such as the inquiry into the closure of commercial banks. These are regarded as outside the 
remit of the research because current definitions of corruption focus on the public sector; 
that is, the executive branch of government and its various arms and departments.
48
 I have 
also omitted the inquiry into the Uganda Peoples‘ Defence Forces (UPDF) illegal 
exploitation of the Democratic Republic of Congo, because it is a matter that falls within 
international law and /or martial law which are outside the domain of this study. 
 
The thesis hopes to contribute to theory and knowledge on anti-corruption, governance 
and commissions of inquiry.  The study seeks to evaluate inquiries, not merely as 
successes or failures, but to understand the wider political and socio-economic context 
within which they operate and which they impact.  
 
                                                 
47
 See Tan, C. (2011) Governance Through Development: Poverty Reduction Strategies, International Law and the 
Disciplining of Third World States, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 2-3 
48
 See part 1.7 below where the choice of case studies is explained, and Part 1.9 below on definitions and key 
concepts used in this study. 
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1.6 Research Design and Methods 
A qualitative approach was chosen to enable an in-depth analysis of the various issues 
involved in this study.  Multiple methods including interviewing, focus group discussions 
and document analysis were employed. The data collected consisted of official documents, 
scholarly works, records of interviews and discussions, newspaper articles and reports, 
audio material from radio programmes, as well as blogs and internet discussion forums. 
This variety of methods and sources was geared towards enabling the researcher to have 
an in-depth and broad understanding of judicial commissions of inquiry and the global and 
national context within which they operate.  
  
1.6.1 Case Study Approach 
This study is essentially an historical one. Four inquiries were chosen as case studies. As 
mentioned already, these were selected primarily because they were into public agencies 
and therefore within the popular definition of corruption as ―abuse of public power for 
private gain.‖49 The case studies are: 
i. The Commission of Inquiry into the Uganda Police Force (1999; hereafter ―Police 
Inquiry‖).   
ii. The Commission of Inquiry into the purchase of military helicopters by the Uganda 
Ministry of Defence (2000; hereafter ―Junk Helicopter Inquiry‖); 
iii. The Commissions of Inquiry into Allegations of Corruption in Uganda Revenue 
Authority, (2002, hereafter URA inquiry)  
                                                 
49
 The definition of corruption is discussed below, 1.7.2.  
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iv. The Commission of Inquiry into the Mismanagement of the Global Fund on 
HIV/AIDS and Malaria (2005; hereafter Global Fund Inquiry). 
 
1.6.2 Research Procedures 
Interviewing 
Twelve key informants were purposefully selected for semi-structured in-depth interviews. 
Five of the interviewees were former Chairs of commissions of inquiry, commissioners, or 
Lead Counsel.  Also interviewed was the Senior State Attorney in the Solicitor General‘s 
Chambers who is responsible for drafting terms of reference for judicial inquiries and 
coordinating the production of white papers based on inquiry reports, and another Senior 
State Attorney from the Directorate of Public Prosecutions who has been involved in 
prosecuting people that have been implicated in the findings of inquiries. Interviewees 
also included an official of the Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda, an umbrella NGO 
that acts as Ugandan Civil Society‘s focal point for anti-corruption activism; the World 
Bank Public Sector Specialist as well as the Chief of USAID Uganda Anti-Corruption 
Threshold Project. The Legal Officer of the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity, the overall 
coordinating agency for the Uganda government‘s anti-corruption policies and 
programmes was also a key informant; as was a former Minister who had been a witness 
to one of the inquiries. 
 
The number of interviews was influenced by three factors; firstly, the difficulty of 
contacting key informants such as former commissioners and staff who had worked on no-
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longer existent inquiries; secondly, the nature of the topic created reluctance amongst 
some participants, such as the aforementioned official(s) from the Ministry of Defence 
who advised not digging up the ghosts of the junk helicopters inquiry; and lastly, the 
limited time available for the study. Hence, it was decided to utilise focus group 
discussions and documentary analysis as means of triangulation.  
 
Focus Group Discussions 
Two focus group discussions were conducted. They provided a quick way to obtain as 
much information as possible within the time that was available for the field study.  
 
The first group was randomly constituted of non-elite, ―urban poor‖ people. In Kampala, 
the capital city of Uganda; there are geographical spaces known as ―stages,‖ which are 
designated stops on Matatu (mini-bus) routes. During the day there are always people to 
be found at stages, including ―touts‖ (usually male) who alert the public to the destination 
of a particular Matatu and encourage people to get on to it; women selling candy and 
sweets, cigarettes, newspapers and roasted peanuts; as well as ―boda-boda‖ drivers (also 
male). Boda-bodas are motor-cycles that are used as public transport. The group consisted 
of some boda-boda drivers, touts and women ―sweetie‖ vendors.  
 
The second focus group was chosen for convenience because it constituted a ready-made 
focus group of Ugandans working in both private and public sector organisations and who 
consider themselves separate and outside the ruling elite. This is a group that meets 
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weekly for social and religious purposes and is known as a ―cell.‖50  Members of the cell 
group were aged 26-35 years and belonged to various professions including law, banking, 
academia, agriculture, engineering and medicine. Some of them were public servants 
while others were employed in the private sector. This group was chosen because it is 
representative of Ugandans that have a ―voice,‖ that read newspapers and watch or listen 
to news telecasts that are vocal critiques of the government in newspaper letters to the 
editor, comments on on-line articles and personal internet blogs.  It represents  the class 
with the knowledge, means and ability to demand for more accountable and democratic 
government in Uganda. 
 
It is a limitation of this study that none of the respondents were rural people, who 
constitute 80% of the population of Uganda. The distinction between urban and rural 
populations has implications for the way in which political power is exercised in African 
countries such as Uganda, as suggested by Mamdani and Ekeh.
51
 Mamdani views the post-
colonial State as ―bifurcated,‖ with a despotic face for its rural population and a more 
democratic one for its urban population, a phenomenon he blames on indirect rule‘s 
tendency to generate what he calls ―decentralised despotism.‖ Ekeh sees Africa as having 
―two publics,‖ one that is rural, ethnic-based and moral, and an amoral Urban one where 
public and civil service is undertaken.  
                                                 
50
 Cells are a significant social phenomenon in Kampala, and are a feature of the growth of Pentecostal Christianity, 
an increasingly potent force for radical transformation in Africa that unfortunately, has attracted minimum scholarly 
attention. 
51
 Mamdani, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.  See also Ekeh, P. (1975) ―Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical 
Statement,‖ Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17(1): 91-112. 
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However, the exclusion of the rural people in this study was not only due to the time 
available, but also due to the fact that commissions of inquiry were chiefly urban 
phenomena that took place in the capital city, Kampala.
52
 Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that even though the research was only limited to Kampala, the capital city, the findings 
have national significance because , as Hanna and Hanna observe ―urban areas are of 
enormous political, social, economic and cultural importance to the countries in which 
they are located… and African towns contain the fuels of socio-economic change.‖ 
African towns are… ―The centres of polity, society, economy and culture and the hubs of 
communication and transportation networks… the centres in which a major restructuring 
of African society as a whole is taking place.‖53  
 
Documentary Analysis 
Because the study was historical in nature and the corresponding difficulty of obtaining 
primary sources of information, documents were a staple source of material for the study. 
In addition to the reports of inquiries where available, mass communication media such as 
newspapers, magazines, internet blogs and discussion sites were used. Documents were 
particularly useful because of the politically sensitive nature of the topic as well as the fact 
that inquiries were ad hoc and no longer existent at the time of the study. In particular, the 
                                                 
52
 Even the Police Inquiry which attempted to be more national by conducting some of its hearings outside Kampala, 
was limited to the urban areas. 
53
 Hanna, W. and J. Hanna (2009), Urban dynamics in Black Africa: an interdisciplinary approach, Aldine De 
Gruyter, pp. 2-3. 
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impossibility of obtaining the Junk Helicopter Inquiry Report which was never published 
by the government necessitated newspapers as the only way of piecing the story of that 
inquiry together. In addition, newspaper reports on inquiry proceedings can provide 
descriptions of mood, atmosphere and dialogue that may not have been included in the 
judicial inquiry report. Newspapers also provide insights into other co-existing phenomena 
that have proved useful in placing inquiries within the larger political, economic and social 
context. 
 
Internet blogs, discussions and comments made below on-line newspaper articles were 
crucial in obtaining peoples‘ views about the topic of corruption and inquiries. They 
provided a readily available source of views and opinion that are in the public domain and 
that could therefore be accessed without the need for obtaining consent and the effort of 
setting up appointments and actually conducting an interview especially in view of 
participants‘ reluctance to be interviewed face-to-face and the time limitations for the 
study.  
 
Audio-visual material 
Recordings of radio talk shows and discussions proved crucial to obtaining views on 
corruption, inquiries and the political context that prevailed during their tenure. Because of 
the time lapse between the inquiries and the timing of this study, radio recordings 
provided a fast and efficient way of generating data for the study. 
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Ethical Considerations 
Corruption is a politically volatile and sensitive topic. Accordingly, respondents were duly 
informed of the nature and purpose of the study, in writing where possible and orally at 
the beginning and end of interviews and focus group discussions. Participants‘ consent to 
participate in the study was obtained orally. Where there was reluctance to participate in 
the study, for example, regarding the Junk Choppers inquiry, other sources such as 
newspapers were used.
54
 Respondents‘ anonymity has been preserved by referring to them 
as ―officials,‖ or by aliases or first names only.55  The researcher has made an effort to 
limit the influence of personal bias on the research findings by declaring her interest and 
involvement in the subject of research.
56
  
 
Problems encountered during the research study 
 
One of the most significant challenges was researching institutions that no longer existed, 
which implied a lack of primary resources and institutional memory.  This was further 
hampered by a poor record-keeping culture in Uganda, evidenced by the fact that some of 
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the inquiry reports, including those in the public domain such as the Global Fund Report, 
could not be readily obtained in the Ministry of Justice and had to be obtained through 
personal contacts. I encountered reluctance and cynicism from respondents, particularly 
with regard to the Junk Chopper Inquiry whose report was never published and a copy of 
which I was unable to obtain.
57
  
 
1.7 Definitions and key concepts of the study 
1.7.1 Commissions of Inquiry 
A commission of inquiry as conceptualised in this study is an ad hoc, temporary body 
established by the president or a minister by statutory instrument, to inquire into any 
matter of public concern under the Commissions of  Inquiry Act of Uganda, section 2 of 
which provides thus: 
It shall be lawful for the President to issue a Commission appointing one or more 
commissioners and authorising such commissioners, or any quorum of them therein 
mentioned, to inquire into the conduct of any officer in the public service of 
Uganda, the conduct of any chief, the conduct or management of any department of 
the public service or of any public or local institution, or into any matter in which 
an inquiry would be for the public welfare.
58
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The Act does not specify that a judge should chair the commission, although it has been 
the usual practice since independence to appoint judges as chairs in most cases.
59
 Inquiries 
are allowed to determine their own procedure and usually adopt an inquisitorial approach 
to fact-finding, inviting the public to come forward with information and submit 
memoranda.
60
 They have the powers of the High Court to compel the attendance of 
witnesses and the production of documents. At the end of the inquiry they are required to 
make a report with recommendations and submit it to the President.
61 
They usually take 
place in a blaze of publicity: keenly watched and followed by the public.  
 
1.7.2  Corruption  
Most scholars, international organisations and agencies involved in the fight against 
corruption have adopted Nye‘s definition:  
Corruption is behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role 
because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or 
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-
regarding influence. This includes such behaviour as bribery (use of a reward to 
pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of 
patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and 
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misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding 
uses).
62
 
 
However, the limitations of this definition have been acknowledged. These include: the 
pre-eminence given to public sector corruption as opposed to private sector corruption, 
ignoring the linkages that may exist between the two; the difficulty of distinguishing 
between private and public interests in some contexts; and the failure to denote whether all 
such behaviour is legal or illegal.
63
  
 
Thus, attempts have been made to improve the definition. For example, Transparency 
International defines corruption as behaviour on the part of officials in the public sector, 
whether politicians or civil servants, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich 
themselves, or those close to them, by the misuse of the public power entrusted to them. 
This would include embezzlement of funds, theft of corporate or public property as well as 
corrupt practices such as bribery, extortion or influence peddling.
64
  
 
The United Nations Manual on Anti-Corruption Policy defines it ―as an abuse of (public) 
power for private gain that hampers the public interest… it entails a confusion of the 
private with the public sphere or an illicit exchange between the two spheres. In essence, 
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corrupt practices involve public officials acting in the best interest of private concerns 
(their own or those of others) regardless of, or against, the public interest.‖ 65 
 
It is because the definition focuses on ―public‖ officials and agencies that I decided not to 
include two inquiries that took place during the chosen time frame (1999-2007); the 
commission of inquiry into the Uganda Military‘s involvement in the illegal exploitation 
of the Congo, and the inquiry into the closure of commercial banks, which were private 
entities (even though the government had shares in some of them). 
 
1.8 Analytical framework 
 
Joseph writes about the difficulties of theorising African politics: 
The student of democratization in Africa after 1989 does not have a ready-made 
explanatory framework or set of defining conditions that can simply be tested in the 
African context. Developments in Africa oblige us to approach seemingly settled 
issues anew and to adopt a critical approach regarding such fundamentals as the 
meaning of democracy and democratization. Students of African transitions must 
also become more actively engaged in formulating theory, heretofore dominated by 
students of other areas of the world. To be avoided is the passive application to 
Africa of externally devised frameworks, as well as the analysis of African politics 
solely within Africa-derived paradigms.
66
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The task of formulating a theoretical framework for analysing the role of commissions of 
inquiry in Uganda is therefore a difficult one. Nevertheless, this thesis attempts to 
―connect qualitative research to the hopes, needs, goals and promises of a free democratic 
society,‖ as Denzine and Linclon have emphasised.67 This is no simple task, given that 
much of the existing research on Africa can be regarded as coming from the standpoint of 
―afro-pessimism.‖  Writing ―in defence of afro-pessimism,‖ at the end of the 1990s, Reiff 
said that ―aid has clearly had a far more minimal effect on Africa's development than 
either donor countries or recipients ever imagined,‖ and went on to describe a lot of what 
has gone wrong.
68
   And yet, writing at about the same time, Gordon and Wolpe called for 
a different perspective, emphasising that ―Africa is not, as it is so consistently depicted on 
our television screens, on the edge of an abyss of futility and despair but at the beginnings 
of a renewal that, in many countries, is yielding a new sense of hope and possibility.‖ 
They gave many examples, and said about Uganda, that  ―The years of Idi Amin's brutal 
tyranny are now but a fading memory in a politically robust and economically dynamic 
Uganda.‖ 69 
 
Optimism should not, however, give way to delusion, as emphasised by Callaghy, who 
says that  
A realistic, even if not always agreeable, assessment – one that takes into account 
the synergy between the vision (and the policies that flow from it) politics and 
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structure, one that avoids unproductive illusions but does so without 
underestimating or undervaluing the creativity of human agency –does better 
service to Africans as they confront their serious problems...
70
  
 
In line with the above, Santos‘ analysis of emancipation and emancipatory relationships 
provides a useful analytical framework for this research study. He talks about social 
processes where power constellations are both boundary setting and constraining as well 
as path-breaking and enabling. He maintains that all the dualisms contained in power 
relations, such as thinkable-unthinkable or allowed-forbidden, are both path-breaking and 
boundary setting, but can never operate in both modes simultaneously or with the same 
intensity. It is through the cumulative exercise of enabling/path-breaking mode power-
relations, that it is possible to alter the constraints and change distributions so as to achieve 
emancipation.
71
 The analysis herein therefore aims at highlighting the complex ways in 
which the various aspects of global and national governance, including commissions of 
inquiry, have been path-breaking despite being birthed in hegemonic settings. It will 
highlight the agency of the Ugandan people in their search for more democratic and 
accountable government. 
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1.9 Thesis Outline 
The introductory chapter gives a background to the research study by briefly describing 
the rise of anti-corruption and judicial inquiries in Uganda. It states the research problem, 
hypotheses, questions, justification for and the objectives of the study. The factors that 
influenced the choice of a qualitative research paradigm are explained, as are the research 
procedures such as interviews, focus groups and document analysis that were utilised to 
obtain data.   
 
Chapter Two looks at the global framework against corruption and its impact on anti-
corruption in Uganda. The World Bank, IMF and bilateral donors such as USAID and 
DFID have been the key proponents of the good governance discourse, which they have 
sought to enforce in countries such as Uganda through the mechanism of aid 
conditionality. It notes that enforcement of conditionality has been hampered by self-
interest on the part of donors. Furthermore, enactment of international treaties against 
corruption, the growth of international civil society and the international NGOs such as 
Transparency International has been significant in the proliferation of anti-corruption 
norms. The chapter examines how the dynamics of the global anti-corruption framework 
have influenced the phenomenon of commissions of inquiry into corruption in Uganda.  
 
Chapter Three looks at the manner in which the Uganda government has adopted and 
adapted to the good governance discourse, by agreeing to its formal requirements, and yet 
utilising various means to subvert it. Thus, Uganda is able to show that it is a good 
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governor by having a ―near perfect‖ array of anti-corruption laws, policies and institutions, 
that are nevertheless inadequately enforced. The chapter analyses the ―neo-patrimonial‖ 
patronage and clientelistic system that defines political organisation in Uganda as the 
cause of systemic corruption as well as the reason for anti-corruption failure. It is 
suggested that commissions of inquiry arise out of the contradictory aim of being a good 
governor whilst insulating key personalities in the patronage system from criminal 
prosecution in order to preserve the regime. 
 
Using examples from various countries, chapter four looks at the history, role, structure 
and functions of inquiries as ad hoc investigatory devices usually appointed in times of 
scandal and crisis. It aims to illustrate that their unique inherent features, such as quasi-
judicialness, public and media participation in an inquisitorial fact-finding process,  render 
them the ideal instrument of power that the Uganda government utilises to be a good 
governor whilst ensuring minimum disruption to the patronage system that ensure regime 
survival. It analyses the legitimation theory that has been proposed as explaining the role 
of inquiries in governance. Thus, inquiries help to reiterate the rational acceptability, 
competency and effectiveness of the state following a crisis. Some scholars have proposed 
that legitimation is achieved through the inquisitorial fact-finding process, which allows 
for public scrutiny of the crisis or scandal and hence facilitates the public to make or 
justify their own conclusions about who should be blamed for it.  
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Chapter Five looks at judicial commissions of inquiry into corruption in Uganda during 
the period 1999-2007. It is a descriptive analysis of the terms of reference, proceedings, 
key findings and outcome of four judicial inquiries into corruption in Uganda – the police, 
junk helicopters, Uganda Revenue Authority and Global Fund inquiries.  
 
Chapter six presents respondents‘ views on commissions of inquiry in Uganda, who 
almost unanimously agree that they are appointed as public relations stunts to show that 
something is being done about corruption whereas nothing is being done. The analysis of 
the responses emphasises that while this is partly true, it would be more correct to view 
them as being aimed at achieving a complex set of political aims related to the survival of 
the regime. Key among these is legitimating the government as a good governor by 
exhibiting democracy, public accountability, judicial independence and media freedom. I 
suggest that ultimately, commissions of inquiry are part of the complex process by which 
the good governance discourse, with its potential and limitations is internalised and 
reproduced in Uganda. 
 
The final chapter concludes by analysing the ―going out of style‖ of inquiries in Uganda, 
summarising the implications that inquiries have had for governance and democracy in 
Uganda. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Global Anti-corruption Framework: “Good Governance,” International 
Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) and International Law 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is aimed at locating commissions of inquiry into corruption within the global 
anti-corruption framework, signified mainly by the good governance discourse. Rita 
Abrahamsen emphasises that the transitions in governance that characterised the late 
1980s and early 1990s in Africa were profoundly influenced by Africa‘s interaction with 
and place in the international system. She points out that ―explaining the transitions with 
reference to domestic factors only is far too simplistic.‖ She notes that globalisation has 
worn down the integrity of the nation state as an autonomous, independent actor.  Central 
agencies of the State, including government ministries, central banks and executive offices 
are increasingly linked to each other and to international institutions such as the World 
Bank and the IMF. In this global order, States are obligated to adopt policies that reflect 
international and domestic imperatives. It is on this basis that the analysis of the global 
anti-corruption framework is considered to be a crucial starting point for the present 
study.
72
 
 
The chapter analyses the techniques that have been employed to promote anti-corruption 
in developing countries such as Uganda. The first part of the chapter looks at the role of 
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good governance discourse in promoting anti-corruption. The second part looks at global 
civil society, particularly Transparency International‘s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). 
The third part considers the role of the role of international and regional anti-corruption 
treaties and conventions. Part four analyses the role of Multi-national Enterprises (MNEs) 
in promoting anti-corruption.  The chapter concludes by noting that the IFIs and bilateral 
donors have promoted an anti-corruption discourse which is beset by contradictions and 
inconsistencies. These contradictions in the international framework are carried over to the 
national one, where they are internalised and reproduced in a similarly contradictory 
fashion, an issue that will be taken up in the next chapter.  
 
2.2 The “good governance” discourse and anti-corruption  
2.2.1 The genesis of the good-governance agenda 
Although corruption in public office has been a problem since the earliest instances of 
formal government, it is only during the latter part of the twentieth century that both 
national governments and the global community at large have taken a keen interest in it.  
As earlier mentioned, the global movement against corruption gathered momentum in the 
early 1990s and was fuelled by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the 
World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Governance issues had come 
to the fore in the WB‘s thinking by the end of the 1980s as a result of its repeated failure 
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to bring about tangible development in Africa.
73
 This failure of the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes of the 1980s was quickly attributed to the inefficiency and authoritarianism 
of the African State, rather than to the nature of structural adjustment itself.
74
  
 
Thus, the global conditions were ripe for the emergence of governance-related 
conditionality in IFI lending. Abrahamsen emphasises the need to view the emergence of 
good governance discourse as historically contingent upon the end of the cold war, 
coinciding with the failure of structural adjustment, now blamed on African governments 
rather than IFIs themselves. An opportunity was thus presented for good governance to 
emerge as the dominant hegemonic discourse, geared towards liberating the poor, whose 
poverty had now been recast as a result of ―bad governance‖ and not necessarily the poor 
design of structural adjustment.
75
   It is also important to note that the historical moment of 
the emergence of good governance coincided with rising pro-democracy demands for 
change in many African countries. Abrahamsen argues that these demands had always 
been present but not heard during the Cold War, and only became audible when the end of 
the cold war also signified the end of the West‘s geo-strategic support for many African 
dictators. These pro-democracy protests in many countries proved to be important in 
providing legitimacy for the introduction of the good governance agenda, as the agenda 
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now claimed itself as being representative of the wishes of the ordinary people of Africa, 
whom it sought to ―empower‖ as well as liberate.76  
 
Following in the footsteps of the IFIs, aid agencies including the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID) (now UK-AID), Danish International Development Assistance (DANIDA) and the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) quickly followed suit in making anti-
corruption a key issue in their relationship with recipient countries. It should be noted that 
at the local level, IFIs and bi-lateral donors usually act in concert, through ―sector wide 
approaches‖ (SWAPs), ―basket funding‖ and umbrella groupings that seek to harmonise 
the policies of various donors.
77
 . In Uganda, there is a Donor Democracy and Governance 
Group (DDGG) that brings together the Governments of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, as well as the 
European Commission, The World Bank and the United Nations Development 
Programme. Their stated objective is to ―deepen democracy and promote human rights 
and good governance.‖78 The subsequent analysis therefore does not venture into the 
nuances between various bilateral donor agencies or the difference between them and IFIs, 
but considers them as homogenous in their intentions and actions with regard to good 
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governance.  Indeed, their policies and actions are frequently referred to as the 
―Washington Consensus,‖79 ―neo-liberal consensus‖ and so on.  
 
2.2.2 The meaning of “good governance” 
The terminology of ―good governance‖ forms part of a wider development discourse 
espoused and propagated by the World Bank, IMF and other donors.
80
 By 1997, the World 
Bank and IMF had concretised what they meant by ―good governance‖ and this was 
reflected in that years‘ World Development Report titled “The State in a Changing 
World.” The report was ―devoted to the role and effectiveness of the state: what it should 
do, how it should do it, and how it can improve in a rapidly changing world.‖81 In it, the 
World Bank argued for a minimalist state that plays a facilitator role in encouraging and 
complementing the activities of private businesses and individuals. 
 
An analysis of the World Bank‘s ideas as presented in the afore-mentioned World 
Development Report reveals that ―good governance‖ is a two pronged concept based on 
the one hand, on better administration and management of public resources and on the 
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other hand, better politics of openness, accountability and participation.
82
  To adopt the 
World Bank‘s use of the term, good governance is the way power is exercised through a 
country‘s political, economic and social institutions in a manner that is participatory, 
transparent, accountable, effective and equitable.
83
 Good governance has been 
conceptualised by the WB to ―rest upon four pillars;‖ viz accountability, transparency, the 
rule of law and participation.
84
 Observance of human rights and promotion of multi-party 
democracy are also key features of the agenda.  Democratic reform was encouraged, if not 
overtly by IFIs, by the bi-lateral donors, because greater political competition is believed 
to lower levels of corruption.
85
 Thus many African countries such as Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi going to the polls for the first time in decades during the 
early to mid 1990s. It is important to note however, that Uganda was for many years, able 
to convince donors to continue with its own version of ―no-party‖ democracy known as 
the Movement system, on which I elaborate in chapter three. The elections held in 1995 
and 2001 were based on individual merit as opposed to multi-party. In the absence of 
multiparty politics, the Ugandan government was constantly required to prove its 
―democraticness.‖ This had implications for the strategy that was used to respond to 
corruption scandals, where commissions of inquiry proved to be crucial.   
 
                                                 
82
 Doornbos, M. (2001). ""Good Governance:" The Rise and Decline of a Policy Metaphor?" Journal of Development 
Studies 37(6): 93-108 
83
 Weiss, T. G. (2000). "Governance, good governance and global governance: conceptual and actual challenges." 
Third World Quarterly 21(5): 795-814. 
84
 Craig, D. and D. Potter (2007). Development Beyond Neoliberlaism? Governance, Poverty Reduction and the 
Political Economy, Routledge. See also Tamanaha, B. (2004) On the rule of law: history, politics, theory. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
85
 Shen, C. and J. B. Williamson (2005). "Corruption, Democracy, Economic Freedom, and State Strength: A Cross-
national Analysis." International Journal of Comparative Sociology 46(4): 327 
  
41 
 
2.2.3 Good governance and anti-corruption 
Anti-corruption has always been and remains one of the most prominent aspects of the 
good governance discourse, perhaps due to the synonymity between corruption and ―bad 
governance.‖ In addition, corruption is of special concern to donors when it involves theft 
and embezzlement of government funds, most of which come from donors. This was 
clearly brought out in a 2003 statement of Uganda‘s development partners (donors) on 
Governance and Anti-Corruption: 
The prevalence of corrupt practices – both administrative and grand – is of grave 
concern to your development partners. According to the Auditor General‘s annual 
reports to Parliament around Ush200 billion is not accounted for, lost, or misused 
each year. This represents 7.5% of the GOU budget, which is lost through poor 
financial management or corruption each year. It is becoming increasingly difficult 
for us, as donors, to explain this to our taxpayers at home who currently provide 
just under half of the Government of Uganda budget.
86
 
 
Donors‘ emphasis on anti-corruption is further reflected in the projects they initiated to 
tackle corruption. In Uganda, DANIDA established a Human Rights and Good 
Governance Office (HUGGO), with an anti-Corruption programme, whose main function 
is to liaise with Uganda government agencies specifically on the issue of corruption.
87
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USAID also established an Anti-Corruption Threshold Project, with the specific goal of 
strengthening the Uganda Government‘s anti-corruption capacity.88  
 
The importance of corruption in international development discourse has also been 
attributed to the vibrant anti-corruption campaign launched by Transparency International 
89
at the same time as the emergence of the discourse, that is, during the 1990s. Also, 
corruption is the key factor in risk analysis, lending decisions and portfolio supervision.
90
 
Emphasis on anti-corruption has also been linked to the fact that the mandates of the WB 
and IMF prevent them from advancing an overtly political agenda. Hence, good 
governance had to be couched in the administrative aspects of government – public sector 
reform, transparency and accountability.
91
  
 
2.2.4 Good governance, civil society participation, judicial independence and media 
freedom  
Aside from anti-corruption, other elements of the good governance discourse sought to 
institute grass roots monitoring of public services through increased civil society 
participation in governmental processes. This led to the unprecedented expansion of the 
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NGO sector in countries such as Uganda, with NGOs being established to take advantage 
of donor funding directly channelled to them to encourage their participation in 
governance. Judicial independence was emphasised as being indispensible to the rule of 
law and democracy. Donors also supported liberalisation and strengthening of the media 
and civil society as key components of efforts to improve accountability.
92
 This led to an 
explosion of mass media, characterised by the establishment of private newspaper 
publishers, FM radio stations and TV Stations. The impact of these factors on Ugandan 
society and their relevance to the construction of commissions of inquiry is important to 
this study, and will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters.  
 
2.2.3 Good-governance and political conditionality 
The technique by which the discourse of good governance was transplanted to developing 
countries such as Uganda was conditionality.  These are conditions on loans to ensure that 
developing country governments conduct their affairs in line with a set of principles 
defined under the good governance discourse. Conditionality in IFI terminology means ―a 
mutual arrangement, by which a government takes, or promises to take, certain policy 
actions, in support of which an international financial institution or other agency will 
provide specified amounts of financial assistance.‖93 ―It is a complex covenant written into 
a loan agreement… that can be thought of as a substitute for collateral.‖94 Donors provide 
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incentives for reforming the macro-economic policy environments of poor countries, 
through a carrot (more aid) and stick (reduced aid) – approach.  Thus, aid allocations are 
supposed to take into account the efforts made to improve governance, including anti-
corruption efforts.
95
  Aid is geared towards positively supporting democratisation, with 
concomitant restrictions in aid for human rights violations or reversals in the democratic 
process. In practice, aid is released in tranches, such that further disbursements can be 
withheld in the event of unsatisfactory performance by the recipient. Under other 
arrangements that do not involve tranching, unsatisfactory performance can be punished 
by declining new aid.
96
 Doornbos observes that good governance discourse was geared 
towards ―establishing new institutional patterns of global hegemony, by compelling state 
and policy structures in recipient countries to conform to norms set by global 
institutions.‖97 Tan refers to the phenomenon as a new type of  ―social contract‖ between 
third world countries and donors.
98
 
 
Conditionality is therefore the means that IFIs use to address the risk of non-compliance 
by borrowers arising from accident or opportunism, to ―plug leaks in the ship of the state.‖ 
Whereas financial markets can resort to mechanisms such as collateral and higher risk 
                                                 
95
 Santiso, C. (2001). "Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality." Georgetown 
Public Policy Review 7(1): 1-22 
96
 Killick, op. cit., at 133. 
97
 Doornbos, M. (2003), ― ―Good Governance‖: The metamorphosis of a policy metaphor,‖ Journal of International 
Affairs 57(1): 3-17, at p.6. 
98
 Tan., C. (2011) op. cit., pp. 3-5 
  
45 
 
premia, these alternatives are not available to IFIs because they serve a broader public 
purpose and cannot resort to such restrictions. 
99
  
 
In practice, conditionality is expressed in formal letters of intent or letters of development 
policy from the borrowing government to the IFI in question. The letters describe the 
economic background to the credit requested and its objectives.
100
 The content of letters of 
intent is the same as that of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs),
101
 which provide 
a common over-arching framework for development policy and planning in recipient 
countries. PRSPs are the basis for all foreign lending to developing countries. Security and 
good governance are some of the main pillars of the PRSP in recognition of the fact that 
―improvements in macroeconomic performance may not automatically translate into 
poverty reduction unless sufficient attention is given to the administrative machinery, 
fiscal transfer mechanisms, the institutional and legal framework and issues of 
transparency and accountability in the public sector.‖102  
 
PRSPs, though similar, are drafted at national level and must be nationally ―owned.‖ Yet, 
the insistence that PRSPs are government owned has been challenged.  Tan says that the 
concept of agency in PRSPs is only nominal at best, and is geared towards legitimising the 
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inequity of the donor-recipient relationship with its problematic colonial history.
103
 
Similarly, the Bretton Woods Project, a network of British NGOs that monitors the World 
Bank and IMF, insists that the process of PRSP making negates the idea of agency 
because the final document must be approved by the IFIs before lending is agreed.
104
 
Moreover, once the PRSP is in place, regular implementation progress reports must be 
submitted to the World Bank in order for further tranches of aid to be released.  
 
2.2.4 Anti-corruption in the PRSP: the significance of commissions of inquiry 
Anti-corruption has therefore been a key component of Uganda‘s PRSPs over the years. 
The Poverty Eradication Action Plans of the early 2000s identified reducing corruption as 
one of the components of the priority areas for action titled ―Making government 
structures affordable, transparent and efficient.‖ The other priorities for good governance 
were: ensuring respect for human rights; pursuing democratisation; and providing a good 
judicial system.
105
 Investigation and action against corruption was one of the ways in 
which corruption was sought to be reduced, and Commissions of Inquiry a key method of 
investigation, ―especially where the situation is not amenable to normal systems of 
auditing and investigation.‖106   
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In 2002, the Uganda government‘s PRSP progress report to the World Bank contained the 
self assessment that: 
...progress on the fight against corruption has been rather slow; there has been very 
slow progress in designated ―high profile‖ corruption cases; important legislation 
has not been passed and scandals around procurement and financial management 
continue to surface...
107
  
 
The government then went on to salvage itself, saying: 
Progress has however, been made in some core areas... the IGG Act is now passed; 
recommendations from the public inquiry into the Police are being taken forward.... 
New commissions of inquiry have probed the Ministry of Defence purchase of 
‗junk helicopters‘ and the exploitation of natural resources in the Congo.108  
 
The following year (2003), the government reiterated that it had made progress in anti-
corruption: 
The government has successfully undertaken efforts to address corruption, for 
example, Commissions of Inquiry such as the Sebutinde Commissions on army 
procurement and revenue collection have been instituted as explicit efforts to end 
corruption in government entities.
109
 
 
This shows clearly that public inquiries into corruption have been one of the ways through 
which the Uganda government has tried to show that it is complying with good 
governance conditionality. Concomitantly, the threat to enforce conditionality has 
frequently revolved around the failure by the government to implement the 
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recommendations of inquiries into corruption, particularly recommendations regarding 
prosecution of the culprits:  
On behalf of Uganda‘s development partners, let me first express our appreciation 
for the extent to which we and the Government of Uganda (GoU) clearly agree that 
the Poverty Eradication Action Plan cannot be implemented in a sustainable 
manner without addressing the issues concerning Good Governance and the fight 
against Corruption.... We would like to highlight ... action areas on which to focus 
our continued dialogue on the fight against corruption... 
The fourth key action area is the publication and follow -up to Government‘s 
commissions of inquiry and anti-corruption reports. Government has commendably 
vested a great deal in a series of Commissions of Inquiry that address very 
important issues of governance, corruption and public sector performance. 
Specifically, we are speaking of the Porter Commission into the plundering of 
resources in the DRC and the Sebutinde inquiry into malpractice at the URA. We 
welcome the Minister for Ethics and Integrity‘s recent pledge that action would be 
taken soon with regard to the Sebutinde junk helicopter report. Nevertheless, we 
would ask you to be diligent and expeditious in following through on the findings 
and recommendations of each of these three Commissions, making their reports 
available to the public and initiating administrative sanctions, dismissals and legal 
proceedings where appropriate. Select reports of commissions of inquiry should be 
published within six months of work completion in tandem with a GoU White 
Paper on proposed action.
110
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Similarly, a 2005 Joint Staff Assessment (JAF) Advisory Note by the IMF and IDA, in the 
section on good governance and security as pre-conditions for economic growth and 
poverty eradication noted: 
 The progress in implementing the recommendations of various Commissions of 
 Inquiry has been very slow and warrants specific actions.
111
 
 
It is however notable that donors have stopped short of actually threatening to enforce 
conditionality by reducing aid. They issue warnings and reprimands, but do not actually 
reduce aid. Nevertheless,  it is clear that commissions of inquiry have been central in good 
governance discourse in Uganda. It is interesting that the government justified reliance on 
them as being suitable ―where the situation is not amenable to normal systems of auditing 
and investigation.‖ This sounds lame because, as will be shown in the next chapter, 
Uganda has an extensive anti-corruption framework consisting of various permanent 
institutions with different procedures and methods available to them. Moreover, 
Commissions of Inquiry are often instituted based on the findings of  an investigation by 
another agency. Further still, inquiries  usually recommend yet more investigation by other 
agencies in their reports. Thus it would be fair to say that the reasons for the government‘s 
reliance on ad hoc inquiries as a way of complying with conditionality is much more 
complex than implied, and will be further explored in chapters 3-6.  
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At this juncture, it is important to evaluate the good governance discourse impact on 
reducing corruption in developing countries generally and Uganda in particular. 
 
2.2.4 Has anti-corruption has failed? Evaluating the impact of the Good Governance 
Discourse and Governance Related Conditionalities  
It is evident there has been no shortage of good intentions from both donors and recipients 
to tackle corruption. The paradox is that despite self-acknowledged failures in fighting 
corruption, Uganda remains a ―star child‖ of the World Bank. It is hailed for successfully 
internalising neo-liberal economic policies, with stable economic growth rates and other 
favourable macro-economic indicators. It has been praised as an ―African Success Story‖ 
and its President, Yoweri Museveni, as one of a ―new breed of African Leaders.‖112  
Uganda was the first country to qualify for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) Initiative,
113
 and its Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), the 
government‘s overarching development policy, pre-dated PRSPs and became the template 
for Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in other developing country states that 
were recipients of World Bank loans.
114
 Uganda‘s former Minister of Finance, Ezra 
Suruma, won the 2008 World Bank ―Africa Minister of Finance of the Year‖ award based 
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on Uganda‘s impressive economic performance, and current Minister Syda Bbumba won 
the same award as recently as 2010.
115
   
 
Uganda enjoys a special relationship with the IFIs, according to Harrison, who classifies 
Uganda as a ―governance,‖ ―post-conditionality‖ state. Governance states are those 
―which can be said to have internalised the impetus of governance‖, ―where the 
governance project has succeeded‖ and neo-liberalism is no longer based on external 
intervention but has been internalised.
116
 Indeed, the PRSP reports usually highlight the 
progress that has been made in tackling corruption, especially in the area of legal and 
institutional reform.
117
  This is further buttressed by Global Integrity‘s rankings, where 
Uganda scores highly for anti-corruption laws, policies and institutions.
118
   
 
And yet, problems persist, as revealed the same PRSP progress reports to the World Bank, 
where Uganda has admitted its poor performance in Transparency International‘s 
Corruption Perception index rankings.
119
 Various scholars have argued that anti-corruption 
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failure is attributable to questions over the effectiveness of aid in general, the legitimacy 
of conditionality, as well as a number of inter-related factors in the complex arena of 
international power relations between IFIs, donors and recipients. Furthermore, good 
governance has lately come full circle, that is, the failure of the good governance agenda 
to transform governance in Africa is now attributed to the nature of the state and politics in 
Africa, which is regarded as resistant to change. These issues are explored in greater detail 
below.  
 
The (in) effectiveness of aid 
One of the most virulent critics of aid so far, Dambisa Moyo, describes aid as ―dead‖ 
because despite two trillion dollars worth of aid, African problems have not been solved, 
but on the contrary, have been exacerbated by corrupt governments sustained on aid.
120
  
She added her voice to that of Collier, who had already pointed out the moral hazard 
inherent in aid, that is, the fact that the injection of aid alleviates the immediate fiscal 
crises of recipient governments, and hence reduces the urgency for change.
121
  
 
Aid can therefore delay reform or result in perfunctory reform. Moreover, the fact that 
there is no penalty for defaulting on promises for reform further reinforces the moral 
hazard, since donor agencies that should enforce conditionality have an interest in 
realising some form of success rather than admitting to failure. Therefore, conditionality 
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enforcement is relaxed or put off when the recipient government shows some signs of 
fulfilling a promise. When the aid is subsequently disbursed, the recipient government 
may renege on its earlier promises for reform. Moreover, delays in releasing tranche 
payments as a way of enforcing conditionality usually does not cost recipient governments 
much and they can even negotiate new credits.
122
  
 
In this manner, aid fuels rather than curbs, corruption. Cooksey points out that aid presents 
perverse incentives to recipient governments and is vulnerable to systematic misuse.
123
 
Aid not only presents perverse incentives, but increases corruption in other ways, for 
example; through creating opportunities for corruption in the privatisation process, 
distorting accountability such that governments are beholden to donors and not to their 
citizens, and directly providing funds for financing patronage and clientelism.
124
  
 
Shrewd recipient country governments evade conditionality by agreeing to take action so 
that aid can be disbursed, but then subsequently delay implementation or take only 
rhetorical or symbolic action.
125
 Symbolic action aptly describes the enactment and 
establishment of numerous laws, policies and institutions that subsequently are not 
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effectively enforced and utilised. This reduces anti-corruption efforts to a mere 
performance.  
 
Lack of ownership of the reform process 
Despite the rhetoric about local ownership of PRSPs, non-implementation of 
conditionality has also been blamed on weak recipient government ‗ownership‘ of the 
measures that conditionality seeks to bring about.  In other words, the fact that proposed 
policy changes are not initiated by recipient governments leads to lack-lustre 
implementation. Many times, IFI and donor objectives clash with those of recipient 
country governments. For example, whereas a significant number of conditions aim at 
downsizing the state, recipient governments may wish to maintain the status quo or even 
expand. A further concern is the extent to which civil society in recipient countries, as 
opposed to central government is associated with the reforms. When local ownership of 
policies is lacking, there is a breach between the interests of the donors who initiated the 
reforms and those who are supposed to be executing the reforms.  
 
Inherent in the problem of lack of ownership is the ―one-size-fits all‖ approach that 
characterises anti-corruption. The similarities in anti-corruption laws and institutions in 
many parts of the world, in disregard of local conditions and circumstances, is testament to 
this. Many countries‘ anti-corruption strategies are, on the recommendation of the IFIs, 
modelled on the experience of Hong Kong and Singapore, which have been lauded for 
their resounding success in fighting corruption. The approach involves the establishment 
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of a single, central anti-corruption agency with investigatory, prosecutorial, and 
educational mandates; as opposed to a multi-agency ad hoc response to corruption.  
 
It has been pointed out that what worked in Hong Kong and Singapore might not work in 
Africa, given the differences in the political contexts in which reforms are being 
implemented, and the differences in resources and capabilities from country to country. 
Indeed, for such agencies to be successful, certain minimum political, legal and socio-
economic conditions for governance are necessary. These conditions are lacking in many 
countries such as Uganda.
126
 Heeks proposes the term ‗contextual collision,‘ to describe 
this tendency, that is, the fact that anti-corruption measures are designed in one context 
with its own values, resources and skills for application in another context that may not 
necessarily have the same characteristics. He views anti-corruption measures as 
‗technology transfers‘ that may not be ‗fit-for-purpose‘ due to these differences in 
context.
127
 Similarly, Doig and Robert‘s study, in which Uganda was one of the case 
studies, found that ACCs in developing countries suffer from the same weaknesses as 
other public sector institutions in those countries – inadequate funding, inadequate staff 
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and other institutional weaknesses; which limit  their effectiveness in fighting corruption. 
The next chapter will look at this issue in greater detail. 
 
Lack of accountability and transparency in aid programmes 
A number of commentators have pointed out the ways in which aid distorts the virtue of 
accountability that it seeks to promote by encouraging accountability to aid donors as 
opposed to citizens. Governments in third world countries such as Uganda have mastered 
the art of dancing to the tune of the aid-donor pipers while ignoring and even suppressing 
the demands of their citizens. Thus, the top-down nature of aid-driven policy reform 
further marginalises the ordinary citizens who are supposed to be beneficiaries of aid.
128
 
Indeed, some scholars maintain that the WB‘s good governance agenda is incapable of 
bringing about the quality of government that it seeks to promote, chiefly because it 
avoids explicit references to politics and power relations in recipient countries, and yet 
these are crucial elements of accountable and transparent government.
129
  
 
Thus, it may be deduced that the World Bank‘s show-casing of Uganda as a success story, 
while turning a blind eye to negative tendencies in the politics of the country, has 
contributed to the prevailing contradictions in Uganda‘s governance: a plethora of anti-
corruption policies, laws and institutions that are unfortunately, weakly enforced because 
the citizenry really does not matter in the equation.  Due to the fact that the state relies 
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more on aid than taxes to finance itself the ―social contract‖ as envisaged by Rousseau is 
distorted and accountability measures tend to be symbolic rather than real.  
 
Questions regarding the legitimacy of conditionality 
Another ground on which conditionality is disapproved is that it interferes with the 
international law principle of state sovereignty enshrined in Article 2 of the United 
Nations Charter. Conditionality infringes the right of states to determine their domestic 
affairs by making direct prescriptions about how recipient governments should run their 
internal affairs.
130
 Thus conditionality and the aid project in general have been disparaged 
as part of a larger neo-colonial adventure;
131
 and as moral and cultural imperialism.
132
 
Despite the fact that GRCs are couched in rhetoric of ―partnerships‖ between donors and 
recipients, the obviously unequal and hierarchical nature of the relationship between 
donors and recipients reinforces the veracity of these claims. Abrahamsen says that ―good 
governance reproduces the hierarchies of conventional development discourse, whereby 
the third world is still to be reformed and delivered from its current underdeveloped stage 
by the first world.‖ Conditionality is therefore linked to larger discursive practices through 
which global power and domination are exercised.
133
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IFIs such as the WB and IMF downplay the coercive and involuntary nature of 
conditionality, insisting that it is consensually agreed upon after long consultations.
134
 The 
emphasis on ―partnership‖ and ―participation‖ in aid discourse is supposed to the show the 
voluntary nature of conditionality.
135
  This is even more so in ―post-conditionality,‖ 
―governance states‖ such as Uganda, where World Bank policies have been so internalised 
that Himbara and Sultan 1995 referred to Uganda as a ―Bantustan‖ or a puppet regime 
where donors pulled all the strings. This accusation was based on the fact that  ―foreign 
aid, in effect, became the cornerstone of the reconstruction process, while donor 
expatriates increasingly constituted the principal actors in the realm of public policy.‖ 136 
Uganda was not only donor-funded, but also donor administered.
137
  
 
Thus, wariness over accusations of imperialism and interference in sovereignty causes 
donors to adopt a ―soft‖ approach that inevitably leads to non-enforcement. This is further 
worsened by the fact that the World Bank‘s mandate forbids it from making explicit 
recommendations on political matters. In an interview undertaken as part of this study, a 
World Bank official in the Uganda Country Office admitted that ―as far as the World Bank 
is concerned, Uganda is doing very well.‖ This is indeed buttressed by the fact that 
Uganda‘s Ministers of Finance have twice been awarded with the ―Finance Minister of the 
Year‖ honour, as discussed above.  She maintained that Uganda‘s macro-economic 
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performance is in line with World Bank expectations, and confessed that the Bank‘s 
silence on matters that are regarded as being political may indeed have a negative impact 
on anti-corruption. This illustrates how a ―soft approach‖  undermines the enforcement of 
conditionality.  
 
How self interest undermines the enforcement of conditionality 
Rational choice theory posits that in the arena of international relations, states are guided 
largely by self-interest in their actions.
138
 This holds true in the relationships between aid 
donors and their recipients. Bose and Burnell 1991‘s analysis of British overseas aid 
illustrates the tension between altruism and self-interest that underlie the British 
government‘s aid policies.139 America‘s foreign policy too, encompasses both idealism 
and self-interest, hovering between America‘s desire to ―spread‖ democracy and its 
capitalist and security interests.
140
  
 
The apologetic stance of donors referred to above is not only due to the illegitimacy of 
conditionality, but also due to self-interest. Burnell notes that bi-lateral aid agencies adopt 
an apologetic stance in their dialogue with recipient governments, citing the political 
pressure from home to justify their need to interfere in recipient countries‘ internal 
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affairs.
141
 This sends a signal to recipient countries that all they need to do is avoid 
embarrassing the donor organisations, whose own institutional interests require that they 
continue to mount aid programmes. Recipient countries are thereby able to manipulate the 
situation to their advantage by doing only what they consider minimal to keep up 
appearances.
142
 Thus, we see a power play in which developing states‘ governments 
exercise agency and have ways of resisting and manipulating global hegemonic power to 
their own advantage. While appearing on one hand to be mere puppets of the World Bank, 
IMF and Bilateral donor hegemony, they take advantage of their apparent weakness to do 
the bare minimum necessary to keep the aid flowing.   
 
Kanbur explains how self interest hinders the enforcement of GRCs, especially on the part 
of the IMF and WB. Enforcement would mean a reduction in aid, which would affect debt 
servicing outflows to donor countries and tarnish the agency‘s image before its political 
masters, but also jeopardise the entire aid project on which the livelihoods and careers of 
donor agency staff depend.
143
 This has been referred to by Araral Jr. as the ―career 
dilemma.‖144 Kanbur says that conditionality illustrates ―the strength of weakness and the 
weakness of strength,‖ that is to say, the IFIs and donors, although regarded as the more 
powerful, are rendered ―weak‖ by their vested interest to keep the aid flowing. 
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Concomitantly, recipient governments, although seemingly ―weaker‖ know this fact and 
use the ―strength‖ of their ―weakness‖ to wantonly violate conditionality.145 No wonder he 
calls it ―a dance‖146 while Mwenda refers to it as ―a game of cat and mouse.‖147 
 
Self-interest also encompasses geo-strategic and economic interests.  During the Cold 
War, geo-strategic interest signified countries that were allied to capitalism as opposed to 
socialism; in the post 9/11 world, a line is drawn between countries regarded as allies in 
the war against terror and those regarded as enemies. Furthermore, following the collapse 
of socialism and the rise of global capitalism, Western Donor countries have sought to 
maintain good relations with countries that are regarded as important for trade and 
investment, especially China and other countries in South East Asia such as Thailand and 
Malaysia.
148
  
 
Studies have shown that GRCs are not enforced or are weakly enforced in those countries 
that are regarded as geo-strategically or economically important, such as Egypt, Algeria 
and Uganda.
149
 De Maria says the ―new war on African corruption is just another neo-
colonial adventure,‖ because ―it is rooted in western orthodoxies of liberal democratic 
capitalism and thinly disguised neo-colonial aspirations of promoting free trade and 
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fighting terrorism, the new priority on the Western agenda since the end of 
Communism.‖150 Countries regarded as allies in the war on terror or as strategically 
important are allowed to get away with bad behaviour.   For example, in Kenya and 
Pakistan corruption increased despite aid conditionality and anti-corruption aid was 
subsequently re-routed as anti-terrorism aid. In Ghana, corruption increased despite 
privatization and the international community said and did nothing about it. 
 
Alesina and Dollar‘s study on the motives behind foreign aid showed that ―who gets aid 
and why‖ is influenced largely by geo-political and strategic considerations, and not so 
much by the economic needs and policy performance of the recipients. They found that 
colonial past and political alliances are also major determinants of who gets aid.
151
  In a 
subsequent study Alesina and Weder further disproved the myth that aid is selectively 
applied to reforming governments that promote good governance and anti-corruption. 
They found no evidence that less corrupt governments receive less aid; on the contrary, 
some highly corrupt governments were found to receive more aid!
152
 
Indeed, Haynes avers that donors‘ continued support for the Ugandan regime despite its 
shortcomings was because their key interest is the stability of the country as an entry point 
into Africa‘s resource-rich Great Lakes‘ Region; as well as Uganda‘s reputation as an 
economic recovery success story following successful implementation of World Bank 
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Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs).
153
  Lynch gives a detailed analysis of 
Uganda‘s geo-strategic importance to the United States, highlighting its willingness to 
send troops to Liberia in 1994, showing solidarity in the US‘ hour of need by expressing 
support for the ―coalition of the willing‖ in 2003, as well as sending troops to Somalia 
after the US withdrew its own. Uganda is strategically located at the heart of Africa and is 
regarded as a bulwark against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism from its northern 
neighbour Sudan. Uganda and the US continue to cooperate militarily. Uganda, with the 
support of the US, currently has troops in Somalia, following the US‘ tactical withdrawal 
from that country in 1994, due to the heavy casualties suffered in 1993. The US has also 
provided assistance to the Uganda government to repulse and try to eliminate the rebel 
Lords‘ Resistance Army.154  
With this in mind, it is no surprise that donors continue to support and praise Uganda 
despite clear evidence of corruption. The non-enforcement of conditionality, shifting of 
goal-posts by IFIs and donors and their tendency to take an ―apologetic stance‖ when 
reprimanding the government about its lack of seriousness in dealing with corruption does 
not bode well for the manner in which anti-corruption is implemented at the domestic 
level.  It also has implications for the appointment, process and outcome of commissions 
of inquiry appointed to investigate corruption. These issues will be explored in greater 
detail in the chapters that follow.  
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GRC enforcement and “The Samaritan’s dilemma” 
The concept of the Samaritan‘s Dilemma in donor aid programmes was brought to 
prominence by Gibson, Andersson et al. In their view, the non-enforcement of 
conditionality is due to the inevitability that stopping or reducing aid would only cause 
further chaos in the economy and have devastating effects on the poorest sections of 
society.
155
 Recipient country governments are aware of this and hence use delaying tactics 
or implement reforms that amount to mere facades, such as appointing commissions of 
inquiry and then not following through on recommendations.  
 
Geographical morality  
Crawford‘s analysis of conditionality enforcement clearly reveals how Sub-Saharan 
African Countries bear the brunt, while other countries that rely on aid such as Algeria and 
Egypt rarely, if ever, have to deal with the threat of reduced aid.
156
 Whereas this may be 
related to the security and geo-strategic importance of such countries, it may also be 
inferred that inconsistency in the application of conditionality has to do with what Alai has 
called geographical morality – ―the norm by which a citizen of a country in the North may 
engage in acts of corruption in any country in the South, including bribery and extortion, 
without the attachment of any moral condemnation to those acts…   The norm is based on 
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the world view that non-Christian, non-Western, and non-white individuals are 
fundamentally immoral and corrupt when measured by European standards.‖157   
 
Geographical morality is implicit in the anti-corruption and good governance discourse in 
a number of ways. Firstly, there is the insinuation that corruption is a problem of ―bad 
governance‖ typical of Sub-Saharan African countries, where corruption is ―endemic,‖ 
―the norm,‖ ―a way of life,‖ and ―culturally condoned.‖158 Geographical morality is the 
major import of Transparency International‘s Corruption Perception Index, whose 
rankings barely change from year to year and consistently show the rich countries of the 
North at the top of the table and the poor countries of the South at the bottom.
159
 
Therefore, selective enforcement of conditionality may be a reflection of the thinking that 
Sub-Saharan Africans and their governments are inherently corrupt. This is further 
reinforced by the fact that even in those instances where conditionality has been enforced, 
it has not been due to corruption but due to a perceived failure to achieve set targets with 
regard to elections and democracy. For example,  the reduction of aid funding to Kenya in 
the late 1980s was largely due to then incumbent Moi‘s reluctance to hold elections and 
hand over power.
160
 Similarly, in 2005 when Yoweri Museveni of Uganda pushed for a 
constitutional amendment to lift presidential term limits, the British government withheld 
£17 billion in aid in what was probably the most visible instance of conditionality 
                                                 
157
 Alai, P. (2000). "The Legacy of Geographical Morality and Colonialism: A Historical Assessment of the Current 
Crusade Against Corruption." Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 33: 877- 904. 
158
 For an analysis of corruption as ―part of African culture,‖ see de Sardan, J. P. O. (1999). "A moral economy of 
corruption in Africa." Journal of Modern African Studies 37(1): 25-52. 
159
 See De Maria, Bill (2008) op. cit., for a discussion of the CPI as a neo-colonial project. 
160
 The silence and seeming acquiescence of donors in corruption is one of the themes in Michela Wrong‘s (2009) 
―It’s our turn to eat: The story of a Kenyan Whistleblower,‖ Harper Collins. 
  
66 
 
enforcement in Uganda. Norway and other countries similarly reduced their aid that year 
by about 30%.
161
 
 
The tendency to turn a blind eye towards corruption in countries such as Uganda, or 
geographical morality necessarily weakens the anti-corruption project by promoting 
apathy, scepticism and cynicism in countries that are supposed to be implementing anti-
corruption policies.  
 
“Do as I say and not as I do:” donors not practising what they preach 
Double standards are also visible in the lack of reciprocity of the policy standards between 
donors and their recipients. It is possible to question the moral standing of donors, given 
their previous willingness to overlook bad governance during the Cold War; the lack of 
transparency and accountability in aid programmes themselves; as well as the 
contradictory policies of donors, for example aid vis-à-vis arms exports and military 
assistance.
162
 
 
 Furthermore, some donor countries have evidently failed to live up to their own standards 
of integrity, as can be seen in the British Aerospace – al Yamamah corruption controversy 
in the United Kingdom.  The controversy started in the early 1990s and involved the 
                                                 
161
 See Mutumba, R. (2005) ―Norway cuts aid over Kisanja,‖ The Daily Monitor, 19 July 2005, at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200507181633.html; last accessed 22 February 2011. See also, BBC News ―Uganda 
unbowed after UK aid cut,‖ 21 December 2005. It is worth noting that the aid was not cut as such but diverted from 
direct budget support to social and economic re-construction programmes in Northern Uganda which had been 
devastated by 20 years of civil war.  
162
 Crawford, op. cit, at p. 41. 
  
67 
 
investigation by the British Comptroller & Auditor General of a series of arms deals from 
1986 – ongoing between British Aerospace (subsequently privatised as BAE Systems) and 
al-Yamamah which are alleged to have involved huge commissions or bribes. The report 
was submitted to the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee and subsequently 
suppressed by its Chair, MP Mr. Sheldon, on grounds that ―the Saudis could have taken 
amiss the contents, and there were a lot of jobs at stake.‖163   
 
Subsequently in 2004, the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) launched investigations into 
the matter. The investigations were launched at a time when BAE Systems and the UK 
government were involved in series of negotiations with the Saudi government and al-
Yamamah over the third phase of the contract that had begun earlier in 1986. The SFO 
then announced in December 2006 that it was discontinuing the entire investigation on 
advice from the Attorney General that it was contrary to national and international 
security. The former British Prime Minister was quoted in the media as saying that 
―strategic interests come first.‖164What he did not explicitly state, but which has 
nevertheless been acknowledged by other commentators, is that in the defence sector, 
Britain ―is virtually a Saudi Client State‖   and that it was not just security interests at 
stake, but business interests as well.
165
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The saga shows that governments such as the UK supposedly at the vanguard of the war 
on corruption are chiefly concerned about protecting the capitalist interests that form the 
basis of their neo-liberal mercantilist state, although this may sometimes be dressed up as 
―security interests.‖ 166It shows that anti-corruption is not about corruption per se, but 
about capitalist interests. 
 
The scandal of the UN-Iraq Oil-For-Food Programme (OFFP) provides another example 
of donors failing to live up to their own standards. Following the implementation of trade 
sanctions against Iraq as punishment for its invasion of Kuwait, the UN Security Council 
put in place the OFFP to avert an impending humanitarian disaster arising from lack of 
adequate food and medicine in Iraq. Contracts for the supply of food and medicine were 
awarded to a number of UN Security Council approved International Companies by the 
government of Iraq. It later emerged that the arrangement was characterised by extensive 
bribes, with companies paying ‗surcharges‘ to the Iraq government on every barrel of oil 
supplied. Similarly, companies bidding to supply food and medicine were only selected by 
the Iraq government if they agreed to make side payments incorporated into the contract as 
inflated prices, training costs and other disguises. Nevertheless, prosecution of the 
implicated companies, many of which fall under the jurisdiction of states that have been at 
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the forefront of the international anti-corruption crusade, has been lack-lustre or non-
existent.
167
  
 
Obidairo posits that the OFFP and BAE scandals that are cited above are evidence of the 
fragility of the international anti-corruption framework. He argues that despite the 
expansion of the international anti-corruption laws and institutions, political expediency 
remains the biggest threat to the attempt to curb trans-national corruption.
168
 
Inconsistencies such as those revealed through the BAE and OFFP scandals not only 
undermine attempt to curb transnational corruption, but cast a shadow over domestic anti-
corruption efforts in developing countries that are implementing reforms at the behest of 
donors and international agencies. 
 
“Bad governance” as a hindrance to the good governance agenda 
Apart from the issues discussed above, another explanation that has been proffered for the 
limited impact of anti-corruption in Sub-Saharan African countries such as Uganda is ―bad 
governance.‖ For example, Unsworth  has castigated donors for failing to engage and 
understand the role of local politics in hindering the successful implementation of many 
aspects of the agenda.
169
  Cammack explicitly said that the failure of good governance and 
anti-corruption is due to the nature of politics in developing countries, which they describe 
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as neo-patrimonial and inherently resistant to the changes envisaged under the good 
governance agenda.
170
 As this is considered in the next chapter it will not be dwelt on it at 
this point. 
 
 
2.1. 5 The “good governance” discourse and the apparent failure to discipline 
corruption in Uganda: what next? 
 
The problems outlined above have various implications for the manner in which good 
governance and anti-corruption have been ―internalised‖ in Uganda.  As a ―governance 
state‖ that is said to be enjoying ―post-conditionality‖ as an economic recovery showcase, 
Uganda has an extensive anti-corruption framework, put in place at the behest of 
donors.
171
 Simultaneously, there is weak enforcement of anti-corruption law and policy. 
This disjuncture between good governance as implemented through political 
conditionality and actual facts on the ground highlights the shortcomings of the good-
governance discourse as a disciplinary mechanism of global governance.  The question 
therefore, is whether the good governance discourse, disseminated as part and parcel of 
the international aid project, is ―dead‖ as Moyo reiterates, and whether it should be 
completely abandoned as she suggests.
172
  
 
                                                 
170
 Cammack, D. (2007). "The Logic of African Neopatrimonialism: What Role for Donors?" Development Policy 
Review 25(5): 599-614. See also, Amundsen, I. (2006). Political Corruption and the Role of Donors in Uganda. CMI 
Commissioned Report Chr. Michelsen Institute;; Fritz, V. and A. R. Menocal (2007). "Developmental states in the 
new millennium: Concepts and challenges for a new aid agenda." Development Policy Review 25(5): 531-552. 
171
 Uganda‘s anti-corruption framework will be discussed in chapter 3. 
172
 Moyo, D. (2009) Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa, New York : 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
  
71 
 
Nevertheless, there are some who argue that aid and GRCs have, to a significant extent, 
been a force for good. The World Bank insists that ―aid can be the midwife of good 
policy.‖173 For instance, as mentioned previously, Uganda has been able to establish a 
legal and institutional framework for fighting corruption, however ineffective it may be. In 
addition, the free markets and economic liberalisation that Moyo advocates as a solution to 
Africa‘s problems have been implemented with some success, leading to a significant 
growth in banking, telecommunications, energy, tourism and other sectors. Furthermore, 
political conditionality may be credited for providing a major impetus for democracy in 
many African countries. Uganda converted from a one-party to a multi-party state in 2006 
largely as a result of donor pressure.  Aid conditionality therefore helped to ―tip the 
balance,‖ combining with rising internal opposition and other circumstances to provide the 
extra leverage necessary for change.
174
  
 
Furthermore, Knack‘s study showed that foreign aid can promote democracy through the 
technical assistance that fosters electoral processes; judicial and parliamentary 
independence as checks on executive power; and more vibrant civil society organisations 
including a free press.
 175
  These factors have had important implications for Uganda, and 
in particular, for the significance of commissions of inquiry. The impact of good 
governance discourse on Uganda is therefore complex, and is characterised by 
contradictions. While it has had a limited impact on corruption, it has the infused the 
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judiciary, the media and civil society with a dynamism that was previously lacking. The 
good governance discourse has created spaces which some judges, journalists and civil 
society activists have utilised to demand more democratic governance.  
 
Thus, good governance is being internalised and reproduced in a manner which is 
inherently paradoxical and sometimes undermines and at other times, promotes the values 
on which it is based. Santos‘ analysis of the dualism and double character of poor relations 
is therefore pertinent to our evaluation of the impact of the good governance discourse, 
which has been both boundary setting and path-breaking. These are matters that I 
elaborate upon in the next chapter. 
 
2.3 The Role of Transnational NGOs – The Corruption Perceptions Index and the 
Moralisation of Good Governance Discourse  
International NGOs are a powerful new force in international politics and are transforming 
global norms and practices. They have been referred to as ―purveyors of norms.‖176 
Reimann attributes the rise of INGOs in the post-war period to the availability of funding 
and unprecedented political access granted to NGOs as a result of the growth of global 
governance institutions such as the United Nations and its various agencies. Indeed, he 
proposes that it is possible to identify a pro-NGO international norm in the 1980s, which 
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put pressure on states to support and include NGOs in national and international political 
activity.
177
 This situation gave NGOs space to thrive and facilitated the birth of new ones.  
 
INGOs tend to be glorified as the do-gooders who oppose globalisation and promote the 
welfare of the masses
178
 or vilified as co-opted agents for the spread of neo-liberal 
capitalism, legitimating its cause through their involvement in the international 
development project.
179
 They have also been accused of engaging in cultural 
imperialism.
180
 However, scholars such as Baxi and Scholte view INGOs as complex 
organisations that are not necessarily either pro- or counter-democratic, but are 
intercultural dynamic political forms that reflect the complexities of the global arena they 
inhabit.
181
 
 
INGOs mobilising for human rights have been the most prominent in this regard, having 
started their campaigns as far back as the eighteenth century, for example the Anti-Slavery 
Society. After the second world war, there was a significant growth in the number of 
Human Rights INGOs, and many of these played a crucial role in the institutionalisation 
of human rights in the UN system. In the 1960s, Amnesty International emerged as global 
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force for human rights, particularly civil and political rights and today remains one of the 
most prominent international human rights NGOs. 
 
The early 1990s are recognised as a watershed during which there was a significant rise in 
the number and scope of international NGOs. Indeed, it was during this period that 
Transparency International (TI) echoing the name of Amnesty International, was 
established in 1993 specifically to address anti-corruption. TI was established by Peter 
Eigen a former World Bank employee keen to make a difference by lobbying the WB and 
other agencies to take on what at the time was a controversial issue that appeared to 
exceed the bank‘s mandate, as the Bank was not allowed to get involved in political 
matters.
182
 Thus, TI, through its Corruption Perceptions Index, became the means by 
which the element of morality was explicitly added to the good governance discourse that 
had hitherto promoted itself in amoral terms.  
 
TI embodies the complexities and dilemmas of INGOs referred to above. As a norm 
entrepreneur or value purveyor, it has been dismissed as an instrument of western 
imperialism. Its close association with global organisations such as the World Bank and 
USAID cast a shadow over its motives. The fact that it was founded by a former World 
Bank employee remains a stain on its legacy, as it is regarded as part of the hegemony of 
neo-liberal globalisation. Furthermore, most of its funding is from governments such as 
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the UK and the USA, as well as big businesses such as Shell and ExxonMobil.
183
  Some of 
its benefactors, such as Balfour Beatty Construction, have been associated with 
international bribery scandals.
184
  Moreover, TI‘s Corruption Perception Index rankings, 
which always show developed countries at the top and developing ones at the bottom, 
continue to be criticised for spreading and entrenching neo-colonialism and geographical 
morality, that is, that developing countries are inherently corrupt while developed 
countries are not.
185
  
 
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is a compilation of professional polls and surveys 
that captures the perceptions of international business leaders, risk analysts and business 
journalists on the relative degree of corruption in various countries around the world.  
Country scores in the polls are averaged on a scale of zero to ten, where zero is entirely 
corrupt and ten is a perfectly clean slate. It has been criticised for its subjective nature and 
inadequacy in capturing the absolute amount of corruption in a country.
186
  Nonetheless, 
the discourse surrounding the CPI is powerful, due to its ability to rank countries into ―the 
good, the bad and the ugly,‖ and thereby generate waves of moral opprobrium against 
those that fail to make the mark. As previously mentioned, the Uganda government has 
found itself on the defensive for failure to reduce corruption when making PRSP progress 
reports, evidenced mainly by its continual decline in CPI rankings. Indeed, the reach and 
                                                 
183
 Tucker, C., ―Seeing Through Transparency International,‖ The Guardian, 22 May 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/may/22/seeingthroughtransparencyin, last accessed 18 January 2011. 
184
 Palast, G., (2000), ―War on Corruption? Not quite, Minister,‖ The Guardian, 09 July 2000, at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2000/jul/09/columnists.guardiancolumnists, last accessed 18 January 2011. 
185
 See De Maria, B (2008) ―Neo-Colonialism through measurement: A critique of the corruption perceptions index,‖ 
Critical Perspectives on International Business 4(2-3):184-202. See also Alai, P. (2000), op. cit. 
186
 Galtung, op. cit 
  
76 
 
influence of TI is such that the Economist has commented that ―no country can ignore 
Transparency International.‖187  
 
The CPI is therefore a technique of international relations that contributes to international 
social conformity and the internalisation of anti-corruption norms. The failure to conform 
results in loss of status and a bad reputation. A bad reputation not only casts a country in 
poor light in the global community but can further translate into low rates of foreign direct 
investment and /or a  reduction in foreign aid. More importantly, the CPI has had an 
impact on the perceived legitimacy of regimes, with an erosion of public support for 
governments that are consistently ranked poorly on the CPI.
188
 It may therefore be said 
that the CPI reiterates the existing mechanisms for disciplining corruption, working hand 
in hand with conditionality and international law to elaborate the discourse of good 
governance. 
A less well-known but increasingly visible anti-corruption INGO is Global Integrity, 
which was established in 1999. As opposed to TI‘s reliance on the perceptions of mostly 
business people and its links with the hegemonic discourse of the World Bank, Global 
Integrity was established by Investigative Journalists Charles Lewis and Nathaniel Heller, 
together with Political Scientist Marianne Camerer. By using investigative journalism and 
data gathering in various countries, Global Integrity provides detailed qualitative and 
                                                 
187
 The Economist (1999). "A guide to graft." 353(8143): 86. 
188
 Seligson, M. A. (2002). "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin 
American Countries," The Journal of Politics 64(02): 408-433; Anderson, C. J. and Y. V. Tverdova (2003). 
"Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes toward Government in Contemporary Democracies." American 
Journal of Political Sciences 47(1): 91-109 
  
77 
 
quantitative information on governance in various countries.
189
 It has developed an 
―Integrity Scorecard‖ which assesses the existence, effectiveness, and citizen access to 
key governance and anti-corruption mechanisms.  The scorecard examines the 
transparency of the public procurement process, media freedom, asset disclosure 
requirements, and conflicts of interest regulations. It looks at laws on the books and de 
facto realities of practical implementation in each country. Peer review is a strong 
component of its methodology. Global Integrity therefore appears to have taken extra care 
to insulate its methods from the criticism that TI has faced with its CPI.
190
  Its approach is 
useful in providing a broader picture of corruption and governance in a country, and 
supplements the role played by the CPI in the global elaboration of anti-corruption 
discourse. 
 
2.4 International Anti-Corruption Law  
 
This section analyses the role of international anti-corruption law (treaties and 
conventions) in the international fight against corruption. It should be noted that whereas 
international law in this area has been developing for some time, it was not until 2005 that 
the first United Nations Convention against Corruption was enacted and subsequently 
ratified by Uganda. Although the country had earlier on acceded to the African Peer 
Review Mechanism in 2003, it did not undertake a self-assessment until 2007-8. The 
analysis in this section is therefore a  brief tentative one that looks at the potential and 
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possibilities rather than impact.  After a historical overview, an analysis of the opportunity 
and threats presented by international anti-corruption law is proffered.
191
  
 
2.3.1 A historical overview of the making of international anti-corruption law 
Aside from the aid conditionality, the growing significance of anti-corruption in Uganda 
and in the world at large can be attributed to the exponential rise in the number of 
international treaties against corruption that have been concluded since the 1990s. 
Although the 1990s are recognised as the decade where corruption became an important 
item on the international agenda, these efforts were by no means the first global attempt to 
address corruption through international treaties. The global community had, since the 
1960s, become concerned with bribery and its effects on international business. In 1975, 
the General Assembly of the United Nations passed resolution 3514 on ―Measures against 
Corrupt Practices of Transnational and Other Corporations, Their Intermediaries and 
Others Involved.‖ In 1980, a draft Convention on Illicit Payments was drafted by the UN 
in accordance with the recommendations of the Working Group. However, the Convention 
was never adopted due to a lack of consensus in the international community regarding 
issues such as the criminality of corporations and the measures to be taken against 
corporations involved in corrupt practices.  
 
                                                 
191
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In the meantime, the US had, in 1977, passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
192
 This in 
turn was a result of the findings of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
investigations in the mid-1970s conducted in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal. The 
investigations found that over 400 U.S. companies had made questionable or illegal 
payments to foreign government officials, politicians, and political parties. One of the 
most notorious examples was the Lockheed bribery scandal, in which officials of 
aerospace company Lockheed paid foreign officials from various governments including 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Japan to favour their company's products.
193
 
Congress enacted the FCPA to end the bribery of foreign officials and to restore public 
confidence in the integrity of the American businesses. Following the enactment of the 
FCPA, American businesses started to feel disadvantaged in global markets,  due to the 
threat of criminal penalties for engaging in foreign bribery brought about by this Act. The 
US government thus became a leading advocate for the creation of international standards 
to limit cross-border bribery in order to alleviate the under-cutting of American businesses 
in international transactions.  
 
However, it was not until 1996 that the UN made another attempt to address corruption in 
the form of the Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Business 
Transactions. Also in 1996, the member States of the Organisation of American States 
                                                 
192
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passed the OAS Convention against Corruption, which was the first international anti-
corruption treaty. In 1997, the UN adopted a Code of Conduct for Public Officials. That 
same year, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
adopted a Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business. The European Union also adopted a Convention against Corruption involving 
Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States in 1997. In 1999, 
the Council of Europe adopted two Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption. In 
2000, the UN adopted the Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, and in 2003, 
member states of the African Union adopted the African Union Convention on Preventing 
and Combating Corruption. This was later that same year buttressed by the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM), of the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) 
under which African States agreed to self-monitoring process to track the extent of their 
adherence to a wide range of African and international human rights treaties and 
standards.
194
 Hailed as a ―welcome addition to pan-African institutional structure,‖195 and 
―the most innovative aspect of the NEPAD,‖196 its impact on curtailing corruption in 
Africa at large and Uganda in particular remains to be seen.
197
 The Declaration 
establishing the mechanism reproduces or reiterates elements of the good governance 
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discourse, proclaiming the commitment of African States to ―just, honest, transparent, 
accountable and participatory government and probity in public life.‖198  
 
In 2003, the UN finally adopted the first universal convention against corruption, thereby 
marking the apex of a decade of international anti-corruption law-making. The passing of 
these numerous treaties and declarations is evidence that there is indeed an emerging 
global consensus that corruption is a problem that must be addressed. Despite the 
enormous opportunity that these treaties represent, there are a number of problems that 
may present challenges to the implementation of the treaties. While it is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to delve into an in-depth analysis of each treaty, the next section provides a 
summary of the key elements of international anti-corruption law and a general appraisal 
of the opportunities and threats therein as elaborated in existing academic literature.  
 
2.3.2 Key features of international anti-corruption law 
The international law against corruption proposes a criminal law approach to dealing with 
corruption.  For purposes of analysis, only the UNCAC will be relied on because it is 
currently the most universal international anti-corruption treaty. The UNCAC identifies 
the following types of behaviour as criminal offences: bribery of national public sector 
officials; bribery of foreign public sector officials; bribery of officials of public 
international organisations; illicit enrichment by a public official, evidenced by ―a 
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significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably 
explain in relation to his or her lawful income‖; embezzlement, misappropriation or other 
diversion of property by a public official; trading in influence; abuse of functions; bribery 
of private sector decision-makers; embezzlement by persons working in private sector 
entities; nepotism and favouritism in public sector recruitment and promotion.
199
 Also 
criminalised are laundering the proceeds of corruption, concealment or continued retention 
of the proceeds of crime; aiding and abetting corruption and obstruction of justice.
200
  
 Unfortunately, the UNCAC does not specifically prescribe sanctions; preferring to leave 
the matter to be determined by domestic law. It is explicit in recommending prevention of 
corruption measures, which include exceptions to bank secrecy, prevention and detection 
of transfer so the proceeds of crime, recommending the establishment of financial 
intelligence units, encouraging the participation of society in anti-corruption, improving 
accounting procedures and introducing ethics-related codes of conduct.
201
 Furthermore, 
the UNCAC encourages international cooperation between states 
202
by prescribing mutual 
legal assistance, law-enforcement cooperation and extradition.  
2.3.3 Problems and prospects in international anti-corruption treaties 
The attempt to curb corruption via international legislation is bound to present numerous 
challenges, given the pre-existing problems with the international legal system in general, 
as well as the nebulous nature of the concept of corruption itself. With regard to the 
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former, the age old debate as to whether international law is really law, due to the lack of a 
formal legislature and enforcement mechanism may pose a challenge. However, many 
scholars agree that this debate is now mute, as consent and willingness to be bound remain 
the foundation of international law.
203
  
 
A much more immediate problem with regard to international anti-corruption law is the 
sheer number of treaties available. Carr observes that in such a situation, states are left 
wondering which treaty to ratify and implement or which one they can use as a basis for 
their domestic legislation. She justifiably worries that some states are simply ―serial 
ratifiers‖,  and that ratification of international treaties can easily be reduced to a fad. She 
correctly points out that this is especially so for developing countries that may ratify in 
order to comply with anti-corruption conditionality and obtain much needed financial 
assistance. Even countries that do not need aid may engage in ratifications simply as a 
domestic exercise.
204
  
 
The challenges to international regulation of a nebulous concept such as corruption are 
more pertinent. For instance, Carr criticises the lack of uniformity and comprehensiveness 
in scope, substance and procedure across the myriad conventions that have been passed. 
She points out how differences in the requirements for tackling corruption under different 
                                                 
203
 See D‘Amato, A. (1985) ―Is International Law Really Law?‖ NorthWestern University Law Review 79 (5 &6): 
1293-1314. 
204
 Carr, I (2007) ―Fighting Corruption Through Regional and International Conventions: A Satisfactory Solution?‖ 
European Journal or Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (2007) 121-153; at 141. Uganda might be 
considered one such ―serial ratifier‖ in order to keep up appearances as discussed in chapter 3. 
  
84 
 
conventions are likely to lead to uncertainty in implementation. One of the uncertainties 
she identifies is the scope of corrupt acts identified in different conventions. Some 
Conventions such as the OECD focus on bribery, whereas some such as the OAS and AU 
Conventions go as far as to criminalise illicit–unexplainable enrichment by public 
officials.
205
 Furthermore, Snider and Kidane point out that the lack of specificity on 
procedural and evidentiary requirements, which are to be determined by States parties, 
could create problems in cases of transnational corruption.
206
  
 
Another area that lacks comprehensiveness is the stipulated sanctions for corruption. Some 
of the regional Conventions such as the AU and OAS are silent on sanctions, leaving it to 
States parties to decide how they will punish offenders. Snider and Kidane have also 
observed that the AU Convention and the UNCAC overlap in so many respects, including 
membership and duplication of obligations. Scroth decries the manner in which the AU 
Convention, in Article 5, neglects private sector corruption by requiring the improvement 
and strengthening of only public sector systems, excluding private sector accounts.
207
 
None of the existing Conventions seeks to include officials from the NGO sector within its 
ambit, which as Snider and Kidane point out is a significant omission because of the 
enormous role that NGOs play at both national and global level.
208
  The cumulative effect 
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of these factors is likely to be inaction or paralysis, as states ponder which model or 
recommendation to adopt.
209
  
 
 
2.3.4 The significance of international anti-corruption law: from conditionality to 
legality 
Despite the above problems, there is no denying that the passing of various international 
anti-corruption treaties is a step in a right direction. It signifies society‘s determination to 
fight corruption and may have a significant deterrent effect. Furthermore, it provides a 
crucial reference for prosecuting those who are found to be corrupt. It also provides a 
potent advocacy tool for NGOs and other civil society actors in their quest for 
accountability and transparency. On the whole, it may be said that international anti-
corruption conventions help to facilitate international cooperation in the control and 
sanctioning of cross-border corruption; provide internationally agreed reference points that 
are useful for reform efforts; putting peer pressure on governments to reduce corruption; 
and providing fora in which governments and other actors can discuss corruption issues, 
align concepts and review anti-corruption efforts.  
 
Thus, international anti-corruption law may be regarded as reinforcing the good 
governance discourse, by adding the crucial element of legality to the more elusive 
concept of conditionality. Although the international community of States made efforts to 
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address corruption prior to the dawn of the discourse, it is clear that it is only since the 
1990s that the movement for international anti-corruption law gained momentum and 
culminated in the first universal anti-corruption treaty, the UNCAC, in 2005. The 
universalisation of anti-corruption in this manner re-emphasises the good governance 
discourse, which was under increasing criticism due to its perceived failure. Where good 
governance conditionality provided a means of coercion (carrot and stick) for tackling 
corruption, international law now promotes voluntary action by states. The development 
of international law thereby solves the problem regarding the fact that conditionality 
interferes with state sovereignty. Indeed, it solves many of the problems that bedevil 
governance related conditionality by making developing country states voluntarily take on 
the primary responsibility to fight corruption as opposed leaving it in the complex domain 
of the donor-recipient relationship. 
 
2.5 Multi-National Enterprises: from bribe givers to moral entrepreneurs?  
As previously mentioned, the global anti-corruption framework had it birth pangs in the 
US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in response to the corrupt activities of United States 
based MNEs that came to light in the infamous Watergate scandal. The Act put in place 
stringent provisions for US firms, and its impact was such that the OECD anti-bribery 
Convention was initiated as a result of US prodding.
210
 Hence, a discussion of the global 
anti-corruption framework would be incomplete without an analysis of their role in anti-
                                                 
210
 Glynn, P., S. J. Kobrin, et al. (1997). ―The globalization of corruption;‖ in K. A. Elloit (ed), Corruption and the 
global economy, Institute for International Economics: 7-27 
  
87 
 
corruption. From a past reputation that is tainted with bribe-giving in international 
business, MNEs have joined the bandwagon of anti-corruption and are re-casting 
themselves as moral entrepreneurs who prefer a level-playing field and therefore 
discourage corruption. 
 
Indeed, Wrage and Wrage conducted a study of MNEs in the USA and concluded that for 
simple and prudent business reasons, MNEs prefer a clean and transparent international 
business environment. Contrary to the majority view that MNEs are purveyors of 
corruption and are guilty of offering bribes, Wrage and Wrage argue that MNEs can be 
viewed in an alternative light as moral entrepreneurs. Corruption increases the costs of 
doing business not only through money paid out in form of bribes, but also because of the 
delays and uncertainty it causes. They argue that companies with competitive good quality 
products and services avoid wasting time in opaque business environments characterised 
by rigged bidding process and insecure rule of law environment for settling commercial 
disputes. In addition, the enactment of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, as well as 
the aggressiveness and success with which a few companies have been pursued and 
prosecuted by the US Justice Department, has made many MNEs wary of corruption. 
Thus, many US-based MNEs have supported the development of the global prohibition 
regime against corruption in their own interest.  As Wrage and Wrage observe, naming 
them as moral entrepreneurs is not to whitewash their image, but to acknowledge the 
  
88 
 
important role they play in transnational business and their enormous potential to curtail 
corruption by establishing internal firm environments that are intolerant towards it.
211
  
 
International Accounting Firms such as PriceWaterHouseCoopers (PWC) and Ernst and 
Young are also playing a role in transnational anti-corruption. The memories of the 
accounting firm Arthur Andersen and its role in perpetrating and covering up corruption in 
Enron are still fresh and are important in keeping the spotlight on these firms as the 
custodians and authors of accounts that reveal or conceal transnational corruption. From 
co-conspirators in corruption with companies such as Enron, they have now re-cast 
themselves as the Auditors who unearth corruption as opposed to covering it up. Thus 
PWC was hired by the Global Fund Secretariat in Geneva after a whistleblower in Uganda 
alerted the Fund to misuse of monies by Ugandan state and non-state agencies. PWC‘s 
audit confirmed that there was embezzlement, nepotism and abuse of office; leading to the 
suspension of the fund and the institution of a Commission of Inquiry.
212
  
The re-casting of MNEs from villains to heroes in anti-corruption discourse is being 
undertaken through their global umbrella grouping, the World Economic Forum (WEF). 
The WEF is a charitable foundation that brings together business leaders, politicians, 
academics, journalists and activists to ―shape global agendas‖ on pressing issues. The 
Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACI) was launched by CEOs from the 
Engineering and Construction, Energy and Metals and Mining industries at the Annual 
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Meeting in Davos in January 2004. PACI is a platform for peer exchange on practical 
experience and dilemma situations, and cooperates with the IFIs and Transparency 
International in its work. Through PACI and their close alliance with other actors in the 
anti-corruption hegemonic discourse, MNEs are re-positioning themselves as part of the 
solution to anti-corruption.
 213
   
The conflicting role of MNEs in global anti-corruption discourse can also be gleaned from 
the fact that it is largely from their perceptions that Transparency International‘s 
Corruption Perception Index is compiled. Thus, they are willing to give bribes in order to 
grab business and investment opportunities, and then to go on to tell the tale. This leaves 
developing country elites out in the cold as the main problem in the equation, the ones that 
―lack political will‖ to fight corruption and therefore the major hindrance to anti-
corruption. No wonder this contradictory relationship remains one of anti-corruption‘s 
most elusive targets, despite decades of international legislation. 
2.6 The emerging global anti-corruption norm 
The discussion has so far looked at the main components of the global anti-corruption 
framework, that is, the various institutions and techniques through which the international 
fight against corruption has been conducted. These are; the IFI and bi-lateral donor 
conditionality that have made ―good governance‖ a pre-requisite for financial aid, 
international law, international NGO activism, and MNEs‘ efforts to ensure a level 
business playing field. It would appear that good governance conditionality has played the 
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biggest role, with the other factors bolstering its efforts in one way or another. The 
prominence of the good governance discourse in promoting anti-corruption globally is not 
surprising, given that this is the means that has the most ―teeth,‖ that is, the threat of 
reduced aid for failure to comply with conditionality. On the other hand, international law 
lacks an enforcement mechanism, while INGOs and MNE‘s similarly lack coercive means 
to back up their anti-corruption activism. 
 
The expansion of the international framework against corruption through these various 
factors has led McCoy to opine that there is an emerging global anti-corruption culture or 
norm.
214
  A norm is defined as a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given 
identity. They are underlined by a strong sense of ―oughtness.‖ Violation results in 
disapproval or stigma whereas conformity attracts praise or is so taken for granted that it 
elicits no reaction.
215
 Norms are obeyed not because they are enforced, but because they 
are regarded as legitimate.
216
Common examples of international norms of inter-state 
behaviour include the prohibition of slavery and the right of self-determination as opposed 
to colonialism. Another example is the norm against racial inequality, which saw South 
Africa ostracised from the international community until the abolition of apartheid in 
1990
217
. 
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International norm evolution has been attributed to the ―moral proselytising‖ of 
―transnational moral entrepreneurs,‖ who motivated by empathy, altruism and ideational 
commitment, frame issues for debate and adopt a range of strategies to convince the public 
of the rightness of their cause.
218
 Organisations such as Transparency International are 
considered as moral norm entrepreneurs that exist solely for the purpose of promoting a 
particular norm. Such organisations then try to persuade state actors to endorse the norm. 
Endorsement by states usually results in the next stage of norm creation, whereby the 
norm becomes institutionalised in international law.  
 
Institutionalisation defines what the norm is and what amounts to its violation. Once 
institutionalised at the international level, a certain critical mass of states must adopt the 
norm in order to achieve what political scientists have called a ―tipping point,‖ or 
―threshold,‖ that is, a point at which more and more countries begin to adopt the norm and 
international and transnational norm influences become more important than domestic 
politics for bringing about norm change. At this stage, international socialisation through 
emulation and praise for conformists in contrast to ridicule for violators allows the norm to 
become more and more entrenched  or internalised to an extent where conformity is taken 
for granted.
219
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McCoy suggests that the emergence of the global anti-corruption norm has been achieved 
through awareness raising, institutionalization through the development of legal and 
policy instruments, and global adoption, internalization, and adherence. She in turn 
attributes the facilitation of the process to the changing global environment, specifically 
the end of the Cold War and the spread of the principles of democracy and liberalism; 
social interactions and the information revolution that contributed to wide-spread diffusion 
of new information about the causes and costs of corruption, as well as strategies to 
combat it; and internal processes within the nation-state, from an explosion of NGOs and a 
freer, more investigative media, to changing calculations among political leaders about the 
costs of corruption. However, she points out that the process is still incomplete and that in 
order for the norm to be said to exist, it will require both international organizations and 
domestic civil society actors to demand and monitor the implementation and enforcement 
of current commitments and to establish accountability.   
 
Thus, from Finnemore and McCoy‘s analyses, it can be inferred that the global anti-
corruption norm is at the third stage of evolution (institutionalisation), with indications 
that it is moving towards the tipping point or threshold. This can be inferred from the 
number of countries (140) that have ratified the UNCAC.
220
 This illustrates the 
significance of anti-corruption on the current global governance agenda. 
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2.7 Chapter Conclusion:  An emerging consensus undermined by contradictions 
Anti-corruption has been shown to be a significant item on the global governance agenda. 
It is a complex arena of various state and non-state actors motivated by an entanglement of 
interests. These actors employ a variety of techniques to tackle corruption, now recognised 
as a universal problem. The most prominent of these techniques is the discourse of good 
governance implemented through the mechanism of PRSP conditionality.  Good 
governance has been riddled with contradictions, and therefore it has both promoted and 
undermined the values of transparency, accountability, the rule of  law and participation, 
on which it is based.  Thus, it would be fair to say that good governance has been neither 
successful nor unsuccessful, but has registered success as well as failure in accordance 
with its inherent contradictions. 
 
The paradoxes that characterise global anti-corruption inevitably impact on anti-corruption 
in the domestic arena by providing leeway for governments to ―selectively and 
strategically integrate (good governance discourse) into existing conceptions and practices 
of political economy.‖221  Commissions of inquiry is one way in which the Ugandan 
government has selectively and strategically internalised the discourse of good 
governance. This will be elaborated upon in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The domestic framework for anti-corruption in Uganda: how to be a “good 
governor” without undermining your support base (part I) 
3.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter, it emerged that the implementation of the good governance 
agenda in countries such as Uganda has met with limited success and that the government 
begrudgingly admits to this fact in its PRSP progress reports. The main evidence for 
Uganda‘s lack of progress with anti-corruption is its performance in Transparency 
International‘s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which has been rather dismal over the 
past decade or so. 
Table 1 
 
A Graphic Representation of Uganda Corruption Perception Index Rankings ( 1999 - Present)
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The graph shows that there has been little or no improvement in corruption perceptions 
despite several years of implementing good governance reforms.  This prima facie 
evidence of the limited impact that the good governance discourse had had on Uganda. 
 
Nevertheless, in spite of its poor performance in the CPI, Uganda has registered some 
success in fighting corruption. One of the areas in which the good governance agenda has 
been quite successful is in spawning an array of anti-corruption and laws, policies and 
institutions.  According to Global Integrity,  
Uganda scores nearly perfectly in an assessment of the legal framework for fighting 
corruption - enforcement of these laws, however, is another issue. In practice, 
performance is very weak…the gap between the legal code and actual performance 
is the largest recorded [in 55 countries] in 2007," suggesting deep problems in the 
country's governance...
222
  
Global Integrity hints at the role of foreign aid in fomenting this situation: 
...Uganda [and Bosnia and Herzegovina] have the dubious distinction of boasting 
the biggest "implementation gaps" of all countries covered in the Global Integrity 
Report: 2009 - that is, the gap between their anti-corruption laws "on the books" 
and the actual enforcement of those same laws. These two countries are also among 
the largest recipients of international donor assistance, lending credence to some 
who argue that political leaders in aid-dependent countries are skilful at 
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establishing laws and institutions to meet foreign donor requirements despite those 
same laws and institutions failing to deliver for ordinary citizens.
223
 
The 2009 global integrity rankings show that Uganda scores 99 % on legal framework 
against corruption and 45% on implementation. Thus the implementation gap now stands 
at 54%. Global Integrity concludes:  
Uganda is an extreme example of the distance between laws on the books and the 
reality of putting those anti-corruption safeguards into practice.
224
 
 
 Table 2 – Uganda’s Global Integrity Index 2006-2009 
Year  2006 2007 2008 2009 
Legal Framework 100/100 95/10 99.6/100 99/100 
Actual 
Implementation 
50/100 47/100 49/100 45/100 
Implementation Gap 50(huge) 48(huge) 51(huge) 54(huge) 
Overall Rating  76 (moderate) 70 (moderate) 72 (moderate) 69 (weak) 
 
The wide gap between anti-corruption rhetoric and practice shows the ineffectiveness of 
foreign aid and good governance conditionality in Uganda. The discussion in the previous 
chapter analysed some of the reasons for this paradox,  such as the nature of foreign aid 
itself, particularly the manner in which it distorts accountability by making recipient 
                                                 
223Global Integrity (2009), ―Foreign aid may not help anti-corruption enforcement in aid-dependent countries,‖ at 
http://report.globalintegrity.org/globalindex/findings.cfm#ForeignAid, accessed 01 February 2011. 
224
 Ibid., at http://commons.globalintegrity.org/2009/12/uganda-where-theres-will-theres-way-and.html, accessed 01 
February 2011.  
  
97 
 
governments accountable to donors instead of their citizens; and the self-interest and 
double standards of donors and IFIs exhibited through the prioritisation of capitalistic and 
strategic interests over altruistic motives.
225
 In addition, some scholars continue to 
attribute the failure of good governance reforms to the lack of political will at the highest 
levels of  recipient governments to fight corruption. This lack of political will  is in turn 
linked to the concept of neo-patrimonialism, which will be elaborated shortly.  
 
This chapter analyses how the good governance reforms promoted by donors are 
undermined by ―lack of political will‖ and/or neo-patrimonialism in Uganda. Part 2 looks 
at the legal and institutional framework as evidence of the Ugandan State‘s rhetorical 
commitment to and internalisation of the good governance discourse. Part 3 looks at the 
role of non-state actors; the Media, the Arts and Civil Society, whose growth and 
expansion has also been directly and indirectly facilitated by good governance 
conditionality. Part 4 explores neo-patrimonialism as the reason for the disjuncture 
between the good governance discourse and its actual implementation in the domestic 
context. It illustrates the skewed manner in which it is implemented, by covert and overt 
actions that subvert its stated aims.  The chapter concludes by proposing that commissions 
of inquiry have arisen as the ideal stop-gap mechanism by which the Uganda government 
attempts to reconcile the contradictory aims of implementing the good governance 
discourse whilst simultaneously subverting it. 
 
                                                 
225
 Refer to the discussion in Chapter 2, at 2.2.4.  
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3.2 Uganda’s “near perfect” anti-corruption framework 
 
As pointed out above, Global Integrity says that Uganda scores ―nearly perfectly‖ in an 
assessment of the anti-corruption legal framework (99.6% out of a maximum possible 
score of 100%). The credit for this goes to more than two decades of good governance 
conditionality and substantial investment by donors and IFIs in anti-corruption in Uganda. 
In order to obtain aid, Uganda must show that it is a ―good governor.‖  This involves 
explicit anti-corruption commitments on the part of the government of Uganda in return 
for aid.  A good example of how anti-corruption conditionality work can be seen in a 2007 
agreement between the Ugandan Government and USAID, specifically titled as 
―Agreement ... for Strengthening Uganda‘s capacity to fight corruption.‖ In this 
agreement, USAID commits to provide a grant of $10,446,180 to the Ugandan 
Government, and the latter explicitly commits to undertake a number of actions to fight 
corruption. These are: 
 Assist in passing the Audit Bill to strengthen the effectiveness of the OAG; 
 Reconsider Civil Service Remuneration Policies to enable performance based 
salary structures for officers directly involved in anti-corruption activities such as 
prosecutors and investigators; 
 Ensure that the Anti-Corruption Court is established that judges and magistrates are 
appointed and the Court begins to function in 2007/8 Financial Year; 
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 Ensure that laws required to support the Anti-Corruption Court, such as the 
Prevention of Corruption Bill and Qui-Tam legislation are presented before 
Parliament for debate.
226
 
 
PRSPs and PRSP progress reports also provide details of how the donors and IFIs have 
been involved in shaping the existing anti-corruption framework in Uganda.  For instance, 
in the Uganda PRSP Progress Report 2003, the government tried to show how it was 
complying with conditionality so that further tranches of aid could be released by the IFIs, 
saying: 
The government has successfully undertaken efforts to address the  problem of 
corruption, for example... the Leadership Code Act was passed by Parliament in 
April 2002 and this calls for mandatory public declarations of the personal assets 
and liabilities for leaders and their close family members. The IGG Bill was passed 
by Parliament in December 2000 and it is now law after being assented to by the 
President in March 2002. The Directorate of Ethics is also spearheading a review of 
the Prevention of Corruption Act 1970 and the focus is on harmonising the 
legislation on corruption and to strengthen the definition of corruption. 
227
 
 
Similarly, priority areas for action (conditionality) in the 2004/5-2007/8 PRSP included 
the following a number of actions to improve transparency and accountability. These are 
worded imperatively, illustrating the coercive nature of conditionality. For example: 
 Government will seek passage of the Auditor General Bill. 
                                                 
226
 Development Assistance Grant Agreement between the Government of the USA and the Government of Uganda, 
March 29, 2007, at http://www.mcc.gov/documents/agreements/daga-uganda.pdf, accessed 26 January 2011. 
227
 GoU, MOFPED (2003) Poverty Status Report / PRSP Progress Report, at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03301.pdf, accessed 26 January 2011, pp. 82-83 
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 Government will implement at least three value for money audits each year, and 
mount a pilot study to estimate the scale of public corruption. 
 Government will computerise the audit function in the Auditor General‘s office, 
complete the audit of classified expenditure, and establish the internal audit 
function in all ministries. 
 Government will complete the recruitment and training of 80 procurement 
officers and establish a national association for procurement professionals.
228
 
 
Indeed, IFIs and bi-lateral donor agencies have invested significant resources in anti-
corruption in Uganda. For example, the DANIDA Uganda Country Assistance Strategy 
proclaims some of the chief aims of  Danish-Uganda cooperation‘s as being ―to promote 
good governance, human rights and democratisation by supporting the judicial system, the 
Inspector General of Government, the local authorities as well as civil society 
organisations (CSOs).‖229  Donors give direct budget support known as ―Poverty 
Reduction Support Credits‖  to anti-corruption agencies through the Uganda Joint 
Assistance Strategy Framework (UJAS).
230
  In 2005-2009, the strategy proclaimed that 
―support to the Department of Ethics and Integrity and to the Inspector General of 
Government will strengthen Uganda‘s anticorruption institutions and help to implement 
the government‘s National Strategy to Fight Corruption.‖231 In 2004/5, for example, 204.2 
                                                 
228
 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Poverty Eradication Action 
Plan (PEAP) 2004/5-2007/8, p. 157. 
229
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, Uganda-Denmark Partnership - Strategy for Development Cooperation 
2004-2008, p. 9. 
230
 World Bank et al, Joint Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Uganda (2005-2009), at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTUGANDA/Resources/UJAS.pdf, accessed 25 January 2011. 
231
Ibid, p. 35  
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billion Uganda Shillings was budgeted for accountability, of which more than 50% came 
from donor funds. 
232
 
 
Thus we see that the Uganda government has complied with conditionality by establishing 
and reforming anti-corruption laws and institutions.  It has also allowed the judiciary a 
degree of independence, liberalised the media and given civil society organisations some 
space and visibility in order to show that it is committed to the principles of good 
governance. The enactment of laws and establishing institutions appears to be the 
minimum necessary to keep up appearances and ensure that aid is not cut off. Enforcement 
of laws and policies, however, is the arena in which the cat and mouse game is played; as 
will shortly be discussed. 
 
3.2.1 The legislative framework  
 
The supreme law of the country, the Constitution of 1995, clearly proclaims the nation‘s 
commitment to a government that is accountable to the people. The National Objectives 
and Directive Principles of State Policy laid down by the Constitution proclaim that: 
 
 All public offices shall be held in trust for the people; 
 All persons placed in positions of leadership and responsibility shall, in their work, 
 be answerable to the people; 
 All lawful measures shall be taken to expose, combat and eradicate corruption and 
 abuse  or misuse of power by those holding political and other public offices.
233
 
                                                 
232
 GoU (MOFPED), The Uganda 2004/5 Budget: A Citizen’s Guide, 
http://www.finance.go.ug/docs/citzensguide.pdf, accessed 25 January 2011. Exchange rate: 1 USD is equal to Uganda 
Shillings 2,300. 
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In line with the above, the government of Uganda has enacted a number of laws  against 
corruption. There are laws that establish and regulate anti-corruption institutions, such as 
the Inspectorate of Government Act which provides for the role and functions of the 
inspectorate,
234
 the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority Act
235
 and the 
National Audit Act
236
 which describes the role and functions of the Auditor General. The 
Leadership Code Act is an important piece of legislation whose enforcement is the 
responsibility of the Inspectorate of Government. However, the key piece of anti-
corruption legislation is the Anti-Corruption Act 2009.
237
 Other relevant laws are the 
Whistleblowers Act and the Access to Information Act. 
 
It is important to note that the existing legal framework is relatively new and was not yet 
in force at the time  of the commissions of inquiry analysed in this study, which were 
appointed between 1999 and 2005/6. During that time period, the laws against corruption 
were contained in the Penal Code Act, a 1950 law 
238
 and the Prevention of Corruption 
Act which was enacted in 1970.
239
 Under the Penal Code, corruption was covered by 
section 87 on abuse of office, defined as ―a government officer doing an arbitrary act 
prejudicial to the interests of the employer,‖ punishable by 7 years of imprisonment.  
Section 268 defined embezzlement as the theft by a government employee of any ―chattel, 
                                                                                                                                                               
233
 Constitution of Uganda, (1995) National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, XXVI. 
234
 Act No. 5 of 2002. 
235
 Act No. 1 of 2003. 
236
 Act No. 7 of 2008. 
237
 Act No. 6 of 2009. 
238
 Cap. 120, Laws of Uganda. 
239
 Cap. 121, Laws of Uganda 
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money or valuable security‖ belonging to the government, and attracted a maximum 
penalty of 14 years. Section 269 on ―causing financial loss‖ made it a crime to ―do or omit 
to do any act knowing or having reason to believe that such act or omission will cause 
financial loss to the Government.‖ The maximum penalty for this was 14 years.  The 
Prevention of Corruption Act criminalised the solicitation and offering of bribes, which 
was punishable with up to 10 years of imprisonment.
240
   
 
Thus, there was a need to harmonise and modernise the law on corruption. In any case, as 
previously discussed, the law was rarely enforced.
241
  Hence, as seen above, donors 
continued to put pressure on the Uganda government to improve its record on anti-
corruption by strengthening the law and institutions, culminating in the passing of the 
Anti-corruption Act of 2009. 
 
 
The Anti-Corruption Act 2009 
The Anti-Corruption Act, aptly titled in accordance with present-day good governance 
parlance, proclaims that it is ―an Act to provide for effectual prevention of corruption in 
both the public and private sector.‖242  We saw earlier that the government aimed to 
―strengthen‖ the definition of corruption, which previously focused only on bribery, 
embezzlement and abuse of office in the Prevention of Corruption Act 1970. Thus, the 
2009 Act defines corruption in a fairly wide manner that includes bribery, embezzlement 
                                                 
240
 Sections 2-5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 
241
 See the discussion in Chapter 1, at 1.2 on corruption and impunity in the privatisation process. 
242
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of government monies, misuse of public resources, abuse of office and neglect of duty. 
The Act acknowledges that corruption is a ―syndicate‖ crime and makes it a crime to 
participate in corruption as a principal, co-principal, agent, instigator, accomplice or 
accessory after the fact in any act of corruption.
243
  
It is a crime to participate in a decision that involves a conflict of interest.
244
  Other 
offences defined under the Act include: 
 Abuse of office, defined as doing or directing to be done an act prejudicial to the 
interests of the employer, in abuse of the authority of the perpetrator‘s office;245  
 Sectarianism, that is,  doing a favour or offering advantage on the basis of religion, 
sect, ethnic group or place of origin;
246
  
 Nepotism, which means doing a favour for a person on the basis of blood 
relations;
247
  
 Embezzlement of funds or property;248  
 Causing financial loss;249  
 Fraudulent disposal of trust property by a trustee;250  
 False accounting and false claims by officials;251  
 Impersonating public officers or threatening injury to public officers to do 
anything, forbear or delay its doing;
252
 and lastly  
                                                 
243
 Section 2 of the Anti-Corruption Act 2010. 
244
 Section 9, ibid. 
245
 Section 11. 
246
 Section 12 
247
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248
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250
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251
 Sections 22 and 24. 
  
105 
 
 Illicit enrichment.253   
The Act seeks to deter corruption by providing for stiff sentences: the maximum penalty 
prescribed for various offences is 10 years or a hefty fine running into millions of Uganda 
shillings.
254
 The Court is also empowered to demand recovery and repayment of money or 
property in all cases. Thus it can be seen that in the Act is a strong piece of legislation 
which if enforced, would have an impact on controlling corruption in Uganda. As of yet, 
nobody has been convicted under the new law because the system is still clogged with old 
cases.
255
  
 
The Leadership Code Act, 2002 
The Leadership Code Act was originally enacted in 1992 and amended in 2002. Its  main 
feature is the requirement for all public officers to declare their income, assets and 
liabilities bi-annually.
256
 The aim of this provision is to prevent illicit gain by leaders, and 
would go a long way in tackling corruption if it was effectively enforced. One of the main 
reasons why the Code was amended was that Asset Declarations were to remain secret, as 
members of the public were not allowed access to them for purposes of verification. Under 
section 7 of the current law, declarations are accessible to the public upon lodging of a 
formal request to the IG. 
                                                                                                                                                               
252
 Sections 17 and 18. 
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 Section 31. 
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 See section 26 on punishment for offences. 
255
 Izama, A (2009) ―Jail is a heartbeat away as new law makes hiring a relative a crime,‖ The Daily Monitor, 25 
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256
 Section 4, Cap. 168, Vol. XXI, Laws of Uganda. 
  
106 
 
The Code prohibits leaders from participating in decisions where they have a conflict of 
interest, obliging them to declare any interest that they might have in any matter that they 
preside over. Failure to declare their interest may result in the leader ceasing to be a 
member of the public body in question, and making good any losses that might arise as a 
result of the decision.
257
   
 
The Act declares that gifts or other benefits in kind given to a leader on any public or 
ceremonial occasion, or commission to a leader on any transaction, shall be treated as a 
gift or donation or commission to the government or institution represented by the leader 
and shall be declared to the Inspector General. The Act goes on to clarify that leaders may 
accept personal gifts or donations from relatives and friends to such an extent and on such 
occasion as is recognised by custom. Furthermore, they may accept souvenirs and 
ornaments whose value does not exceed 100,000 Uganda shillings (about US$ 50).
258
 The 
Code also prohibits influence-peddling, abuse of office and public property, nepotism and 
cronyism.
259
 Breach of the Code may lead to a warning, a caution, demotion, dismissal 
from or vacation of public office.
260
 
 
Section 18 of the Code provides that any person who alleges that a leader has committed a 
breach of these Code my lodge a complaint to the Inspectorate, which shall inquire into 
the matter and make a decision regarding whether or not the leader was in breach of the 
                                                 
257
 Sections 8 & 9, Leadership Code Act. 
258
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259
 Sections 12 and 13. 
260
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Code. Such a decision must be contained in a detailed report that sets out the nature and 
circumstances of the breach, the evidence received, the findings and decision made. The 
Inspectorate is required to communicate the decision to an authorised person (appointing 
authority of the leader) for implementation. The decision may be a  warning, caution, 
dismissal, demotion or vacating the office. The manner in which this provision was 
originally drafted ignored the necessity of the Inspectorate observing natural justice in the 
making of its decisions, and led to civil action against the Inspectorate by Kakooza 
Mutale, a Presidential Advisor on Security.
261
 Hence, the Act was amended to include 
section 26, which obliges the Inspectorate to observe the rules of natural justice when 
inquiring into allegations under the Code.  
 
The Inspectorate is given the powers and rights of the High Court as regards attendance, 
swearing and examination of witnesses, production and inspection of documents as well as 
enforcement of its orders.
262
 In addition, officers of the Inspectorate are immune from civil 
or criminal liability when performing their duties.
263
  Inquiries, proceedings and reports of 
the Inspectorate are also protected from quashing by certiorari due to error on the face of 
the record.
264
  
 
All in all, the Leadership Code Act is a comprehensive law with detailed provisions that 
could prevent officers from abusing their public powers for private gain. Indeed, it is no 
                                                 
261
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wonder that Uganda scores highly on anti-corruption laws on the Global Integrity 
Scorecard. It does however, have some weaknesses, which will be analysed later on in this 
chapter. 
 
The Whistleblowers’ Protection Act  
The Whistleblowers‘ Protection Act265 is intended to provide an enabling environment for 
whistleblowers to provide information on acts of corruption without fear of reprisal. The 
long title proclaims it as a law ―to provide for the procedures by which individuals in both 
the private and public sector may in the public interest disclose information that relates to 
irregular, illegal or corrupt practices; to provide for the protection against victimisation of 
persons who make disclosures..." 
 
Disclosures may be made orally or in writing to authorised officers, defined as including 
the Speaker of Parliament or Deputy Speaker of Parliament, the Executive Director of 
National Environment Management Authority in case of environment issues, Resident 
District Commissioner, a Senior Ethics Officer with the Directorate of Ethics and 
Integrity, a human rights commissioner with Uganda Human Rights Commission, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, an inspectorate officer of the Inspectorate of Government 
and a police officer not below the rank of Assistant Inspector of Police.
266
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 Act No. 6 of 2010. 
266
 Ibid, section 1. 
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Following the making of a disclosure, a whistleblower should not be victimised or be 
subjected to criminal or civil action stemming from his or her role as a whistleblower and 
the state must protect a whistleblower whose family is endangered as a result of a 
disclosure.
267
 The Act further provides that  all disclosures are to be "expeditiously" 
investigated and that "appropriate" action has to be taken immediately.
268
 Where the 
whistle blowing results in the recovery of monies, the whistleblower shall be entitled to 
5% thereof.
269
 
 
The Whistleblowers Act has been described as ―ambitious‖ even whilst conceding its 
potential to curtail corruption in Uganda.
270
 The question that remains is whether the 
protection it offers would be adequately enforced. 
 
The Access to Information Act 
This law was enacted in 2005 ―to provide for the right of access to information pursuant to 
article 41 of the Constitution; to prescribe the classes of information referred to in that 
article; the procedure for obtaining access to that information, and for related matters.‖271 
The Act applies ―to all information and records of Government ministries, departments, 
local governments, statutory corporations and bodies, commissions and other Government 
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organs and agencies, unless specifically exempted by this Act.‖272 Its purpose is stated as 
including the promotion of an efficient, effective, transparent and accountable 
Government; protection of persons disclosing evidence of contravention of the law, 
maladministration or corruption in Government bodies; promotion of  transparency and 
accountability in all organs of the State by providing the public with timely, accessible and 
accurate information; and empowering the public to effectively scrutinise and participate 
in Government decisions that affect them.
273
 
 
The Act provides that all public bodies shall designate their Chief Executives as 
information officers with responsibility for compiling information about the body and 
ensuring that it can be accessed by the public.
274
 Requests for information should be made 
in writing, although oral requests may be entertained and reduced into writing by an 
officer of a public body, and a response should be received within 21 days of making the 
application.
275
 As with other pieces of legislation, the outstanding issue is its application 
and enforcement. 
 
3.2.2 The institutional framework – seven agencies (and still counting)? 
The primary anti-corruption agency is the Inspectorate of Government (IG) which is 
constitutionally independent and mandated to prevent, investigate and prosecute  
corruption. A number of other bodies have functions closely related to anti-corruption 
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action but have other responsibilities that are not solely focused on anti-corruption. These 
include the Anti-Corruption Court, Directorate of Public Prosecution (DPP), Criminal 
Investigation Directorate (CID) the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets 
Authority (PPDA), the Parliamentary Committees such as the Public Accounts Committee 
(PAC) and the Committee on Statutory Authorities and Enterprises (COSASE) , the 
Auditor General and the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity. The latter (DEI) coordinates 
anti-corruption policy and provides political leadership.  All the above agencies cooperate 
closely with one another through quarterly meetings of the Inter-Agency Forum  (IAF). 
There are also proposals for a Leadership Code Tribunal
276
 and even for an 
―Accountability Sector Secretariat‖ attached to the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity 
whose purpose will be to coordinate and monitor all government agencies with an anti-
corruption mandate. 
277
 The Anti-corruption Coalition of Uganda, (ACCU) an umbrella 
organisation of NGOs involved in anti-corruption advocacy activities, had also 
recommended an independent body to handle whistle blowing, although this proposal was 
ignored when the Bill was enacted into law.
278
 
 
The Inspectorate of Government (IG) 
The Inspectorate of Government is a Constitutional Office, established under article 223 
of the 1995 Constitution and the Inspectorate of Government Act of 2002 . It consists of 
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an Inspector General of Government (IGG) and two Deputy Inspectors-General.  The IGG 
and deputies are appointed by the President with the approval of Parliament and have wide 
ranging terms of reference covering all public offices in Uganda. The IG serves not only 
as the government‘s general ombudsman, but is also responsible for the prevention, 
detection, investigation and prosecution of corruption; in addition to public education and 
information on corruption generally.
279
 Thus it can be said that the IG is Uganda‘s Anti-
Corruption Commission and the most important agency in the fight against corruption. 
The IG was originally established in 1986 when the current NRM had just captured power. 
One of their stated priorities at that time was to fight corruption in public office, for which 
they placed the blame on the previous ―bad‖ regimes of Milton Obote and Idi Amin. 
Hence the establishment of the office was indicative of a new era of transparency and 
accountability.  
 
The IG is responsible for the enforcement of the Leadership Code Act 2002 and along 
with the Directorate of Public Prosecutions, the Anti-Corruption Act of 2009. 
 
The Auditor General 
The Auditor General is a Constitutional Office established under the 1995 Constitution 
and the National Audit Act 2008 as the office with responsibility for ensuring that all 
public accounting in Uganda is done in accordance with the law.
280
 To this end, the 
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Auditor General is empowered to audit all public accounts of all public offices under 
central and local government, whether executive or judicial.
281
 Where a malpractice is 
revealed, the Auditor General is authorised to disallow the transaction in question and 
make a report to the Speaker of Parliament, who in turn refers the matter to the appropriate 
Committee of Parliament.
282
  In the exercise of his/her functions, the Auditor General has 
been granted wide powers of access to all books and accounts of government, as well as 
powers to conduct searches and to call any person to provide relevant information.
283
  
 
The office is headed by the Auditor General who is assisted by the Assistant Auditor 
General. The OAG has a total workforce of 338 employees of which 254 are technical 
staff and 84 are administrative and support staff. With 62 professional accountants the 
office is currently the largest employer in Uganda of qualified accountants. 
 
The Auditor General is one of the least applauded anti-corruption agencies in Uganda. 
Perhaps because it does not take action on its own but only refers the irregularities it 
uncovers to Parliament, it does not attract as much media attention as say, the Inspectorate 
of Government. It conducts a staggering amount of work that does not attract media 
attention until it reaches the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) as a scandal. An insight 
into the large volume of work can be gleaned from its 2009Annual Report to Parliament.  
 
                                                 
281
 Ibid, sections 13 -17. 
282
 Ibid., section 20 
283
 Ibid, section 24. 
  
114 
 
The Directorate of Audit (Central Government) completed and reported on 219 audits 
consisting of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (83), Projects (131) and special audits 
(5). In addition, the Directorate issued 71 audit warrants for recurrent, development and 
statutory withdrawals of funds from the consolidated fund account amounting to Shs. 
5,638,472,056,063; and, inspected 70 Tertiary Institutions under the Ministry of Education 
and Sports.
284
 
 
The Directorate of Audit (Local Governments) completed and reported on 1,662 accounts. 
They included Higher Local Governments (195), Regional Referral Hospitals (11), special 
audits (15) and Lower Local Governments (1,441). The Directorate of Audit (Statutory 
Corporations/VFM) completed and reported on 155 accounts. A further audit of (43) 
accounts are work-in progress. In addition, the Directorate also undertook five (5) special 
audits that were requested for in the period. The newly established Value for Money 
(VFM) Audit Department with only 17 staff managed to complete and report on ten (10) 
VFM audits with ten (10) other studies as work in progress.
285
 
 
The Auditor General is especially crucial to the effectiveness of Parliament‘s oversight 
committees, in particular, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) for Central Government 
Ministries and Departments, the Local Governments‘ Public Accounts Committee and the 
Committee on State Enterprises, Commissions and Authorities. The reports and guidance 
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of the Auditor General enable the Parliament to effectively perform its role of overseeing 
the executive and ensuring that it is accountable for its handling of public monies. As an 
insider ―whistleblower‖ the Auditor General‘s contribution to the success of anti-
corruption initiatives in Uganda is significant.  
 
Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority (PPDA) 
The PPDA is among the new anti-corruption arsenal established under the donor and IFI 
public accounting and management reforms established by Act of Parliament in 2003. The 
previous system featured a Central Tender Board in the Ministry of Finance, which was 
responsible for all procurements whose value exceeded $1000. The system was slow and 
protracted, as well as being riddled with corruption. It is estimated that more than 90 per 
cent of complaints sent to the IGG are procurement related. Concomitantly, 65% of 
Uganda‘s total budget passes through the public procurement system each year.  Hence 
Uganda International Development Partners were keen for the establishment of a more 
transparent, efficient and streamlined system. 
286
 
 
Accordingly, in 2003, the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act was passed.
287
 
The Act establishes a regulatory body known as the Public Procurement and Disposal of 
Assets Authority that is responsible for training and capacity building in procurement 
matters in all public agencies; ensuring that all public procurement is carried out in 
                                                 
286
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accordance with the law; conducting procurement audits and investigating complaints.
288
  
The Act emphasises transparency and accountability in procurement, by providing 
detailed rules for advertising and public display of bid opportunities, public opening of 
bids, and public notices for best evaluated bidder ad contract awards.
289
 Dissatisfied 
suppliers may seek administrative review of the process.
290
 Providers who are found to 
commit offences such as bribery may be suspended and disciplinary action taken against 
errant public officers who manipulate the process.
291
  
 
One of the innovations introduced by the new law is the public naming and shaming of 
company and individual providers who are involved in corrupt procurement practices. The 
PPDA is empowered under Regulation 351 of its regulations to suspend a provider from 
participating in public procurement or disposal proceedings. Seven companies and their 
respective directors, have so far been suspended and publicly named. 
292
 
 
Police Criminal Investigations Directorate (CID)  
Originally referred to as the Fraud Squad, the Uganda Police Force Criminal 
Investigations Directorate Anti-Corruption Department has now been re-named to reflect 
the on-going emphasis on anti-corruption within Uganda‘s governance framework. The 
role of the department is the investigation of corruption-related crime, categorised under 
                                                 
288
 Ibid, section 6. 
289
 Ibid, parts IV, V and VI. 
290
 Ibid, part VII. 
291
 Ibid. 
292
 See Suspended Providers‘ Register, at, 
http://www.ppda.go.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=23&Itemid=41, accessed 26 January 2011. 
  
117 
 
Economic Crime. According to the 2008 Annual Crime Report, 13,162, cases of economic 
crime were reported and investigated, compared to 9,978 cases reported in 2007; an 
increase of 40%.  However, crimes specifically classed as corruption were only 46. In 
2009, only 95 corruption cases were reported and investigated. These low numbers reflect 
the lack of success in fighting corruption in Uganda.
293
 The factors responsible for this 
discrepancy are discussed later on in this chapter. 
 
The CID has received foreign assistance from the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and the 
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to assist in the investigation of cases that arose from 
the Global Fund scandal, which is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
294
  The 
Forensic Services Department is currently being strengthened to enable the Police Force to 
improve its performance in this area. There are plans for a modern analytical laboratory 
that conducts finger print analysis, DNA analysis, ballistics, and toxicology tests. At 
present, the CID is mostly limited to Scene of Crime analysis to search for physical 
evidence, which is not very relevant in corruption related crime.
295
  
 
Directorate of Public Prosecutions 
The Directorate of Public Prosecutions is a Constitutional Office consisting of a director 
and two deputies.  Article 120 of the 1995 Constitution provides that it shall be 
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autonomous and independent from the control or direction of any person or authority.  It 
further outlines the functions of the DPP as including: 
a. To direct the Police to investigate any information of a criminal nature and to report 
to him or her expeditiously; 
b. To institute criminal proceedings against any person or authority in any court with 
competent jurisdiction other than the Court Martial; and  
c. To take over and continue any criminal proceedings instituted by any other person 
or authority.  
According to the 2008 Annual Prosecution Report, a total of 72 corruption-related cases 
were handled by the DPP. 24 were sanctioned for prosecution, 23 were still being heard by 
Court, while there were 3 convictions and 4 dismissals. 12 cases were undergoing further 
inquiries whereas 6 case files were closed due to lack of or weak evidence.
296
  
 
There have been calls for the DPP to relinquish all responsibility for corruption cases to 
the IG, in order to avoid duplication of roles. However, this proposal has never been 
implemented because it is regarded as a fetter on the DPP‘s discretionary powers over all 
criminal prosecutions in Uganda. 
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Parliamentary Committees 
Article 90 of the 1995 Constitution establishes Parliamentary Committees and vests them 
with power to summon any Minister or other public officer to give evidence before them. 
They are also given power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of 
documents. The Parliamentary Rules of Procedure clarify that Parliament may have both 
standing committees and sectional committees. Of the standing committees, The Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC), the Committee on Commissions, Statutory Authorities and 
State Enterprises (COSASE), and the Local Government Accounts Committee (LGAC) 
are the most relevant in the fight against corruption.
297
 
 
The Public Accounts Committee is assigned the responsibility of examining the audited 
accounts of government as presented to the Clerk by the Auditor General. The Committee 
on Commissions, Statutory Authorities and State Enterprises (COSASE) is responsible for 
examining the reports and accounts of such bodies to ensure that they are conducting their 
business in accordance with the law. The Auditor General prepares a separate report which 
is forwarded for the Committee‘s consideration. Finally, the Local Governments Accounts 
Committee examines Local Government Accounts following receipt of a report on the 
same by the Auditor General.  
Parliamentary Standing Committees have played a significant role in holding government 
officers to account for corruption. It is notable that the PAC is presently chaired by a 
member of the opposition, which has given the PAC a reputation for impartiality in 
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dealing with corruption. Examples of corruption scandals that have been handled by 
parliamentary committees include the fraudulent privatisation of Uganda Commercial 
Bank (1998),
298
 the irregular purchase of land by the National Social Security Fund from a 
company owned by Security Minister Amama Mbabazi (2008)
299
, and  mismanagement 
and misappropriation of funds for the Commonwealth Heads of State and Government 
Meeting (CHOGM) (2007).
300
  
 
The role of the opposition MPs on PAC can be credited to good governance reforms, 
without which multi-party politics would probably not be practiced in Uganda today. 
Between 1986 and 2005, the NRM ruled Uganda under the ―no-party Movement system,‖ 
which was ―individual-merit‖ based, yet also ―broad-based and all-inclusive.‖  Political 
Party activity was virtually banned and parties existed in name only. By 1996 it had 
become increasingly clear that the Movement was really a one-party system, and there was 
increasing pressure from donors to free up the political space and allow political parties to 
operate freely. The NRM conceded to multi-partysim in 2005 after various threats by 
donors to cut aid to Uganda.
301
 I suggest that appointing various Commissions of Inquiry 
between 1999 and 2006 when the NRM caved into the demands for a multi-party system 
of governance was one of the strategies the government used to show that it was 
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democratic in spite of the ban on political party activity. I will return to this issue in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Directorate of Ethics and Integrity 
The directorate was established in 2002 under the Office of the President as the body 
responsible for overseeing the government‘s so-called ―Zero Tolerance‖ anti-corruption 
policy. It is responsible for ―providing political clout and representation of the anti-
Corruption agenda in various local and international fora.‖  It also coordinates all 
government and non-government agencies in the anti-corruption campaign; spearheads the 
development of anti-corruption policies, laws and integrity standards; and acts as 
secretariat and one-stop centre for the accountability sector programmes.   
 
The National Anti-Corruption Strategy is a five year planning framework designed to 
make a significant impact on building the quality of accountability and reducing the levels 
of corruption in Uganda. The strategy seeks to strengthen a number of core areas that are 
regarded as crucial in the fight against corruption. These are: adherence to established 
regulations and legal requirements; political and administrative oversight in the fight 
against corruption; public attitudes and beliefs towards corruption and effective 
enforcement of anti-corruption measures. It seeks to encourage public organisations and 
agencies to adhere to financial and procurement rules and regulations, to change public 
attitudes such that corruption is no longer accepted or glorified, and to encourage 
Ministers and other political leaders to publicly demonstrate their commitment to anti-
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corruption and to promote the implementation of criminal and administrative sanctions for 
culprits.  
 
The Judiciary   
The Anti-Corruption Court is an administrative division of the High Court of Uganda 
established in July 2008 by Practice Direction of the Chief Justice of Uganda specifically 
to address corruption-related cases. The rationale for its establishment was to provide an 
orderly mechanism for the speedy and efficient disposal of corruption cases. Unlike other 
divisions of the High Court, the anti-corruption court will also have two Chief Magistrates 
and Four Grade 1 Magistrates to preside over cases within their jurisdiction. Although the 
Magistrates would not qualify to be members of the High Court, the Magistrates‘ Courts 
Act authorises the Chief Justice to designate magistrates to assist the Anti-corruption 
Division of the High Court.
302
  
 
The Anti-Corruption Court started off with a bang, because its establishment coincided 
with prosecutions recommended by the Commission of Inquiry into the Global Fund for 
HIV/AIDS and Malaria. It tried and convicted Fred Kavuma, a former national television 
producer, who became the first person to be convicted by the ACC over misuse of Global 
Fund  money. He was sentenced to five years in prison for obtaining $19,000 by false 
pretences, and was ordered to refund the money. He obtained the money to air HIV/AIDS 
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sensitization programs, but instead diverted the money to personal use and submitted 
forged receipts to the Ministry of Health. Teddy Ssezi Cheeye, formerly Economic 
Monitoring Director of the intelligence agency External Security Organisation (ESO) and 
former anti-corruption crusader who set up a company in 2005 to serve as a GF sub-
recipient, was sentenced to ten years in prison for embezzling $56,000 of GF money for 
which he produced forged documentation as accountability. His company, ironically 
named the ―Uganda Centre for Accountability‖ (UCA), was awarded a contract to monitor 
other GF Sub-Recipients and to ensure that their work was conducted in conformity with 
approved work plans and budgets. However, the court found that UCA performed almost 
no such monitoring work despite having expended all the grant money within the first 
month of its receipt. Elizabeth Ngororano and Annaliza Mondon established an NGO 
―Health Value Added Ltd.‖ which received US$15,000. They failed to account for most of 
the funds and were sentenced in July 2009 to five years in jail with an order to refund the 
embezzled money. 
303 
 
With the Anti-Corruption Court making headlines, the NRM regime has been quick to 
give itself credit for having ―restored the rule of law and the independence of the 
judiciary‖304  However, it is obvious that the current level of judicial independence has 
also been due to donors‘ insistence on judicial independence as a pre-requisite for the rule 
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of law. Santos sees this phenomenon as the global rule of law/judicial consensus, one of 
the pillars that supports hegemonic globalisation. The rule of law and an independent 
judiciary are regarded as quintessential to development, mainly because of their role in 
ensuring predictability and certainty for investments and securing property rights.
305
 He 
further observes that the ―1990s witnessed the increasing social and political visibility of 
the judicial system across the globe, the rising protagonism of the courts and judges in 
public life and the mass media and the transformation of the once exoteric judicial affairs 
and proceedings into the frequent topic of conversation among lay citizens.‖ 306  
 
In Uganda, DANIDA is the donor agency that has had the most visible impact and 
interaction with the Judiciary, through its ―Strengthening the Judiciary Project.‖ From 
1995-2005, DANIDA poured over 125 million Danish Kroners into the Judiciary.
307
 This 
money went to building and improving the physical infrastructure of the court system and 
improving the human resource capacity of the judiciary by providing training for judicial 
officers. More than 128 judges and magistrates from Uganda attended training courses in 
Denmark during the period 1995-2005. During this training, one of the primary themes 
was the independence of the courts and the executive.
308
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The rise of good governance  has therefore led to a change from the days of Idi Amin 
when judges were openly intimidated and even murdered.
309
 Judicial independence in 
Uganda can be deduced from the extent to which the judiciary is willing to reach 
judgments that do not favour the Executive branch of government, especially in politically 
sensitive cases.  For example, in Ssemwogerere versus the Attorney General, the 
petitioner, who was the Chair of the opposition Democratic Party, challenged the 
constitutionality of the Referendum Act 1999 that was passed without Parliamentary 
Quorum. The Constitutional Court declared both the Act and the Referendum held under it 
null and void, to the chagrin of the regime.
310
 The Referendum concerned the 
abandonment of the Movement System in favour of Multi-partyism. It was boycotted by 
political parties but nevertheless the ―Yes‖ vote carried the day in accordance with the 
NRM‘s wishes. 
 
The Judiciary has made other ―anti-executive‖ judgments in politically sensitive matters, 
including the acquittal of Opposition FDC leader Kizza Besigye on rape and treason 
charges.
311
 The Constitutional Court nullified sections of the Penal Code that criminalised 
the ―publication of false news,‖ that were being used by the government to harass the 
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press and intimidate journalists.
312
 It also nullified sections of the Political Parties and 
Organisations Act that sought to suppress the activities of Political parties.
313
  More 
importantly, in petitions challenging the election of the President in 2001 and 2006, the 
Supreme Court conceded that the election was heavily rigged and stopped short of 
nullifying the results, upholding the result of the election by a narrow majority of the 
bench (3:2, in 2001, and 4:3 in 2006).
314
  One commentator observed that these rulings 
were the best possible for the incumbent President Museveni, because they simultaneously 
demonstrated the independence of the judiciary, whilst preserving his re-election.
315
 
 
Thus the Judiciary is regarded as independent due to its willingness to deliver judgments 
that do not favour the executive. According to Ellet, the Ugandan Judiciary has exhibited 
assertive behaviour in censuring government behaviour, even though it has always stopped 
short of indirectly jeopardising or directly attempting to remove the NRM regime from 
power. She attributes the quality and institutional strength of the Ugandan judiciary to a 
cultural legacy of being separate and distinct from the executive, enhanced by the fact that 
judges still maintain a colonial culture of wearing expensive wigs and robes and exhibiting 
other British mannerisms. Despite the obvious disadvantages of this colonial heritage, 
                                                 
312
 Judgement of the Supreme Court in Obbo and Another versus the Attorney General, Constitutional Appeal No. 2 
of 2002 (unreported). 
313
 Ssemogerere and Others versus the Attorney General, Constitutional petition No. 5 of 2003. See also Rwanyarare 
and Others versus the Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No. 7 of 2002 (unreported). 
314
 Kizza Besigye versus Y. K. Museveni, Presidential Election Petition No. 1 of 2001; Kizza Besigye versus the 
Electoral Commission and Museveni, Presidential Election Petition No. 1 of 2006. Whether the decision was the 
correct one based on the facts and the law or due to timidity remains a matter for speculation. 
315
 See Petersen, C.E., (2006) Uganda: Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Council Elections 2006, Norwegian 
Centre for Human Rights, available at 
http://www.jus.uio.no/smr/english/about/programmes/nordem/publications/nordem-report/2006/0806.pdf; last 
accessed 31 March 2011. 
  
127 
 
such as being far-removed from the ordinary people, Ellet maintains that it has served the 
judiciary well in helping it to maintain a distinct professional and solid identity in the 
midst of Uganda‘s numerous regime changes. She also credits the well-trained judges, 
many of whom left the country during the years of instability in the 1970s and 80s, and 
returned in the 1990s. They have a cosmopolitan global outlook and are not easily cowed 
by executive power and attempts at interference. Ellet further observes that constant public 
criticisms of the Judiciary by the Executive has helped the former to win crucial support 
from Ugandan elites who are not part of the ruling regime, who frequently express their 
support by writing letters to the editors of leading newspapers. 
316
 
 
Accordingly, it may be inferred that the Judiciary in Uganda, (or at the very least, some 
individual judges), has exercised independence and played a significant role in controlling 
executive excess. Although derided by the Executive, it is widely respected both locally 
and internationally. This is an important factor that has influenced the appointment and 
proceedings of commissions of inquiry into corruption chaired by judges, as I will 
elaborate in chapter 4. 
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3.3 The role of non-state actors in anti-corruption in Uganda 
 
3.3.1 The Media 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, ―participation‖ was one of the pillars of the good 
governance agenda / discourse. Media liberalisation was also regarded as an important 
element of democracy and human rights promotion, another key component of the good 
governance discourse. In addition, the media was perceived to be crucial to the fight 
against corruption: 
A free press can be a vital check on abuses of power, especially in  countries that 
lack other means of restraining politicians and bureaucrats.
317
  
To this end, donors have pushed for the liberalisation of the media in countries such as 
Uganda that were previously characterised by State control of the media. For example, the 
DFID ( now UKAID) 2006 White Paper ―Making Governance Work for the Poor‖ had as 
one of its main objectives the creation of a £100 million ―Governance and Transparency 
Fund‖ designed to support free media and civil society in order to enable citizens to hold 
governments to account for the delivery of services.
318
 
The Uganda PRSP 1994/1995 reveals media freedom to be an element of conditionality. 
Under ―Democracy, Human Rights and Political Governance,‖ the government reiterates 
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its commitment to forming a political system characterised by, among other things, ―free, 
strong and independent media, including alternative people‘s media.‖319  
Since the liberalisation of the airwaves in the 1990s, Uganda's press, radio, television and 
internet have grown exponentially. Where once there was only one national Radio Station, 
TV Channel and one or two newspapers, today Uganda boasts of over 100 radio stations, 
over 10 TV broadcast stations, 3 daily newspapers and 9 weekly or monthly periodicals.
320
 
Reporters Without Borders ranked Uganda 107th out of 173 countries on the Worldwide 
Press Freedom Index 2008, 86
th
 out of 175 in 2009, and 96
th
 out of 178 in 2010; which are 
slightly above the average for Sub-Saharan Africa.
321
 Freedom House 2009 ranks the 
country at 112th out of 195 countries and describes the press environment as 'partly free,‘ 
and gives it credit for being one of only 3 African Countries with Freedom of Information 
Laws.
322
 
The growth of the print and electronic media has been accompanied by a surge in public 
debate on governance and corruption-related issues on radio and TV talk shows. Mutabazi 
observes that the vacuum created by the ban of political party activities led the media to 
take up the role of opposition and to a great extent it played that role effectively, given the 
prevailing constraints. It was the main source of political information and allowed 
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Ugandans to get to know ―the other side‖ of the hitherto regarded as benevolent 
―Movement.‖323 Similarly, Mwesige observes that the political role of radio has been 
altered by the introduction of private radio in developing countries such as Uganda. He 
particularly draws attention to political call-in talk shows, which create an opportunity for 
ordinary people to challenge the ruling establishment in unprecedented ways in a situation 
where information previously moved only in a top-down manner.
324
  
In particular, ―Ebimeeza‖ or open-air public round-table forums broadcast over radio had 
become lively cites for debate where the government was freely criticised for its 
incompetence and wrong-doing.
 325
 There has also been an expansion in access to the 
internet, with many newspapers and even radio stations available online. Journalists such 
as Andrew Mwenda,
326
 Charles Onyango Obbo,
327
 Ssemujju Ibrahim Nganda
328
 and 
several others write weekly columns that are critical of the government.  Mwenda and 
Obbo have been arrested a number of times for the crime of sedition, and were 
instrumental in freeing up media space when they successfully petitioned the 
Constitutional and Supreme Courts to overturn oppressive laws that curtailed freedom of 
speech and of the press.
329
  
                                                 
323
 Mutabazi, S. S. (2009). "Switching roles in pursuit of democracy in Uganda: the performance of civil soceity and 
the media in the absence of political opposition." Les Cahiers D'Afrique de l'Est 41: 95-115. 
324
 Mwesige, P. (2009), ―The democratic functions and dysfunctions of political talk radio: the case of Uganda,‖ 
Journal of African Media Studies 1(2):221-245 
325
 Mwesige, P. (2009) ―Disseminators, Advocates and Watchdogs: A Profile of Ugandan Journalists in the New 
Millenium,‖ Journalism 5(1):69-96 
326
 The Independent, www.independent.co.ug  
327
 The Daily Monitor, www.monitor.co.ug; The East African (weekly), www.eastafrican.co.ke  
328
 The Weekly Observer, www.observer.ug  
329
 The crime of sedition was defined under sections 42-44 of the Penal Code as ― saying or publishing statements 
inciting hatred towards the person of the president.‖ See Charles Onyango Obbo and Andrew Mwenda versus the 
  
131 
 
Uganda also has a growing community of bloggers and ―cyber-dissidents‖ who are critical 
of the government on their blogs and contribute to various internet discussion forums.
330
 
Thus the media in Uganda has been relatively free and has played an important role in 
exposing corruption, as cases involving senior members of government are frequently 
reported by the media, and the public expressing their views on corruption through radio 
and TV talk shows, letters to newspaper editors, on their blogs and on e-newspapers.
331
  
Despite the arrests of journalists, the regime has  to a limited extent, been tolerant of 
discussions about corruption in the Media, even tolerating the naming of specific 
individuals allegedly involved in corruption. This has enabled the media to be a credible 
force against corruption in Uganda, and because it is largely private and not government 
owned it is trusted by the public as an authentic source of news of what goes on in 
government. The media remains Uganda‘s most credible ―opposition and it is through this 
avenue that ―public outcry‖ against corruption is seen and heard. This public outcry then 
forms the basis for a commission of inquiry, which according to law must be appointed to 
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look into matters ―of public concern.‖332 When a Commission of Inquiry is instituted, it is 
media access and reportage of its proceedings that makes the inquiry a public event and 
gives it significance. I will discuss in greater detail the significance of the media in the 
appointment and proceedings of inquiries in Uganda in chapters 4 and 5.  
 
3.3.2 Theatre and Music 
Theatre and Music are popular cultural art-forms in Uganda, a fact that has not been lost 
on Uganda‘s donors. Frank notes that international organisations are increasingly turning 
to theatre as a means of raising development issues and influencing behaviour change.
333
 
There is also increasing support and active encouragement of theatrical and music groups 
who can spread the message of good governance through songs and plays. An example in 
the International Anti-corruption Theatre Movement (IATM), birthed in Uganda by 
Ugandan actor and producer, and supported by Action Aid Denmark, an international 
Danish NGO that is in turn supported by DANIDA.  The organisation, consists of eleven 
smaller groups that stage plays against corruption across the country.
334
  
Aside from these ―development‖ theatre groups, there are urban-based theatre groups that 
regularly stage plays in theatre buildings.
335
 Although these are mostly for entertainment, 
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they too regularly portray political and development themes in their plays, including 
corruption. Examples of such groups include The Ebonies, The Bakayimbira dramactors, 
and Afritalent.  
Uganda has many local pop-musicians, whose styles ranges from rap, R & B, to what has 
been described as ―neo-traditional.‖336 Music is recognised as having played a significant 
role in the dissemination of public health messages relating to HIV/AIDS,
337
 and is now 
being looked at as a way of promoting anti-corruption messages as well. For example, 
there is an on-going global competition for original songs by young bands (18-35 years) 
on the theme of anti-corruption organised by Fair Play, which in turn is an initiative of 
Jeunesses Musicales International (JMI),the World Bank Institute and the Global Youth 
Anti-Corruption Youth Network.
338
 A number of Ugandan Musicians have written songs 
about corruption, for example, a hip-hop song entitled ―Corruption‖ by Bebe Cool and 
Sweet Kid, two of Uganda‘s leading pop-stars, criticises the regime for its hypocrisy, for 
claiming to liberate Ugandans but condemning them to live in a ―Babylon‖ of poverty and 
discrimination.
339
  Similarly, ―Corruption ndwade mbi (corruption is a bad disease)‖ by 
Nabweru Parent‘s School Choir is a lament about corruption in Uganda and says 
everything in Uganda is sub-standard, including schools, roads, hospitals, and even 
includes the example of the helicopters.
340
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―Akeyo ka yiya,” meaning ―the broom sweeps,‖ an anti-corruption song in one of the local 
languages, Lusoga, decries corruption in Uganda and decries the regime for its selfishness 
and greed, calling upon the citizens to stop selling their souls for a few shillings.‖341  
―Nsobedwa,‖ meaning, ―I am flabbergasted‖ is a Luganda rap about corruption and greed 
by politicians. It bemoans the culture of impunity, and the fact that honest men suffer 
while the thieves prosper.
342
 ―Enguuzi‖ meaning ―bribery‖ by traditional music group 
Abafrika ba Mungu is another example of the portrayal of corruption in popular culture. It 
is a lament for the nation, decrying the poor state of the hospitals, roads and schools and 
calls upon the people of Uganda to wake up.
343
  ―Nipatiye  chai‖ Swahilli for ―Give me 
some tea‖ is by Ugandan Afro-fusion group Tamba and Qwela decries both petty and 
grand corruption in Uganda.
344
  
It is difficult to evaluate what impact these artistic forms are having on corruption in 
Uganda; indeed, such an evaluation is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, they 
reveal that good governance discourse is no longer restricted to boardrooms and offices 
where donor and government officials meet, but has been adopted and adapted on the 
streets, the suburbs and the slums. It is a testimony of the agency of the Uganda people 
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and the ways in which they have taken advantage of the discourse to fight for their 
emancipation.  
 
3.3.3 NGOs and Civil Society 
Alongside encouraging media freedom, the good governance discourse espoused the 
growth the civil society as one of the means of keeping the state in check. The 
participation of civil society in the formulation, review and implementation of PRSPs 
remains a crucial element of the PRSP process as it is the means of proving that it is 
―nationally owned.‖ 345 Donors have greatly encouraged the growth of civil society by 
channelling a significant percentage of aid directly through NGOs as opposed to the state. 
For example, DFID, through the Uganda Civil Society Umbrella Programme, supplied 
GBP 2,000,000 to civil society organisations in Uganda between 1998 and 2003 with the 
aim of strengthening their capacity to participate in governance and hold the government 
to account.
346
 
There are over 3,500 registered NGOs in Uganda. Many are ―small, unspecialised and 
unfocused.‖347  The main activity for most of them is advocacy, although a good number 
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are also involved in service delivery in education, health, water and sanitation. They are 
organised under networks at district and national level, for example, the Uganda National 
NGO Forum which is a nationwide umbrella organisation for the NGO sector, the 
Development Network of Voluntary Associations (DENIVA), and of relevance to this 
study, the Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda (ACCU). The ACCU is an umbrella group 
of more than 70 civil society organisations seeking to curb corruption in Uganda in order 
to contribute to poverty reduction. The ACCU engages in advocacy and research on 
corruption-related issues. It organises an anti-corruption week every year in December, the 
purpose of which is to mobilise civil society in the fight against corruption. In 2008, the 
coalition started the Name and Shame book where public servants who are caught in 
corruption practices and convicted are named and shamed.
348
 ACCU works closely with 
Transparency International Uganda (TI) Uganda, which is a member of the coalition that 
undertakes advocacy work on anti-corruption laws, holds workshops, and arranges 
campaigns, seminars and events.  
Uganda Debt Network (UDN) is an advocacy and lobbying coalition of NGOs, institutions 
and individuals that actively engage in anti-corruption lobbying activities.
349
 The UDN 
was formed in 1996 as a result of civil society concerns with the social economic 
development of the country due to the unsustainable level of Uganda's debt burden.
350
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The African Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption (APNAC) Uganda was 
established in 2000 as one of the first country partners in the network. It engages in 
advocacy and networking within and outside the Parliament on corruption issues and, in 
particular, in sensitising the public on the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption (ACPCC).
351
   
The ―safe‖ approach to activism and advocacy adopted by many NGOs such as ACCU 
belies another reality – that most NGOs in Uganda are not necessarily motivated by 
altruism or a burning desire to cause change, but have become an avenue by which elites 
who are not employed in the government or the private sector can create jobs for 
themselves by accessing donor funding.  A recent study on the NGO sector in Uganda 
casts doubt over the viability of a ―charitable sector‖ in Uganda:  
…the evidence suggests that grants from external donors do not encourage a local 
charitable sector. Many local NGOs seem to be created simply to obtain grant 
funding. This interpretation is reinforced by the numerous Ugandan NGOs that 
have a shadowy existence when they do not receive an external grant. For instance, 
of the roughly 1,700 NGOs registered in Kampala at the time of the survey, only a 
quarter could be located. Grants do not appear to go to NGOs that would raise 
funds on their own; instead, they go to a few well-educated, well-connected 
organizations and individuals skilled at writing grant applications. Observing that 
grant recipients do not raise local resources does not imply that they deliver 
services poorly. But it calls into question the assumption that underlies the switch 
away from government services: if local NGOs are not driven by an altruistic 
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motive, why should they be expected to behave in a less opportunistic manner than 
civil servants? 
352
  
This lack of altruism and the corresponding upward accountability of NGOs to donors as 
opposed to downward accountability to citizens implies that NGOs can only have a 
limited impact on anti-corruption in Uganda.   This has arisen largely because the so-
called growth of civil society in Uganda has come about as a top-down development, 
encouraged by the World Bank and other donors as one of elements of good governance 
and democracy. NGOs have arisen not necessarily because they have an emancipatory 
agenda, but as a logical response to the availability of donor funds. They are not grass-
roots movements as such, but top-down formations. As Odora says, ―it reflects donors‘ 
practice of channelling more resources outside the state, not an increased political 
importance of civil society.‖353 Needless to say, there are other internal political factors 
that limit the effectiveness of NGOs. These will be discussed shortly in the section that 
follows.  
 
On the other hand, Jones‘ recent study of rural life in Eastern Uganda points to the fact 
that civil society in Uganda is indeed alive and active, but not in the places where 
academics tend to look for it. He observes that the Churches and Burial Societies are the 
main institutions through which the rural people manage their affairs and address their 
development and social concerns. He decries the marginalisation by academics of the role 
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of the church and customary institutions in development.
354
 Other scholars have pointed 
out the significance of religious organisations such as Mothers‘ Union, Young Women‘s 
Christian Association (YWCA) and the Roman Catholic Women‘s Guild in addressing 
women‘s development concerns.355 Hence there is a need for the re-conceptualisation of 
―civil society‖ in Uganda.  
 
Although the prospects for genuine grass-roots movements that can challenge corruption 
and demand accountability in Uganda currently appear dismal, there remains a possibility 
that ―out of the ashes‖ of the prevailing socio-economic conditions, an authentic civil 
society may gradually emerge.
356
 This will be made possible by the increasing political 
awareness of the population, especially the rural people who are the largest constituency. 
Increased political awareness will be a long term outcome of increased access to education 
through the introduction of Universal Primary Education; increased media access through 
the proliferation of privately-owned radio and TV stations; improved telecommunications 
and improved transport networks connecting the rural and urban areas. Thus, the impetus 
for democracy and emancipation engendered by global neo-liberal policy, while top-down, 
may have planted the seeds for more authentic democratisation. Indeed, both Mwenda
357
 
and Tripp
358
 note that there are already significant spaces and opportunities within civil 
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society, the media, the educated elite, the judiciary and the legislature where a democratic 
culture is gaining ground. It is these spaces that some judges, journalists, opposition 
politicians and other activists have taken advantage of to criticise the government and 
push for accountability and transparency. 
 
The discussion above has shown the steps that the Ugandan government, with the support 
of its donors, has taken to put in place a comprehensive anti-corruption framework. It has 
been shown that there are laws and institutions in place that have the potential to curtail 
corruption in Uganda. There is a fairly independent judiciary, a vibrant media, and a 
fledgling civil society which have tried to hold the government accountable for its actions 
within the limited spaces available. The good governance discourse has therefore had a 
contradictory impact on Uganda that is both boundary-setting and path-breaking; to 
borrow Santos‘ phrase. The ways in which the anti-corruption framework has been 
repressive as opposed to emancipatory calls for a deeper analysis of the various factors at 
play. Accordingly, the next section discusses why, and how the government subverts anti-
corruption efforts. 
 
3.4 Neo-patrimonialism and the “lack of political will” to fight corruption 
The establishment of a ―near perfect‖  anti-corruption framework is crucial to the ability of 
the Uganda State to obtain development aid. The various PRSPs and PRSP Progress 
Reports over the years reveal that the Uganda government is at constant pains to 
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demonstrate its commitment to anti-corruption. And yet, despite the progress made, the 
framework has had a very limited impact on corruption in Uganda. In the previous 
chapter, the limited impact was attributed to problems within the discourse of good 
governance itself and its implementation mechanism of conditionality. However, there are 
also many internal problems in the domestic arena that hinder anti-corruption. These are 
frequently attributed to the ―lack of political will‖ to fight corruption.  
 
The lack of political will is a complex issue, as a number of scholars have acknowledged. 
Fritzen calls it the ―orthodox paradox,‖ meaning the impracticability of political leaders 
spearheading anti-corruption reforms that go against their interests. According to him, the 
―lack of political will‖ frequently cited as the reason for the failure of anti-corruption 
efforts is simplistic, as it fails to acknowledge the impossibility of State elites policing 
themselves. The ruling elite cannot police themselves when they gain so much from 
corruption and have so much to lose by fighting it.
359
 What they gain is the expansion and 
maintenance of their power base; concomitantly, seriously addressing corruption by 
punishing culprits poses a threat to that power-base.  
 
The present configuration of politics and government in Uganda is based upon patronage 
and clientelism, and corruption is the glue that holds the patronage network together. This 
works in the following ways; firstly, the President, who is at the top of the network, allows 
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(by turning a blind eye) his political cronies and potential rivals such as Ministers and 
heads of other government bodies to enrich themselves by embezzling funds or obtaining 
kickbacks on government contracts in return for their support. Secondly, public goods and 
services such as electricity, roads, schools and health centres are awarded to communities 
in exchange for political support, thereby rendering them clients. Thirdly, citizens sell 
their votes to politicians in exchange for cash or consumable goods.  This type of political 
arrangement based on patrons and clients has been referred to as neo-patrimonialism. 
 
3.4.1 Neo-patrimonialism defined 
The concept of neo-patrimonialism has been identified as central to the lack of political 
will in fighting corruption.
360
 In this regard, the failure of anti-corruption is due the fact 
that it attempts to promote legal-rationality as propounded by Weber in a context that is 
characterised by neo-patrimonialism, described as a ―mixture‖ of legal rationality and the 
patrimonial style of government.  It is drawn from Weber‘s theories on power, domination 
and authority. Weber averred that there are three types of authority: legal, traditional and 
charismatic.  Patrimonialism falls under the traditional mode of authority and domination. 
Weber used it to describe a system of rule based on administrative and military personnel, 
who were responsible only to the ruler.
361
  Weber‘s theory has been modified elsewhere 
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by Quimpo, as ―a type of rule in which the ruler does not distinguish between personal and 
public patrimony and treats matters and resources of state as his personal affair.‖362 
 
The term itself originated with Eisenstadt, who derived it from Weber‘s term, 
―Patrimonialism.‘  Neopatrimonialism is therefore a modern form of the traditional 
patrimonial form of rule and is a mixed system. Elements of patrimonial and rational-
bureaucratic rule co-exist and are interwoven.
363
  Erdmann‘s further elucidation of the 
concept is enlightening: 
Under patrimonialism, all power relations between ruler and ruled, political as well 
as administrative relations, are personal relations; there is no differentiation 
between the private and the public realm. However, under neo-patrimonialism the 
distinction between the private and the public, at least formally, exists and is 
accepted, and public reference can be made to this distinction. Neo-patrimonial rule 
takes place within the framework of, and with the claim to, legal-rational 
bureaucracy or ‗modern‘ stateness. Formal structures and rules do exist, although in 
practice the separation of the private and public sphere is not always 
observed….two role systems or logics exist next to each other, the patrimonial of 
the personal relations, and the legal-rational of the bureaucracy. These spheres are 
not isolated from each other... they permeate each other: the patrimonial penetrates 
the legal-rational system and twists its logic, functions, and output, but does not 
take exclusive control over the legal-rational logic… informal politics invades 
formal institutions.
364
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In neo-patrimonialist states, politics is highly informal, and some scholars have argued 
that the state is a mere façade that masks the realities of deeply personalised political 
relations.
365
 Neopatrimonialism encompasses both clientelism and patronage. The former 
refers to the exchange or brokerage of specific services and resources (for example land, 
jobs) for political support in the form of votes. The latter refers to politically motivated 
distribution of ―favours‖ not to individuals, but to groups, usually ethnic or sub-ethnic.366 
In this manner, it creates a distorted social contract between rulers and ruled , where 
people delegate power to those who will take care of them.
367
 This fuels corruption even 
further, because a moral economy is created in which there is what Chabal and Daloz refer 
to as asymmetrical reciprocity between leaders and led. Clientelism and corruption are 
legitimated by the fact that they serve a community purpose  as well as individual 
enrichment.
368
  
 
Neo-patrimonialism also involves ―presidentialism‖ which means ―the systematic 
concentration of political power in the hand on one individual, who resists delegating all 
but the most trivial decision-making tasks.‖369 The president ―is literally above the law, 
controls in many cases a large proportion of state finance with little accountability, and 
delegates remarkably little of his authority on important matters… the presidency emerges 
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as the dominant arena for decision-making, to the point that regular ministerial structures 
are relegated to an executant‘s role.370  
 
However, it should be noted that, scholars such as Pitcher and Moran cautioned against 
using the term to describe ―all of Africa‘s troubles.‖371 saying that its current popular 
usage is a serious misreading of Weber. In particular, they emphasise that Weber‘s use of 
the term delineated a legitimate type of authority. It included ideas of reciprocity and 
voluntary compliance between rulers and ruled, which enabled subjects to check the 
actions of their rulers; yet analyses of African patrimonialism overlook this important 
aspect. They also decry the tendency to use the term to describe various regime types 
ranging from dictatorial to semi-democratic, ―which has established and naturalised a 
supposedly characteristic form of leadership and governance to the continent as a whole… 
providing a neat and consistent explanation for violence, state collapse, corruption and a 
host of other ills.‖372 Using a case study of Botswana, one of Africa‘s ―success‖ stories, 
which they show to be very clearly a neo- patrimonial state, they reveal the shortcomings 
of using the term to condense Africa‘s complex development problems. They suggest that 
each African country should be viewed individually and called what it is – ―an 
authoritarian regime, a dictatorship, or a democracy with adjectives.‖373  Thus, Tripp‘s 
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conceptualisation of the Ugandan State as ―hybrid,‖ or ―semi-authoritarian‖ rather than 
―neo-patrimonial‖ would be more desirable.374  
 
Nevertheless, in this study, I will retain the term neo-patrimonialism because it more aptly 
illustrates the patron and client relationships that are important to my analysis of anti-
corruption failure in Uganda, as opposed to viewing them through a democratic/dictatorial 
lens. In the next section, I elaborate on how neo-patrimonial patron-client relations operate 
in the Ugandan context. 
 
 
3.4.2 Neo-patrimonialism in Uganda 
In ―Personalising power in Uganda,‖  Mwenda notes that the leader (Museveni) ―wears all 
the hats and pulls all the strings.‖375  Journalist Onyango Obbo says that ―Museveni must 
have the Africa record for dealing with the smallest problems personally,‖ from resolving 
disputes between technocrats, to land disputes and family disputes.
376
 The President has 
allegedly been involved in government procurement, directing to whom tenders should be 
awarded as happened in the Junk Helicopters saga discussed in Chapter 5. He was also 
reportedly involved in procurement deals for the Commonwealth Heads of State and 
Government Meeting (CHOGM) that took place in October 2007 in Uganda. In the Global 
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Alliance for Vaccine and Immunisation (GAVI) Funds scandal, in which Ministers for 
Health Jim Muhwezi, Mike Mukula, and Alex Kamugisha were implicated, he directed the 
IGG to conduct investigations, contrary to the Constitutional guarantee of the IGG‘s 
autonomy.
377
 These are just a few examples of the President‘s extensive involvement in 
decision-making in Uganda.  
 
The personalisation of power can be further seen in instances where the President has 
publicly admitted to protecting senior politicians close to him from legal proceedings/ and 
or sanctions that loomed over them due to their involvement in corruption. Speaking at the 
wedding of Francis Otafiire, son of Minister of Water, Lands and Environment Kahinda 
Otafiire, Museveni is quoted to have said: 
I will not run away from old friends. I refused to run away from (Amama) Mbabazi 
during the Temangalo saga because he is an old friend and that is why I have 
always defended Otafiire whenever he is attacked by all sorts of people…378 
Indeed, many people close to Museveni have been tainted by corruption allegations. In 
2008, Ananias Tumukunde, an aide to President Museveni, was jailed at Southwark 
Crown Court for receiving £80,000 in bribes from a Wiltshire-based firm that was 
awarded a contract to protect world leaders during the Commonwealth Heads of State and 
Government Meeting in 2007 in Kampala.
379
 On December 9, 2009 the British handed a 
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cheque for the amount to the IGG at a public function in Kampala. And yet,  Museveni 
kept Tumukunde on his staff and never came out to applaud the actions of the British or 
condemn Tumukunde.
380
 
Thus we see the President out rightly acknowledging corruption in his regime and 
simultaneously admitting to going out of his way to protect members of the ruling elite.  
 
A portrait of Uganda‘s ruling elite would show the President at the top or centre, and just 
below or surrounding him are the remaining members of the so-called ―band of 27‖ who 
went with him to the bush to launch a guerrilla war in 1980, of which the above-named 
Otafiire is one. It also includes other people who did not go to the bush, but supported the 
activities of the NRA/NRM by fundraising, raising awareness and so on, of which Amama 
Mbazazi is one. Many of these ―top‖ cadres are Ministers or army generals. It is also 
significant that they are from the same ethnic group. A few members of the band of 27 
such as Kizza Besigye and Mugisha Muntu have left the NRM and are now in the 
Opposition. In addition to this ―original‖ group of ―1986‖ millionaires, so called because 
they took power as a rag-tag under-nourished army but are now extremely wealthy and 
pot-bellied individuals, are various others who have been co-opted into the system over 
the years, most of whom are from the President‘s family and/or ethnic group.381  
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Patronage in countries such as Uganda constitutes a ‗rational choice‘ made by politicians 
as the best way of maximising and legitimating their power. For example, With 71 
members, Uganda has the third largest cabinet in the world, after North Korea and Kenya. 
A large Cabinet enables the President to buy off potential opponents among the elites by 
giving them salaried jobs and opportunities for accumulation through corruption. More 
importantly, it provides a short cut to obtaining the support of the masses, as these co-
opted elites form an important bridge between the leadership and the various ethnic 
constituencies that make up Uganda. As one Ugandan political commentator has observed: 
(Ethnic) identity creates a common emotive ground between elites and the masses 
that obscures the economic and class differences between the two groups. Elites 
construct their presence in government as a sign that their tribe or religion is 
represented in the high councils of power. Ordinary people see in the success of 
their kith and kin an image of their own future... To legitimise their wealth, wealthy 
elites indulge in exaggerated demonstrations of generosity. They host lavish feasts 
where the masses are treated to meat and chicken and alcohol; they give charity to 
poor neighbours whenever they are in difficulty; they pay school fees for a few 
children in the village; they help some get jobs in the capital city... It is through 
these acts of generosity that elites legitimise their wealth among their impoverished 
kith and kin. But their public displays of wealth also offer hope among the tribe that 
their sons too can grow to attain such feats of wealth and status. Therefore, a 
strategy of co-opting elites, even when it diminishes the state‘s capacity to deliver 
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public goods and services to the masses, remains a more cost-effective strategy of 
building successful political coalitions to win elections in Africa.
382
  
Echoing Chabal and Daloz, the same commentator maintains that in this way, corruption 
is accountability. Although corruption is on its face, a selfish act that enriches big men at 
the expense of the poor, the fact that a significant portion of stolen funds are spent on 
extending personal generosity to individuals or rural communities buy corruption its 
legitimacy.
383
   
In Uganda, political coalition building has evolved into an art form, where patronage 
extends from the presidency down to the village level, the lowest unit of local government 
administration. In 1986, the NRM government introduced a novel system of popular 
participation based on ―Resistances Councils,‖ later re-named Local Councils (LCs), with 
units ranging from LC1 (village), LCII (parish), LCIII (sub-county), LC IV (County) to 
LC V(District). The basic unit, the LC I is composed of all adults within a given locality, 
with a directly elected executive committee. However, beyond the village level, voting is 
based on electoral colleges made up of committee members, thereby creating a hierarchy 
that becomes increasingly elitist the higher one goes in structures of the system.   
 
The LC system was hailed both locally and internationally as an innovation that greatly 
increased the peoples‘ participation in their governance; one that enabled the government 
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to get away with what was essentially a one-party state long after other regimes in Africa 
had been pressured into adopting multi-party politics.
384
 However, it was not long before 
cracks begun to appear, as the Movement showed itself to be increasingly authoritarian 
and intolerant of dissent and opposition.
385
 Following mounting donor pressure, in 2005 
the Movement system was abandoned in favour of multipartyism, and ―the Movement‖ 
became a political party – the National Resistance Movement.386   
 
Despite the introduction of party politics, the ruling NRM has maintained a stranglehold 
over Ugandan politics. This is because the local government structures were fused with the 
Movement system, as the Local Councillors from Village to District level also served as 
political mobilisers. This created a formidable political mobilisation apparatus which the 
opposition parties have not effectively penetrated to-date.
387
   Secondly, Local Council 
politics was captured by local elites, as only such people had the political and economic 
influence to be elected through the electoral colleges. 
388
 With ethnicity as the corner-stone 
of the patronage system, the re-introduction of multi-party politics has been accompanied 
by a domino effect, with different tribes and sub-tribes demanding to be located within 
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their own district to avoid marginalisation from larger tribes. There are now 114 districts 
from 10 at independence and 33 at the time when the NRM took power. The re-
emphasising of ethnicity and tribalism at the expense of nationalism is seen as an attempt 
by the NRM to entrench patronage by fragmenting the opposition, creating jobs for its 
clients whilst maintaining its hold on power because granting districts to locals who 
demand for them makes the latter beholden to the government and obliged to ensure that 
voting in that district is pro-NRM.
389
 The transformation of Local Councils into 
instruments of patronage in Uganda lends credence to Chabal and Daloz‘s claim that 
African leaders‘ corrupt behaviour can be rationally explained, that what appears as 
corruption and disorder are politically instrumentalised and enable the system to work and 
to perpetuate itself.
390
 
 
It can therefore be seen that neo-patrimonialism, manifested through patronage politics is 
one of the most important factors behind the lack of political will to fight corruption and 
hence the ineffectiveness of laws and policies. It does this in two ways – firstly, the ruling 
elite are unwilling to enforce anti-corruption because they benefit a great deal from it. 
Secondly, and perhaps even more crucially, patronage quells demands for accountability 
from an electorate that has settled for public services to be given as favours and not as 
rights. All in all, corruption emerges as the glue that holds patronage networks together 
and therefore as the means by which political power is exercised and maintained.  
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3.5 How the Uganda government subverts anti-corruption  
 
Given the important role that corruption plays in the political system, there are various 
ways by which the government subtly and blatantly subverts ant-corruption. Subtle ways 
include the under-resourcing and overburdening of anti-corruption agencies, which is 
further aided by the existence of multiple agencies with overlapping jurisdictions. They 
also include the use or abuse of discretionary powers to prosecute or not to prosecute 
(usually blamed on lack of evidence), as well as the discretion not to implement non-
binding recommendations made by anti-corruption agencies.  Anti-corruption is also 
subverted by the passing of watered down laws that give with one hand, but contain claw-
back clauses that impact negatively on the ability of the law to tackle corruption. On the 
other hand, blatant ways involve direct interference in the work of anti-corruption 
agencies that obstructs the process of justice, as well as nepotism and cronyism in the 
appointment of officials involved in anti-corruption. Moreover, the State can use coercive 
and non-coercive means to clamp down on the judiciary, media and civil society who 
demand for accountability. 
 
 3.5. 1 Under-resourcing and overburdening anti-corruption agencies 
In spite of the Constitution proclaiming that ―the distribution of powers and functions as 
well as checks and balances provided for in the Constitution among various organs and 
institutions of 
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government shall be supported through the provision of adequate resources for their 
effective functioning at all levels,‖391 a common lament of anti-corruption agencies in 
Uganda is the lack of resources. This might  look like as a straightforward issue of lack, 
yet there is more to it than meets the eye. The lack of financial and human resource 
capacity can be regarded as a deliberate ploy to hinder anti-corruption, especially when 
one takes into consideration the amount of money that is invested in sectors such as 
Defence. 
392
 
 
For instance, the Inspectorate of Government (IG), Uganda‘s main anti-corruption agency, 
perennially suffers from staffing shortages. Despite the overwhelming amount of work it 
does, for example, the department concerned with Leadership Code enforcement currently 
handles over 15,000 Asset Declaration forms a year with minimum staff. Its reports to 
Parliament usually highlight its inability to retain experienced lawyers, which affects its 
institutional memory and further slows down its work.
393
 During the first half of 2009, 
(January –June) the IG handled a total of 2,933 complaints. Out of these 1,834 were 
brought forward from the previous reporting period, while 739 were received or initiated 
by the Inspectorate of Government within the reporting period. Only a total of 361 
complaints were concluded including 73 complaints which were processed and later 
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referred to other institutions. These numbers give a picture of the overwhelming amount of 
work that is left undone or carried forward from reporting period to reporting period.
394
 
 
Similarly, the DPP still receives over 1000 corruption related files in a given year, 
particularly embezzlement. However, for example in 2005, only 168 out of these 1000 was 
sanctioned for prosecution. An impressive 51 of the cases ended in convictions while 7 
were acquitted. Nevertheless, the fact that 1,100 cases out of a total of 1,326 were ―still at 
other stages‖ reveals the magnitude of the corruption problem and DPPs inadequacy to get 
to the bottom of it all.
395
  
 
The problem of lack of capacity is keenly felt in the CID, which receives about 30 to 40 
corruption-related complaints every month. And yet, there are only about 30 people 
working in the Fraud Squad. As a result there is an enormous backlog in cases. Moreover, 
there are only three forensic experts; one ballistic expert and two handwriting experts. 
These experts have to work with obsolete materials and equipment, as there is no proper 
laboratory, and only two microscopes to work with.
396
 This shows the government‘s lack 
of commitment to the investigation of corruption, despite rhetorical statements to the 
contrary.  
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There is inadequate police expertise in forensic auditing and investigation of corruption. 
This causes delays in investigation of crimes, and may eventually lead to prosecution 
being abandoned or cases dismissed due to insufficient evidence. The lack of human 
resource capacity is exacerbated by poor remuneration of the government officers with 
responsibility for managing corruption. Not only does it affect their morale and 
motivation, it also leaves them open to temptation from the perpetrators who have 
amassed a lot of wealth and can easily compromise them.   
 
Matters are further worsened, in the case of the Inspectorate of Government, by its 
extremely wide mandate. Whether this is a deliberate ploy by the government to paralyse 
its operations and reduce its effectiveness can only be a matter for speculation. In any 
case, it is clear that the current mandate is far too wide and leads to the Inspectorate being 
spread thinly over matters that could be ably handled by different institutions. The 
ombudsman function of ensuring just and fair treatment in administrative decisions is 
quite different from the anti-corruption function.  The enforcement of the Leadership Code 
Act is also something that could be ably handled by a different department, so that the 
Inspectorate concentrates on the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
corruption. This specialisation on corruption only would also enhance cooperation with 
the recently established Anti-Corruption Division of the High Court that has been set up 
specifically to handle only corruption-related cases.  
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―Too many cooks spoil the broth‖ is an adage that aptly describes the limitations of anti-
corruption in Uganda. There is an overlap between the IGG and the Directorate of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) regarding the prosecution of corruption-related offences which can 
cause foot-dragging and passing-the-buck, as happened with Jim Muhwezi and Mike 
Mukula‘s petition to the Constitutional Court seeking clarification regarding whether it 
was IGG or the DPP who had power to prosecute them.
397
 Under section 41, the Anti-
Corruption Act grants authority to both the Director of Public Prosecutions and the 
Inspector General of Government, to order the investigation of suspects‘ bank accounts, 
share accounts and other documents that may be necessary to prove various corruption 
offences. This provision was highly opposed by the former IGG, Mrs. Faith Mwondha, 
who argued for the powers under the Act to be granted only to the IGG so that there could 
be clarity on the issue.
398
 Nevertheless, her calls were not heeded. This reveals  how the 
government subverts anti-corruption by leaving loopholes that it can wiggle through in 
order to avoid or delay the enforcement of the law. Similarly, irregularity in procurement 
is currently handled by both the IGG and the PPDA causing uncertainty on the part of both 
the government and the public.
399
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Another problem that has hampered anti-corruption agencies is the ability to hire and 
retain qualified staff, especially in professions such as law and accounting where the 
private sector offers much more lucrative opportunities. In 2006  Mr. John Muwanga, a 
former partner in PriceWaterHouse Coopers (PWC)  declined re-appointment after his 
first term expired on grounds that his pay was insufficient.  He was earning Uganda 
shillings 2.9 million (about USD 1,450) gross pay when other senior public servants were 
earning much higher salaries; for example, the Commissioner General of Uganda Revenue 
Authority - 28 million, the Executive Director of the National Social Security Fund – 14.5 
million and the Executive Director of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets 
Authority  - 8 million. He later accepted to remain in office when his salary was 
increased.
400
 The incident was nevertheless an eye-opener into the government‘s inability 
to follow through on its commitment to anti-corruption by adequately remunerating public 
servants employed to fight corruption. 
 
3.5.2 Exercising discretionary powers in such a way as to subvert anti-corruption 
A closer look at the modest achievements of anti-corruption agencies  may lead to an 
inference of the government‘s deliberate subversion of anti-corruption efforts. This can be 
seen from the fact that most of the arrests and prosecutions that the IG conducts are of 
Local Government Staff; for example, in January –June 2009, all the 16 arrests effected by 
the IG were of Local Government Officials such as teachers, town clerks, development 
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officers and others.
401
 In that reporting period, there were 51 on-going prosecutions, and 
only one of them involved ―big fish,‖ Ministers of Health Jim Muhwezi, Mike Mukula and 
Alex Kamugisha, who stand accused of misappropriating funds under the Global Alliance 
for Vaccines (GAVI).  
 
In addition, the DPP sometimes uses his discretionary power to prosecute in a manner that 
causes speculation about his independence and autonomy.  Firstly, he has often been 
accused of catching only small fish when it comes to corruption, while the big fish are left 
to swim free. One notable instance is the Junk Helicopters scandal, where inexplicably, the 
DPP decided not to charge the implicated big fish ―Salim Saleh‖ a General in the army 
and brother to the President, who reportedly made a Commission of  $800,000 on the deal, 
with abuse of office or accepting a bribe. Instead, the DPP called him as a prosecution 
witness in a bribery case against Emma Katto, the business-man who supplied the 
choppers. Salim Saleh was also implicated and even confessed to involvement in the 
fraudulent sale / privatisation of Uganda Commercial Bank and Uganda Grain Millers, but 
has never been arrested or charged with any criminal offence.
402
   
 
In 2002, the DPP instituted criminal proceedings against William Nganwa and John Lule, 
who were the respective Executive Director and Secretary of the National Drugs 
Authority. They were charged with neglect of duty and abuse of office for allowing the 
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importation and subsequent release on the market of adulterated malaria drugs 
manufactured by Ningbo Pharmaceuticals of China, a company that had already been 
blacklisted by the Authority for failing to comply with good manufacturing practices. 
There was evidence that the two officials had personally visited China to ―inspect‖ the 
consignment, despite not being qualified to do so as this was an assignment that should 
have been undertaken by a Chemist. They then forced the Head of the Quality Control 
Laboratory to issue a clearance certificate, despite his findings and report that the drugs 
were not suitable for human consumption. Towards the end of the proceedings, which had 
dragged on for over 3 years due to constant requests for adjournment by the Prosecution, 
the DPP discontinued the case on grounds that it had ―lost interest‖ in the matter!403 Such 
blatant subversion of anti-corruption is made possible by the fact that the exercise of the 
prosecutorial powers is discretionary, and it is this discretion that simultaneously allows 
for politically motivated prosecutions and also insulates DPP from accusations of being 
politically motivated. 
 
There are other instances where the DPP has shown partiality to the regime, appearing not 
to have acted independently or autonomously. In 2005, the DPP brought trumped up 
treason and rape charges against prominent opposition politician Kizza Besigye and hired 
private practitioners to the tune of 2.9 million Uganda shillings (over USD 1 million) to 
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conduct a private prosecution.
404
 Not only was the transaction carried out in total disregard 
of procurement regulations, it also made a mockery of the office of the Directorate and its 
capacity to undertake the function of public prosecution. In addition, the DPP has been 
zealous about charging journalists who are outspoken about the regime‘s misdeeds with 
sedition.
405
 Although these cases are not directly concerned with corruption, they illustrate 
that the DPP is not immune to political pressure in the performance of its duties.  
 
Another instance that reveals how official discretionary powers are abused to facilitate 
corruption is that public officials have also become adept at circumventing procurement 
regulations through ―management by crisis;‖  that is, by deliberately delaying the process 
so as to create a crisis that would justify rushed decision making and ―emergency‖ 
procurement.
406
 Recent examples of procurements that have been undertaken in utter 
disregard of the law include the sale of the National Airport at Entebbe to an Arabian 
Company with ties to Sam Kutesa, Foreign Affairs Minister related to the President 
through marriage,
407
 the sale of land by Security Minister Amama Mbabazi to the National 
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Social Security Fund (2008), and the purchase of vehicles for the Commonwealth Heads 
of State and Government Meeting.
408
  
 
Non-binding recommendations made by anti-corruption agencies may be ignored under 
the rubric of discretionary powers. For example, the PAC can only examine but take no 
further action; it falls to the IGG or the DPP to pick up where PAC left off. Many times 
action merely stops at the PAC‘s headline grabbing hearing. In the recent scandal 
involving the misappropriation of millions of dollars that had been allocated to Uganda‘s 
hosting of the Commonwealth Heads of State and Government Meeting (CHOGM) in 
2007, this failure by the Government of Uganda to implement the recommendations of the 
PAC has led to enforcement of aid conditionality and cut-back of donor funding to the 
2010 budget.
409
 
 
3.5.3 Passing diluted or weak laws that give with one hand and take away with the 
other 
Tamanaha opines that ―today, law is widely viewed as an empty vessel to be filled as 
desired, and to be manipulated, invoked, and utilised in the furtherance of ends.‖410 This 
attitude is discernible in the Uganda government‘s approach to anti-corruption law, which 
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appears to be enacted to ensure minimum compliance with good governance 
conditionality. The enactment of legislation that has significant loopholes or claw-back 
provisions is evidence of the government‘s lack of commitment to punishing the corrupt.  
An instance of this can be seen in the Access to Information Act of 2005. One 
commentator has said that there are more sections in the Act that limit access to 
information than those that guarantee it!
411
 For example, the Act prohibits access to 
Cabinet Meeting Minutes and lays down a catalogue of other instances where access 
would be denied. These include information relating to privacy of the person; commercial 
information of a third party; certain confidential information (although this is not clearly 
defined); information that would prejudice the safety of persons and property; information 
on law enforcement and legal proceedings, especially when sub-judice; records privileged 
from production in legal proceedings; information on defence, security and international 
relations, and information on the operations of public bodies.
412
  
The exemptions laid down in this manner are so wide that practically any request for 
information can be declined by citing one of these provisions. Indeed, a recent request by 
two journalists to access agreements between the Government of Uganda and International 
Oil Companies that are drilling for Oil in Western Uganda was refused by the Attorney 
General and the Minister for Energy. When the applicants appealed to the Magistrate‘s 
Court, their appeal was unsuccessful. The Chief Magistrate Deo Ssejjemba ruled that in 
his opinion, the applicants had failed ―to prove to a standard satisfactory in civil 
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proceedings that the public benefit in the disclosure of the details of the agreements far 
outweighs the harm that such a disclosure would entail in view of the confidentiality 
clauses.‖ 413A further appeal has been lodged in the High Court and a decision is awaited. 
In any case, this first ―test case‖ of the Act has shown that freedom to access information 
in Uganda may be more of a myth than a reality. 
Furthermore, the Act does not recognise the right of non-citizens to access information, 
which may be detrimental to refugees and stateless persons.  In addition, by restricting 
access only to information held by public bodies,
414
 the Act fails to take cognisance of the 
fact that in the current governance set-up, there are many private bodies that carry out 
public functions. All in all, the Access to Information Act in its present form leaves a lot 
to be desired.  
 
Another means by which the law is weakened is to neglect or delay to pass the subsidiary 
legislation required to bring the Act into operation. For example, section 3 of the 
Leadership Code Act empowers the IG to investigate and inquire into or cause an inquiry 
to be conducted on its own initiative or on a complaint made by any person, into any 
alleged breach of the Code by any leader. In particular, section 3(1)(d) empowers the IGG 
to investigate and report on any conduct that is allegedly high-handed, outrageous, 
infamous or disgraceful in accordance with the definition of the words highhanded, 
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outrageous, disgraceful and infamous conduct to be provided by the regulations to be 
made by the Minister. These regulations have never been made by the Minister to this day, 
thereby rendering the section useless.
415
 
 
The 2010 Whistle blowers Act is another law whose enforcement is likely to run into 
trouble. It allows for anonymous disclosures under section 3(2), but goes ahead to render 
this useless by providing that a person who makes an anonymous disclosure shall not be 
entitled to protection under the Act. Moreover, the Act provides for disclosures to be made 
to among others, the Resident District Commissioners (RDC) who are the President‘s 
political representatives at local government level. This is detrimental to anti-corruption 
because the office of the RDC is by its nature partisan. Matters are not helped by the fact 
that the Act names a wide range of officers and institutions who are authorised to receive 
disclosures, including the Inspectorate of Government, the Uganda Human Rights 
Commission, the National Environment Management Authority, the Directorate of Ethics 
and Integrity and Parliament; and gives them wide discretionary powers to decide whether 
or not a disclosure is ―actionable.‖416 This provides leeway for many disclosures to never 
see the light of day. Moreover, the protection offered to whistleblowers has been criticised 
for being inadequate, as it does not include identity change or relocation for 
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whistleblowers. Another objection is that the 5% reward is not sufficient motivation for 
potential whistleblowers, and should have been increased to 10 or even 20 -30%.
417
 
 
These issues are pertinent given De Maria‘s warning concerning Whistleblower legislation 
in countries such as Uganda. He warns of the dangers of exporting Western whistleblower 
concepts into the developing world, into contexts where corruption is socially constructed, 
legitimised and accepted. Furthermore, whistleblowing was conceptualised in societies 
where there exists a rule of law and a strong public service ethic, unlike countries such as 
Uganda where the rule of law is routinely flouted, and the notions of a ―public‖ domain 
and a public service ethic are highly contestable. De Maria also notes that whistleblowing 
was designed for the city, to complement the anonymous spaces of urban and work living 
where workers can make disclosures on the strangers who are their workmates. He 
prophesies that in a situation where there are strong work-family connections and close-
knit communities, whistleblower protection is doomed to failure because the price to be 
paid by would-be whistleblowers in terms of social reprisals or even being harmed or 
killed is far too high. 
418
 
 
De Maria‘s fears are not without basis. The Uganda Revenue Authority Act already 
includes provisions that allow a person who blows the whistle on tax evasion to receive 
10% of the tax recovered. Due to the fact that many tax evaders are ―connected‖ to the 
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regime, this provision has proven hard to enforce and has landed some whistleblowers in 
trouble. For example, recently, it was reported in the press that a man who blew the 
whistle on tax evasion by Fotogenix Limited, a local company that imports photographic 
equipment and materials, was arrested by operatives from the Chieftaincy of Military 
Intelligence and incarcerated at Jinja Road Police Station.
419
 In another instance, 
Atanasius Kakwemeire, former head of the National Drug Authority Control Laboratory, 
lost his job after he blew the whistle on his superiors for authorising the importation of 
drugs from a Chinese company called Ningbo Pharmaceuticals that had been blacklisted 
for failing to meet Good Manufacturing Practices.
420
 
 
Thus we see that in Uganda, enacting anti-corruption law is chiefly a means to the end of 
obtaining aid, rather than a genuine commitment to deal with corruption. 
 
 3.5.4 Disregard for the law, selective enforcement of the law and misusing the law to 
 subvert anti-corruption  
In addition to the above-mentioned subtle ways by which the government subverts anti-
corruption, there have also been some instances of blatantly ignoring the law or selectively 
enforcing it in order to subvert anti-corruption. For example, commentators on the new 
anti-corruption law have pointed out that the President would be one of the first culprits if 
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he did not have immunity from criminal and civil proceedings because he has employed 
many of his relatives in ―State House‖ and recently appointed his wife a Minister of State 
in charge of Karamoja Affairs.
421
 There is also the astonishing case of Major General 
Salim Saleh, the President‘s younger brother, who by his own admission, has been 
involved in numerous corruption scandals, from the botched privatisation of Uganda 
Commercial Bank, to the purchase of junk helicopters; and yet has never been charged 
with a criminal offence.
422
  
 
On a number of occasions, the ruling elite have used legal means to thwart anti-corruption 
proceedings brought against them. For example, in a recent attempt by the IGG to enforce 
the Anti-Corruption Act and to have Mr Gasasira,  the Principal Accountant, Ministry of 
Health dismissed for ―illicit enrichment‖ and having unexplained wealth well beyond his 
income have been hampered by a Court action filed by Gasasira‘s lawyers, who allege that 
he has not been given a fair hearing.
423
 The irony in this situation is that an attempt at 
legal-rational behaviour is itself being legally challenged, revealing the contradictions in 
Uganda‘s fight against corruption.   
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Another example of using the law to thwart anti-corruption occurred in 2003, when the 
presidential advisor on Political Affairs, Maj. Roland Kakooza Mutaale failed to declare 
his assets in accordance with the Code. The IGG wrote to the President recommending his 
dismissal from office. The President complied and dismissed Mutale, but in retaliation, 
Maj. Mutale filed a petition in the High Court citing unfair dismissal and abuse of natural 
justice.  In Kakooza-Mutale versus the Attorney General
424
, judge held that the petition 
would succeed on the ground that Mutale was dismissed without being given a chance to 
be heard.   At about the same time, In Fox Odoi and James Akampumuza versus The 
Attorney General,
425
 the first petitioner, who was then Presidential Legal Advisor, and his 
co-petitioner, a prominent lawyer; rallied to Mutale‘s aid by challenging various sections 
of the Leadership Code Act 2002 as being inconsistent with the Constitution. In particular, 
they challenged section 19(1) of the Act, which mandated the IGG to write to an 
―authorised person‖ requiring them to effect the dismissal or other disciplinary action of a 
subordinate who was found to be in breach of the Code. It was further alleged by the 
petitioners that where persons had their appointment and dismissal provided for in the 
Constitution, any action taken as a result of recommendation from the IGG would be 
unconstitutional. Moreover, that where such action was required of the President, it was a 
fetter on presidential discretion and was therefore unconstitutional. The President swore an 
affidavit in support of the petition, deponing that ―he had no choice‖ but to sack Kakooza 
Mutale after the IGG ordered it.  These actions by the President and his apparatchik were 
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indications of the regime‘s attitude towards the IGG and a revelation of their double 
standards in the fight against corruption. 
 
The Constitutional Court agreed with the Petitioners and today, all persons whose 
appointment to or dismissal from public office are provided for in the Constitution as well 
as all presidential appointees are excluded from the ambit of the Leadership Code Act.  
Mr. Odoi, the petitioner was later quoted in the Press saying, ―The Constitutional Court 
just affirmed that the President is the most powerful man in the land and cannot take 
direction from anyone.‖426  
Yet another instance of using the law to subvert anti-corruption was the 2004 petition by 
Annebrit Aslund, former Commissioner General of Uganda Revenue Authority, to have 
the report of the Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Corruption in Uganda 
Revenue Authority quashed due to apparent disregard of the principles of natural justice 
by the Chairperson‘s allegations of incompetence made against her,  which she was never 
given an opportunity to defend herself against. Her petition succeeded, thereby issuing a 
death blow to the Commission‘s work and its report.427 Her example was followed in 
2008, when Jim Muhwezi and others filed a Constitutional Petition challenging the 
investigations, findings and recommendations made by the Inspectorate of Government in 
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the GAVI funds report dated April, 2007.
428
 The petition was however, unsuccessful, and 
prosecution of  the alleged culprits is proceeding.
429
  
 
3.5.5 Overt Executive interference in the work of anti-corruption agencies 
The IG is supposed to be independent, autonomous and not subject to the control or 
direction of any other authority according to article 223 of the Constitution of Uganda, 
1995.Yet there have been a number of instances of overt interference by members of the 
executive in the work of the IG. In 2008, the Executive was riled when the IG halted the 
proposed sale of Naguru Housing Estate to a private investor on grounds that procurement 
regulations had been breached. The government was particularly riled because then IGG, 
Faith Mwondha, was regarded to be ―hindering investment.‖ Minister of Lands Otafiire 
was quoted in the press as saying: 
She (IGG) was given a powerful office which she is abusing. She is becoming a 
burden to the Government. Why can‘t she point out the problem and we correct it 
instead of saying that she is investigating the project without pointing out the 
wrong.
 430
 
 
Such statements from a Cabinet Minister are inimical to the purported independence and 
autonomy of the Inspectorate. Moreover, it has also come to light that the IG has 
sometimes taken action following the direction of the President. In the Global Alliance for 
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Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI) scandal, the IG instituted a prosecution case against 
the Ministers responsible for Health, Jim Muhwezi, Mike Mukula and Alex Kamugisha; as 
well as Presidential aide Alice Kaboyo upon instructions from the President and not on its 
own initiative.  This is one of the grounds on which the prosecution was challenged in the 
Constitutional Court.  
 
The Executive has also blatantly interfered in the anti-corruption work of Parliament. In 
2008, the Committee on Commissions, Statutory Authorities and State Enterprises 
(COSASE) investigated  the allegedly irregular purchase of land by the National Social 
Security Fund (NSSF), which is estimated to have over 1.3 Trillion Uganda Shillings 
(USD 65,000,000) worth in workers‘ deposits. Procurement procedure was not duly 
followed. The land in question was owned by Arma Limited, a company owned by 
Uganda‘s Security Minister, Mr. Amama Mbabazi. It was alleged that the price of 11 
billion Uganda shillings (about USD six million) had been inflated and the Director of the 
Fund admitted to the Committee that he had been pressured to authorise the transaction by 
the Security Minister, his business partner, Mr. Amos Nzeyi and his supervising Minister 
of Finance Ezra Suruma. The latter and the Security Minister are both shareholders in 
Kigezi Bank of Commerce, which at the time was in urgent need of re-capitalisation. 
Evidence adduced before the Committee revealed that the proceeds of the sale were 
indeed meant for the re-capitalisation of the bank.  
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The members of the Committee were divided in their opinion, although the majority report 
recommended that the Ministers resign or be dismissed for conflict of interest and 
influence peddling in contravention of the Leadership Code Act of 2002.  The Minority 
recommended that the Ministers be absolved of any wrong doing as the investigation had 
been tampered with and one of the major witnesses, the Managing Director of NSSF had 
reportedly told lies to the Committee. At this point, the President, who until that point had 
made no comment or appeared to be involved in any way, stepped in by calling a meeting 
of his NRM Party parliamentary caucus.
431
 During the meeting, the President reportedly 
told the caucus in no uncertain terms that he would back Mbabazi  because the integrity 
and reputation of the whole NRM Party was at stake in the matter. He reportedly asked 
Mr. Mbabazi to apologise for the debacle, and it would appear that was the end of the 
matter. Indeed, following this meeting and on the day the report was due to be tabled 
before Parliament for discussion, the Attorney General, an NRM stalwart, advised the 
house not to debate the report because in his ―learned‖ opinion, the COSASE had no 
jurisdiction to interpret or enforce the Leadership Code Act as this was the responsibility 
of the IGG. That was the final nail in the coffin of the COSASE‘s investigation.432  
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 ―Temangalogate‖ 433 as it has now been baptised reveals the ways in which the advent of 
multi-party democracy has in some ways been inimical to transparency and accountability 
in Uganda. In this case, the ruling NRM party used its parliamentary majority to stifle 
accountability procedures. On the other hand, the Temangalo scandal and the Attorney 
General‘s biased advice to the House show how a neo-patrimonial state can twist the law 
this way and that to maintain its stay in power.  
 
Whereas the NRM government has not overtly interfered with the Judiciary‘s handling of 
anti-corruption cases, it has not hesitated to show the Judiciary who is in charge in other 
politically sensitive cases. In Ssemogerere‘s case where the petitioner challenged the 
Referendum Act and succeeded, the government reacted very strongly to the judgement.  
On the weekend following the delivery of the judgment, a furious President Museveni 
came out on national television to dismiss the ruling. He accused the Constitutional Court 
of usurping the powers of the people, being corrupt and opposition party sympathisers. He 
made derogatory comments about judges‘ colonial attitude, ―with their wigs and so on.‖ 434 
The following week, the NRM mobilised its supporters for a big demonstration against the 
Judiciary. On June 29, 2004, hundreds of Movement Supporters poured into the streets of 
Kampala and thence to the High Court Grounds to protest the ruling. They chanted anti-
Judiciary slogans and appealed to the President to sack the five judges who presided over 
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the case. They also presented a petition to the Speaker of Parliament, demanding that 
punitive action be taken against the judges. The protesters were even treated to a party in 
the High Court Gardens to thank them for a job well done.
435
  
 
In 2005, executive interference in the judiciary reached its zenith when the government 
adopted a militaristic approach to its clashes with the Judiciary. This happened after a 
Judge released on bail five men accused of treason that were allegedly linked to 
Opposition Leader Kizza Besigye and his alleged rebel outfit known as the Peoples‘ 
Redemption Army (PRA). On that occasion, the government deployed an elite urban 
military hit squad known as the Black Mamba Squad to surround the High Court and re-
arrest the suspects. They were heavily armed and it was said that their order came from the 
very top.  These actions were extensively condemned both at home and abroad for the 
threat they posed to judicial independence and Ugandan democracy at large. The Judiciary 
responded by suspending its business, and was supported by the Uganda Law Society who 
held a demonstration to express their opposition to the High Court siege. 
436
 Other Civil 
Society organisations expressed their support for the Judiciary. The East African Law 
Society and the International Commission of Jurists condemned the incident and requested 
an inquiry; Ugandans in the Diaspora held demonstrations in New York, Washington DC, 
Boston, Houston, Los Angeles, Texas, London, Toronto and Johannesburg. Diplomatic 
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representatives in Kampala also condemned the incident and in a very public way, 
enforced aid conditionality by withdrawing budgetary support for the government for 
disrespecting the rule of law.
437
  
 
Today, the relationship between the Executive and the Judiciary remains a rather strained 
one. More recently, the government has shown that it can use its power to ―discipline‖ 
judges regarded as unsympathetic to its cause, as revealed in its refusal to second Justice 
George Kanyeihamba, a vocal critic of the Executive both in his judgements and outside 
the Courtroom, to an appointment with the African Court of Human Rights on grounds 
that he might use his position to embarrass the government.
438
 Justice Sebutinde, who 
caused the regime much embarrassment through the formidable cross-examination skills 
she exhibited as Chair of various judicial inquiries into corruption was seconded to the UN 
Special Court for Sierra Leone at the Hague, putting her safely out of the way. 
 
3.5.6 Nepotism and cronyism in the appointment of anti-corruption officials 
The NRM government‘s lack of commitment to anti-corruption can also be gleaned from 
its handling of appointments to anti-corruption offices. For example, the Police 
Commissioner is directly appointed by the President and is in theory, answerable to the 
Minister of Internal Affairs; in practice, he answers directly to the President. The present 
Inspector General is Major General Kale Kaihura, one of the ―band of 27‖ who started the 
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NRA/M bush-war, from the same ethnic group as the President and known to be his close 
associate. This situation is exacerbated by a media report which showed that over 40% of 
new Police Recruits in recent years have been from Western Uganda, the President‘s home 
region.
439
 The unashamed nepotism in Police appointments can be explained by the nature 
of power and governance in Uganda, with its complex horizontal and vertical ties of 
patrons and clients. This requires presidential control over the police force as a matter of 
political survival.  
 
Another disturbing aspect of anti-corruption in Uganda is the Directorate of Ethics and 
Integrity, as it is directly under the Office of the President. Unlike the IG, there is no legal 
guarantee for its autonomy and independence. On the contrary, the DEI as the overall 
coordinator of anti-corruption activities puts anti-corruption firmly under the control of the 
President. While the President‘s leadership and ―political will‖ are necessary for the fight 
against corruption, in the Ugandan situation where the President is the be-all and end-all 
of political decision-making, the current position of the DEI under the Office of the 
President is cause for concern.  Moreover, the DEI is headed by Mr. Nsaba Buturo, also 
from Western Uganda and who was himself in the spotlight in 2005 for misappropriating 
U Shs 20 million (USD 10,000) from a government-owned radio station Mega FM when 
he was Minister for Information.
440
 Although he refunded the money, his re-appointment 
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as Minister of Ethics and Integrity says a lot about the ruling party‘s lax attitude towards 
its members who are accused of corruption.    
 
3.5.7 Undermining anti-corruption by oppressing the media and civil society  
Despite a rhetorical commitment to media freedom, the Ugandan state has reacted strongly 
whenever it has felt that the media has overstepped its bounds. Recently there has been a 
clamp-down on the media, with public radio talk shows banned and discussion of certain 
topics on in-house talk shows banned.
 441
 Oppressive laws that criminalise Sedition have 
been used to lock up journalists,
442
 while government security agents have also been 
known to raid media houses, confiscate equipment, shut down radio stations and block 
access to their websites.
443
 The government appears to have a love-hate relationship with 
the media, sometimes giving it free reign with the President actively participating in talk 
shows, and sometimes clamping down hard. An emerging trend suggests that true to the 
regime‘s chief concern of maintaining power, it gets more and more intolerant when 
elections are due, and relaxes its grip on the media after it has securely bagged the election 
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result. With elections due in 2011, nothing is being left to chance as the government 
shows clearly that it will not tolerate any criticism.
444
 This has led Jjuuko to observe that: 
What is liberalised in Uganda is freedom to invest in the media, not freedom of the 
press. The civic political content has never been liberalised. If you look at the 
number of stations, you have missed the point.
445
  
 
Similarly, Oloka-Onyango had earlier on observed that there is an invisible line beyond 
which freedom of expression in Uganda is simply not tolerated.
446
  
In the same vein, the commitment to enhance civil society participation in government is 
empty talk made for the purpose of fulfilling conditionality. In reality ―there is no civil 
society in Uganda,‖447  as one of the respondents to this study declared.  As seen above, 
most civil society organisations do not have altruistic motives but have come into being to 
take advantage of the availability of donor funds. Furthermore, grassroots organisations 
have been thwarted by the ―Movement‖ political system, under which every adult 
Ugandan was by law, a member of their Village Local Council supposedly with a say in 
policy-making, law-making and even justice delivery through the Local Council Court.  In 
this way, the grassroots LC Movement system created a situation where civil society 
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became fused with the State, as all grassroots development initiatives were channelled 
through the LC system. This effectively stifled the development of autonomous civil 
society movements in Uganda.  
 
Furthermore, the State‘s attitude towards NGOs can hardly be described as supportive. 
While the NGO sector has flourished and grown since 1986 when the NRM came into 
power, of late the government has sought to stifle civil society through the enactment of a 
harsh and restrictive regulatory law. Civicus, an international watchdog organisation for 
civil society organisations observes: 
…it is our opinion that the legal framework for the registration and operation of 
NGOs  (in Uganda) reflects a deep distrust of their activities and discounts their 
vital role in socio-political development.
448
 
Civicus expresses concern over provisions in the legal framework governing NGOs.
449
   
The registration procedure creates ―a web of bureaucratic red tape,‖ which would be 
difficult for anyone wishing to register an NGO to navigate.
450
 Multiple endorsements 
from district and national level authorities are required, and the criteria is defined in such a 
way to leave the State leeway to refuse to register any NGO they deem unfit for 
registration.
451
  NGOs are prohibited from engaging in any act ―contrary to national 
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interest‖ giving the State further leeway to clamp down on their activities.452 Moreover, 
their functioning is hindered by excessive executive interference in their activities.
453
 
Provisions introducing personal liability for office bearers in addition to organisational 
liability have caused a lot of disquiet in the NGO community.
454
 In addition, the National 
Board of Nongovernmental Organisations mandated to oversee NGO activity has an 
excessively bureaucratic composition including representation from the security organs. 
Notably, the Ministry for Internal Affairs as opposed to the Ministry for Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs is charged with the overall regulation of the NGO sector.
455
 
The legal framework governing NGOs reflects the character of the State in which they 
operate - one pre-occupied with holding onto power and minimising all forms of dissent 
that would present a threat to its survival. This explains why most NGOs in Uganda steer 
clear of controversial political matters and prefer to work on women‘s rights, child 
protection, and environmental protection. NGOs involved in anti-corruption are 
particularly vulnerable as they are likely to rub the powers that be the wrong way. As 
such, the ACCU, which is the most visible anti-corruption NGO,  appears to have adopted 
a ―safe‖ reactive approach, making statements regarding particular scandals and 
individuals as opposed to strategically addressing the systemic nature of corruption and its 
link to the authoritarian tendencies and neo-patrimonial character of the regime. 
                                                 
452
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454
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3.6  Chapter conclusion: Between accountability and impunity –  commissions of 
inquiry as the solution to the dilemma of being a good governor and a powerful 
patron 
The discussion above shown that the Ugandan State has made a rhetorical commitment to 
good governance and has complied with the minimum requirements that would ensure that 
it continues to obtain international aid by passing laws and establishing institutions to deal 
with corruption. It has a fairly comprehensive legal framework that criminalises corruption 
and prescribes stiff punishments for it. It has established a number of agencies specifically 
geared towards anti-corruption, and has repeatedly avowed its commitment to anti-
corruption in its annual development plans, the PRSPs. In addition, it has allowed the 
judiciary to be fairly independent, the media to be relatively free, and civil society 
organisations to grow. Thus, there are significant opportunities and spaces within the 
political and governance framework where the Ugandan people can demand governmental 
transparency and accountability. 
However, the government has used various covert and overt means to subvert the reforms 
above and in order to ensure that corruption, which is a crucial element of its power 
maintenance strategy, continues relatively unabated.  The ensuing situation is a 
paradoxical one that enables the Ugandan state to somewhat successfully straddle both the 
good governance discourse and neo-patrimonialism and thus ensure its stay in power.  
In the chapters that follow, I will show how and why the mechanism of judicial inquiries 
provide an ideal way of being a ―good governor‖ in a neo-patrimonial setting.  I suggest 
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that the contradictory interests at play necessitate a symbolic form of accountability that is 
apparently authentic and yet simultaneously fosters impunity. Commissions of inquiry, 
aptly described by one scholar as ―putting public officials on trial without sending them to 
jail,‖ and where the government is free to ignore the advice resulting from the inquiry, are 
one such unique mechanism.
456
  
  
                                                 
456
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Chapter 4 
 
The role of Commissions of Inquiry in Governance: legitimation through 
truth-finding 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines the role of  commissions of inquiry in governance generally, as a 
pre-cursor to analysing their role in anti-corruption in Uganda.  The chapter begins with an 
overview of how inquiries have been utilised in various countries of the world. It then 
describes the unique features of their organisational type, such as their publicness, quasi-
judicialness and inquisitorial approach to fact-finding. It suggests that it is these features 
that have not only made them a popular device with governments all over the world,
 
but 
particularly amenable for investigating corruption in Uganda. This is because they aptly 
demonstrate ― ‗good governance‘ in action.‖  
 
The chapter further explores the complex role of commissions of inquiry as devices of  
legitimation, that is to say, their role in repairing crises of legitimacy and restoring public 
confidence in the government after a crisis. It is suggested that the main importance of 
commissions of inquiry lies in their ability to facilitate a truth-finding process which 
enables various groups to achieve multiple aims. This is especially pertinent in Uganda, 
where the state and the citizens have contradictory aims in relation to anti-corruption. The 
judicial truth-finding process nonetheless provides a single forum where all these parties 
can achieve their various ends – the ruling regime can show that it is a good governor and 
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continue to obtain aid whilst shielding the culprits from criminal prosecution, and civil 
society acting through the media can participate minimally in enforcing accountability.  
 
4.2 Commissions of Inquiry – ubiquitous instruments of governance 
Commissions of Inquiry are popular all over the world. Simon says they  
...are a ubiquitous and curious form of governance. In some respects we might 
analogise them to a political stem cell:  they can emerge from almost any form of 
government and develop into a wide variety of actual institutions... they may be 
constituted by virtually every department of Anglo-American government.
457
 
 
Hence, inquiries can be found in established democracies such as the UK, Canada, 
Australia and the USA, as well as ―emerging‖ ones such as Uganda. They are also used in 
countries that do not have a tradition of English Common Law, including Sweden, France 
and Germany. Even though they preceded legal rational government as we know it today, 
they have remained a feature of modern government whose primary purpose is 
investigation and fact-finding. They have been used to inquire into matters ranging from 
disasters such as air-crashes, to assassinations and corruption scandals. Inquiries have 
escaped the confines of individual sovereign states and international ones have been 
appointed by the United Nations, for example, the 1982 Commission of Inquiry into 
Israeli practices against the Lebanese and Palestinian Peoples,
458
 the 1999 inquiry into 
                                                 
457
 Simon, J: (2005), ―Parrhesiastic Accountability: Investigatory Commissions and Executive Power in an Age of 
Terror,‖ Yale Law Journal 114:1419-1457 at 1427-1428. 
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 International Commission of Inquiry into Israeli Crimes Against the Lebanese and Palestinian Peoples (1982), 
Eye-witness reports and conclusions of an international inquiry, London. 
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East Timor,
459
 the 2004 International Commission of Inquiry for Darfur
460
 and the more 
recent 2009 inquiry into human rights violations in Guinea.
461
  
 
4.2.1 Commissions of inquiry in Britain 
Britain, is the mother country of commissions of inquiry. They date back to 1086, when 
William I appointed the first Royal Commissioners to conduct the Doomsday Survey 
whose main purpose was to ascertain the ―the ownership of each estate of land and its 
value for taxation.‖462  Thus, royal commissions preceded the establishment of Parliament 
and modern legislative or bureaucratic procedure. Their growth in subsequent centuries 
went parallel to the development of the justice and administrative system. However, as the 
political centre of gravity moved from the Crown to Parliament, royal commissions 
became less and less popular and were over-taken by Parliamentary Select Committees as 
a device of inquiry.
463
  
 
They became popular again during the Victorian era, but on the whole, their popularity 
rose and waned over the centuries in relation to different executive administrations and 
constitutional struggles over royal prerogatives vis-à-vis parliamentary supremacy. The 
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 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2000) Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on East Timor, at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.54.726,+S.2000.59.En, accessed 02 February 2011. 
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British government nevertheless utilised them in colonial Africa, first as a strategy for 
justifying colonialism and later decolonisation. Comaroff dubs this phenomenon of using 
inquiries to legitimate law and policy as ―lawfare,‖ a modification of ―warfare.‖ In his 
analysis, inquiries were one of the modes of lawfare by which the colonial government 
sought to pacify and govern the ―natives‖ through a torrent of ethnographic 
anthropological studies on ―native‖ life. Lawfare had ―many theatres, many dramatis 
personae, many scripts.‖464 Inquiries were some of the theatres through which the colonial 
state sought to consolidate its power, particularly during times of crisis and rebellion.
465
  
 
As in many other parts of its colonial empire, the British Protectorate Government in 
Uganda resorted to inquiries as it continually sought ways of achieving its mission to 
civilise ―natives.‖ Notable colonial inquiries in Uganda include the 1933 Commission of 
Inquiry into the administration of justice in East Africa chaired by H.G Bushe, then Legal 
Adviser to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Its terms of reference were ―to inquire 
into the administration of the Criminal Law in Kenya, Uganda and the Tanganyika 
territory in relation to the procedure and practice of (a) the Courts other than Native 
Courts, and (b) the Police Authorities, and to consider whether in regard to any procedure 
                                                 
464
 Comaroff, J. L. (2001). "Colonialism, Culture and the Law: A Foreword." Law & Social Inquiry 26(2): 305-314.  
465
 See for example, the 1959 Devlin Commission of Inquiry into Nyasaland (Malawi), which was established to 
inquire into insurrections in that colony and eventually formed one of the bases for the decolonisation of Malawi; 
discussed in Comaroff, ibid. In Zimbabwe, Mungazi analyses how the colonial government appointed inquiries into 
education, presumably with a view to attuning the system to national development, but ultimately used the reports to 
enhance its control over not just education, but society as a whole. See Mungazi, D. A. (1989). "A Strategy for 
Power: Commissions of Inquiry into Education and Government Control in Colonial Zimbabwe." The International 
Journal of African Historical Studies 22(2): 267-285. Another example is the 1953 one-man Commission of Inquiry 
of Carothers into the Mau-Mau rebellion in Kenya led by a Psychiatrist which sought to portray the Mau-Mau as a 
neurotic gang of thugs and not a liberation Movement.  See McCulloch, J. (1995). Colonial psychiatry and "the 
African mind,"  Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
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or practice of such courts of Authorities, any alterations are desirable (a) in the case of 
natives, and (b) generally.‖466  This inquiry was established at a time when Britain was 
pre-occupied with Penal reform at home, and there was agitation over conflict between 
European and African Justice prevailing at the time. More importantly, there was long 
standing frustration over the perceived uncertainty of customary law, which at the time 
was determined through the testimony of chiefs and elders.
467
 
 
Another prominent colonial inquiry was the 1945 Inquiry into the disturbances that 
occurred in Uganda during Jan 1945. Peebles extensively analyses this inquiry through the 
eyes of the Uganda Herald, the then newspaper of the day.
468
 The disturbances were 
characterised by nationwide strikes by ―native‖ Ugandans in government departments, 
private offices, factories, and even by domestic workers in private households. There was 
looting and sabotaging of infra-structure. In March 1945, Governor Hall appointed 
Uganda‘s then Chief Justice, Norman H. P. Whitley, to direct a Commission to inquire 
into the disturbances. Quoting from the Inquiry Report, Peebles recounts that Whitley 
controlled the investigation entirely, including the ability to determine which Asians, 
Africans and Europeans he allowed to give testimony and evidence. He examined 80 
Europeans, 16 Asians, and 102 Africans, (who were mostly Baganda, even though the 
strikes had included virtually all the tribes of Uganda). He later submitted a 32- page long 
                                                 
466
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 Vincet, J. (1989). ―Contours of Change: Agrarian law in Colonial Uganda,‖ in J. Starr and J. Fishbourne Collier 
(eds),  History and power in the study of law: new directions in legal anthropology, Cornell: Cornell University 
Press. 
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report to the Protectorate Government, in which he claimed that he had done ―his best to 
obtain evidence representing the views of all parties and classes.‖ He admitted that he did 
not take the testimonies of some parties seriously because of their ―unsatisfactory and 
unreliable‖ nature. And thus, by only believing evidence that fit into his idea of Uganda‘s 
problems, Whitley presented a partial and inaccurate analysis of the event that led him to 
conclude that the ―origins of the disturbances were political rather than economic.‖ Such a 
conclusion was clearly wrong, given the fact that strikers who met with the Kabaka (King 
of Buganda) before the inquiry had presented their demands as including changes in the 
Kabaka‘s ministry, ―increased rates of pay‖ for workers, and ―better prices for crops.‖469 
The Whitley Inquiry is thus a good example of how inquiries served a legitimation 
purpose during the colonial period, shown here by the difference between how Whitley 
interpreted the strike and the demands the strikers presented to the Kabaka of Buganda.  
 
Unsurprisingly, corruption was never a subject of colonial inquiries, because of the nature 
of colonial governance in Africa and its emphasis on ―coercion,‖470 or its alternative, 
―pacification‖.471  Hence, the 1933 inquiry into the administration of justice may be 
regarded as one that was geared towards facilitating the coercion of  the colonised through 
―lawfare‖ as Comaroff aptly puts it;472 while the inquiry into the 1945 disturbances was 
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one geared towards pacification. Thus we see pacification and lawfare as two sides of the 
same coin of power consolidation. 
 
Back home in Britain, by the 20
th
 century, the growth of the civil bureaucracy led to 
departmental committees of inquiry subsuming the role of royal commissions, and at 
present most investigatory  public inquiries take the form of Tribunals of Inquiry provided 
for under the Inquiries Act 2005, rather than Royal Inquiries which were a prerogative of 
the crown and not statutory.
473
  Recent examples of important inquires include the inquiry 
into the death of Steven Lawrence,
474
 the Hutton Inquiry into the death of Dr. David 
Kelly,
475
 and the on-going Iraq Inquiry chaired by Sir John Chilcot.
476
 Thus, inquiries are 
still an important mechanism for resolving crises in governance in Britain today. 
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 Gilligan, G. (2002). "Royal Commissions of Inquiry," The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 
35(3): 289-307 
474
 Stephen Lawrence was an 18 year old Black British man who was stabbed to death in London on 22 April 1993 
while waiting for a bus. Five suspects were arrested but no convictions were ever made. There was a racist motive to 
the attack and the inquiry also found that ―institutional racism‖ had played a role in the inadequate investigation 
which led to the Police not obtaining enough evidence to convict the killers.  See Report of an Inquiry by Sir William 
Macpherson of Cluny Presented to Parliament by the Home Secretary,  (February 1999). 
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 Dr. David Kelly was a British UN Weapons Inspector in Iraq. In July 2003, it became known that he had an 
unauthorised discussion with a BBC journalist, Andrew Gilligan, about the British government's dossier on weapons 
of mass destruction in Iraq. He was subsequently called to appear on 15 July before the parliamentary foreign affairs 
select committee, which was investigating the issues Gilligan had reported. Kelly was questioned harshly by the 
Committee. He was found dead two days later, and verdict of Suicide was recorded by both the Coroner and the 
inquiry. See:  Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr David Kelly C.M.G. by Lord 
Hutton, (2004), at http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk/content/report/index.htm. , accessed 02 February 2011. 
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4.2.2 Commissions of inquiry in other developed countries such as the US, Canada 
and Australia 
 In the United States of America, investigatory commissions were used as early as 1794 
after the Whiskey rebellion, when President Washington appointed a special commission 
to investigate the causes of the rebellion and negotiate appropriate sanctions with the rebel 
leaders. In the nineteenth century, they were used to respond to catastrophes and worrying 
social problems resulting from the growing pressures of mass industrialisation.
477
  In the 
twentieth century, they were popularised at federal level by the Hoover Administration, 
but they had been used by President Roosevelt before him.
478
 Famous examples of US 
Inquiries include the President‘s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy 
(the Warren Commission),
479
 and the more recent 9/11 Commission.
480
  
 
In Australia, Royal Inquiries are ―a regular occurrence,‖ and have taken on a much more 
prominent position than they do in their country of origin, Britain.
481
 Their popularity has 
been attributed to Australia‘s history of a colonial state that relied heavily on coercion and 
military might; hence coercive royal commissions and boards of inquiry with inquisitorial 
powers but no need for parliamentary approval reflecting the nature of the colonial state. 
Their powers of coercion make them an extremely powerful mode of inquiry easily 
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478
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available to Commonwealth and State governments, made even more attractive by the fact 
that a Minister of government can influence the selection of Commissioners and their 
terms of reference, and yet at the same time, distance themselves from the operation and 
after-effects of the commission.
482
 
 
Royal Commissions are also a popular mode of inquiry in Canada, where statutory 
provisions for the establishment of Inquiries were first introduced in the Province of 
Canada in 1846 and ―have become a permanent feature of federal and provincial political 
life.‖483  Centa and Mackelm observe that since confederation, the federal government of 
Canada has established over four hundred Inquiries to examine a wide array of matters of 
public concern, while provincial governments have also relied on them to examine and 
report on various matters. They attribute the popularity of Inquiries in Canada to their 
useful public policy functions, particularly their ability to exercise wide-ranging 
investigative power to unearth facts concerning matters of public importance.  
 
Inquiries are also a common feature of government in Israel, where they have been used to 
manage political conflicts and the killings resulting from this conflict. For example, in 
1983, after the publishing of a book on the matter, the Israeli government instituted a 
Commission of Inquiry into the earlier murder of Dr. Haim Arlosoroff in 1933.
484
 After 
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the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in 1995 and the massacre in the Tomb of the 
Patriarchs in Hebron in 1994, the Israeli government set up inquiries to investigate the 
incidents.
485
  
 
4.2.3 Commissions of Inquiry in post-independence Africa 
African governments have also resorted to commissions of inquiry during times of crisis, 
including the investigation of corruption scandals. In post-colonial Anglophone Africa, 
inquiries have investigated a range of issues, from disasters, to social unrest, murders and 
corruption scandals. Much of Uganda‘s post-independence history has been characterised 
by conflict, turbulence and social upheaval, particularly the notorious Idi Amin years of 
1971 – 1979.  This era was characterised by a number of inquiries into ―disappearances‖ 
of various people, many of which came to nought as the reports were never published.
486
 
Out of twenty nine inquiries established over that period, five were set up to investigate 
incidents of missing persons and human rights violations in general. For example, there 
was an inquiry into the 1970 disappearance and reappearance after several days of a 
British High Commission official, Mr. B.A. Lea. The British and Ugandan governments 
offered differing explanations for the incident, prompting the appointment of an inquiry. 
                                                 
485
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In 1971, there was a similar inquiry into the disappearance of two American citizens, Mr. 
Nicholas Stroth, a freelance journalist and Mr. Robert Siedle, a university lecturer. A 
further inquiry in 1974 aimed at a general inquiry into allegations of missing persons in 
Uganda following a significant amount of international and local outcry about murders 
and disappearances allegedly at the hands of state agents.  
Along with the conflict and social upheaval that characterised these years, there was 
degeneration in public administration. Hence, long before corruption and anti-corruption 
became buzz-words under the international ―good governance‖ agenda, inquiries were 
being appointed into mismanagement and abuse of office in government departments and 
state-owned enterprises. This shows that corruption was a problem in post-colonial states 
long before the IMF, WB and other donors decided to focus on it as the cause of under-
development. Writing about East African inquiries during this period, Kiapi observes that 
―there have been far more commissions to investigate allegations of corruption than to 
look into other matters in East Africa.‖487 Examples of corruption-related inquiries in 
Uganda during this time include the inquiries into ―allegations of corruption in all its 
aspects,‖ (1971), as well as others into Uganda Transport Corporation (1975), Uganda 
Airlines (1975 and 1978), Makerere University (1976), Uganda Hotels (1980), Kampala 
City Council (1983), and ―corruption and financial mismanagement in all aspects in 
government departments and other public bodies‖ (1986).488  
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What became of these inquiries into corruption? Reports were dutifully compiled and 
recommendations made by Commissioners, but they sat on shelves gathering dust and a 
number have since disappeared into thin air, in keeping with the poor record-keeping and 
archiving that is common in developing countries such as Uganda.
489
The 
recommendations made and whether or not they were implemented was never a serious 
issue on the public agenda, simply because the regime turnover in Uganda during this 
period was far too high, and the violence, insecurity and instability meant that people‘s 
chief concern was survival. Between 1962 when Uganda gained her independence and 
1986 when the current president took power following an armed struggle, Uganda had 
been through five unconstitutional changes in government brought about by armed 
coups.
490
  
 
Kenya has conducted quite a number of headline-grabbing inquiries, including the 1990 
inquiry into the death of Cabinet Minister Robert Ouko, the 2003 Goldenberg Inquiry and 
the recent 2007/8 Waki Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence.
491
 Both 
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Tanzania and Kenya have held a number of inquiries into land matters.
492
 On-going 
democratic transitions in the region have sparked inquiries, as Tanzania too has held a 
post-election violence inquiry, following a violent demonstration in Zanzibar in 2000.    
 
The discussion above shows that commissions of inquiry are popular with governments all 
over the world, with different systems of government and different socio-political 
contexts.  This is testimony to their versatility and flexibility.  They are particularly 
important in resolving crises of government arising from accidents or scandals. The next 
section considers in greater detail the features of inquiries that make them popular 
instruments of governance, and suggests that it is these features too, that have enabled 
them to ―flourish‖ as anti-corruption devices in Uganda‘s good governance era.  
 
4.3  Features of Commissions of Inquiry 
4.3.1 Executive appointment  
In their birthplace in England, the appointment of Royal Commissions is nominally by the 
Crown, but in reality they are appointed by Ministers. Their descendant cousins, tribunals 
of inquiry are appointed by Ministers under the Inquiries Act 2005.
493
  In Federal 
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Australia, too, they are appointed by the President under the Inquiries Act.
494
  In Israel, 
notably, the power of appointment vests with the President of the Supreme Court, and not 
with the executive branch, although the latter may make a resolution calling for the 
institution of an inquiry.
495
 In Kenya, the power of appointment is vested solely in the 
President.
496
 In most other countries, executive appointment is a key feature of Inquiries. 
In Uganda, appointment may be done by the President or the relevant Minister. Gilligan 
notes executive appointment allows governments to minimise any political risks by 
appointing appropriate people and delimiting the terms of reference.  Nevertheless, 
governments also have leeway to distance themselves from the operation and effects of the 
inquiry if they wish, especially if it should turn up something unexpected and unwanted. 
497
The terms of reference give instructions to the Commission and appear in the warrant or 
other legal instrument establishing the inquiry.  
 
4.3.2 Ad hoc-ness 
Inquiries are appointed temporarily for a specific period of time to investigate a matter 
delineated in the terms of reference, and make a report with appropriate recommendations. 
Ad hoc-ness is a key feature of Inquiries that distinguishes them from other governmental 
modes of inquiry such as planning inquiries or inquiries by Parliamentary Standing and 
                                                 
494
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Sessional Committees.
498
 Simon notes that they are highly contingent, frequently arising 
in the context of catastrophic events.  Hence they are an ―emergency apparatus, hastily 
assembled in times of public crisis and charged with completing their investigation within 
a short period of time.‖ 499 It has been further argued that ad hoc-ness and temporariness 
are a feature of inquiries which makes them uniquely capable of analysing problems. The 
fact that it is not a long term commitment with career prospects or long-term obligations 
enhances the members‘ ability to be independent, objective and impartial.500  
 
4.3.3 Membership 
The factors that influence the membership of an inquiry include expertise, the need to 
represent various interested stakeholders, and political considerations. Ideal typologies of 
Commission membership proposed by scholars suggest that a commission should include 
an expert, layperson, party representative, official and interested party; or expert, 
representative of an interest, fuse box, advocate of a particular philosophy, consensus 
builder or genial host.
501
  
 
Gilligan observes that ―the selection of a Commissioner is important to governments, as it 
be a limiting procedure, a possible damage control device and a legitimation strategy to 
appease or re-assure an angry or confused electorate.‖ He notes that there has been a 
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tendency for judges and lawyers to be chosen to sit on Inquiries due to the acknowledged 
ability of legal practitioners to ―get to the bottom of things‖ and an assumption that they 
bring impartiality and independence to the inquiry.
502
  Inquiries that do not involve 
lawyers and judges tend to be discredited, as is happening with the on-going Chilcot 
Inquiry on Iraq, where a number of commentators have decried the Commissioners‘ lack 
of cross-examination skills as well as their inability to decide on the legality of 
government actions.
503
 Some commentators are of the view that the Labour government 
deliberately chose non-lawyers as a way of ensuring a favourable outcome to the 
government.   
 
Thus cross-examination and the ability to weigh evidence are regarded as key elements in 
the inquiry process, and excluding lawyers from membership may lead to accusations of 
the inquiry being a political whitewash and a waste of time. In Uganda, there has been a 
marked preference for judges as chairs of judicial inquiries into corruption because they 
are regarded as independent and as having the moral authority to discipline the corrupt 
executive branch of government.
504
 Also, Lady Justice Sebutinde was chosen to chair 
three notable inquiries into corruption because of her formidable cross-examination 
tactics.
505
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Indeed, the decision to establish a Commission, select Commissioners, define the terms of 
reference, then select and direct those involved in an inquiry are inherently political. Yet 
such decisions are also bureaucratic, as Gilligan further reiterates. ―They are not merely 
the decisions of a minister, but also reflect the opinion of a permanent civil bureaucracy. 
Generally, civil bureaucrats provide government ministers with advice and draft the actual 
terms of reference… they provide the secretary, often a short list of appropriate potential 
commissioners from a pool of available notables known in bureaucratic circles as ―The 
Book of the Great and Good.‖ ‖506 
 
4.3.4 Independence  
Independence from the Executive and Parliamentary branches is a key feature of inquiries 
in many countries, including Uganda. Hence there is a tendency for many inquiries to be 
quasi-judicial in nature, due to the belief that this will give the impartiality it needs, in 
addition to the necessary legal/judicial expertise in investigation and fact-finding.
507
 
Simon observes that despite the existence of legislative inquiries and investigations, 
independent investigatory commissions have remained relevant and popular due to the 
perceived need to reach beyond the traditional branches of government and 
counterbalance the increasing depth and breadth of executive administrative power.
508
 
Prasser‘s study of Public Inquiries in Australia notes that their importance lies in the fact 
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that they are independent, unlike similar government bodies such as Parliamentary 
Committees, Departmental or Ministerial Committees, task forces and project teams.
509
 
 
Inquiries are external yet internal to the government. Although they are independent to 
pursue their own procedure in fulfilling their terms of reference, they are appointed by, 
funded by and report to the government of the day. Thus, as Scraton observes the decision 
to commission an inquiry, its status and terms of reference, are political. There is no public 
debate on the terms of reference, or on who is appointed to be a member. Once appointed, 
Commissioners exercise broad discretion in gathering evidence and information, the 
conduct and progress of the inquiry, the selection of witnesses and disclosure of 
documents, the significance attached to evidence and its influence on findings and 
recommendations.
510
 It follows that this internal-external character presents both a threat 
and an opportunity for taking a fresh look at problems and making appropriate, workable 
recommendations.  
 
Sometimes the independence of an inquiry may be called into question when links 
between the membership and the establishment are revealed. For example, links between 
members of the Chilcot Iraq Inquiry and the Labour government have proved to be 
                                                 
509
 Prasser (2003), op. cit. 
510
 Scraton, P. (2004) ―From Deceit to Disclosure: The Politics of Official Inquiries in the United Kingdom‖ in G. 
Gilligan &  J. Pratt (eds) Crime, Truth and Justice: official inquiry, discourse, knowledge, Devon: Willan Publishing, 
at p. 63. 
  
202 
 
discrediting factors to its yet unknown outcome.
511
 Such links create suspicion of a pre-
determined outcome. One of the witnesses who appeared before the Uganda Global Fund 
Inquiry felt that he had not been afforded a fair hearing because  the Chair, Justice Ogoola, 
was a former employee of the IMF and regarded as part of the donor group that had 
demanded an inquiry.
512
 Thus independence is crucial in order for the public to trust the 
outcome of the inquiry as genuine. 
 
On the other hand, in newly democratised ―governance‖ states such as Uganda, the 
independence of an inquiry is a crucial way in which the regime can show that it is towing 
the line of good governance by respecting judicial independence and the rule of law. 
Hence independence is one of the factors that enables inquiries to be used as instruments 
to show off good governance in Uganda. In an interview with Justice Sebutinde, she 
confirmed that to its credit the State had never made an attempt to influence the conduct of 
any of the inquiries she chaired.  There was however, an incident during the URA Inquiry 
in 2003 where gunmen attacked her residence.  The Police has never established who was 
behind it or why they did it. Even though there was speculation in the media that the State 
was behind it and were trying to derail her investigation of tax evasion in URA, Sebutinde 
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denies this and is adamant that the State was very supportive, beefed up her security and 
reassured her of its full support of her work.
513
 
 
4.3.5 Public hearings 
Public hearings are generally the norm for inquiries in most countries.  A public process is 
essential if the inquiry is to fulfil its purpose of restoring public confidence.
514
 When the 
British Government first decided to appoint a public inquiry into the Iraq war, there was a 
proposal that the proceedings would not be open to the public. However, this was quickly 
shelved when the proposal proved to be very unpopular with the public.
515
 The 
―publicness‖ of inquiries is crucial, and according to Prasser‘s thesis, it is the key factor 
that explains their popularity and constant re-appointment by the Australian government. 
516Other proponents of inquiries aver that this ―publicness‖ supports key features of 
democratic practice, by promoting deliberation and debate.
517
 This is very important in the 
newly democratised such as Uganda, where public hearings and the public scrutiny of 
official wrongdoing is a novel and exciting feature hitherto unheard and unseen through 
decades of authoritarian rule. Thus it is not surprising that all the inquiries into corruption 
during the late 1990s and early 2000s were open to the public and indeed highly 
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publicised – it was a demonstration of the democratic era into which Uganda had been 
ushered by the NRM government.  
 
The role of the media in enhancing the publicness, and hence the theatrical and ritualistic 
aspects of inquiry proceedings is also important. First, the media plays a role in the time 
leading up to the inquiry, as it is the frenzy of media attention that creates a scandal or a 
―matter of public importance‖ warranting the appointment of an inquiry. Once the inquiry 
is in place, the radio and TV broadcasting of proceedings or their verbatim reproduction in 
newspapers transforms the inquiry in time and space from a specific location to an item of 
mass consumption. Brummet argues that the mediation of proceedings through the Mass 
Media signifies an ideological force. ―The Mass Media have now assumed the role of the 
Church, in a more secular age, of interpreting and making sense of the world to the mass 
public.‖518 As one commentator on an opinion article about the Chilcot Iraq Inquiry put it: 
―Of course it‘s (the inquiry) a waste of time. Because the accepted version of the truth will 
be determined, as it always is – by the media – not by the inquiry... the media have the 
power to change public opinion drastically without ever changing the facts... Tony Blair 
was re-elected 2 years after the Iraq war, long after it was shown to be a disaster... The 
only thing which has changed since that election is that the media have decided to bring 
Blair and the Labour party down....‖519. 
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The influence of the media and its agenda-setting role has been discussed and analysed by 
many scholars.  It has been described as ―primordial‖ because of the fact that it is 
seemingly unrestrained and uncontainable.
520
 McCombs observes that there are many 
issues that compete for public attention, but the media determines public perception on 
what are the most important issues of the day. 
521
 The media plays a significant role in the 
time preceding an inquiry, and once an inquiry is instituted, media interest and portrayal 
determines public perceptions regarding both the proceedings and the outcome of the 
inquiry. Media commentary shapes public opinion and in many ways constitutes the court 
of public opinion through which public officials perceived as responsible for the wrong-
doing are tried, convicted and punished, not by jail, but by loss of reputation. It is through 
the media that discourses on the subject matter of the inquiry are generated and 
transmitted.  
 
In Uganda, the media has had a tremendous impact on inquiries into corruption through 
daily reportage, analysis and debate.  The media has made corruption and anti-corruption 
key items on the national agenda, turned the members of inquiries into celebrities and 
public officials implicated in wrong doing into pariahs. This is an issue that will be 
explored in greater detail in chapters 5 and 6.  
 
                                                 
520
 White, T. H. (1964). The making of the President, 1960. New York, Atheneum Publishers. 
521
 McCombs, M. E. (2004). Setting the agenda : the mass media and public opinion. Cambridge: Polity Press  
  
206 
 
4.3.6 Inquisitorial proceedings 
Most inquiries adopt an inquisitorial mode to fact finding. The term denotes the need for 
the tribunal to ―inquire‖ or to find the truth. There is less of a focus on winning or losing, 
or a simple verdict of ―guilty‖ or ―not guilty.‖522 Inquisitorial proceedings are a common 
feature in countries with civil legal systems as opposed to case / common law systems, 
where proceedings are adversarial in nature. Inquisitorial proceedings are characterised by 
the active participation of the judge in determining the facts of the case – questioning 
witnesses, interrogating suspects, ordering searches and further investigations.  In contrast, 
in adversarial proceedings, the judge is a disinterested impartial referee between two 
parties.  
 
Keeton maintains that inquisitorial procedure is unavoidable if the principal function of 
the body is fact-finding. He says that this inquisitional style is advantageous where one or 
more of the witnesses is quasi-accused, as it lends ―weight‖ to the inquiry. However, the 
down-side is that where a witness is innocent of wrong-doing, inquisitorial style 
proceedings where fact-finding and attribution of fault goes hand in hand can be regarded 
as an abuse of due process. When members of the inquiry engage in cross-examination, 
they might create the impression that they were from the start, hostile to witnesses 
appearing before them. Moreover, there is no accused as such and no definite criminal 
charge, and yet the atmosphere created by inquisitorial style tribunal proceedings still 
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lends them an aura of determining criminal guilt and liability, as opposed to simply 
establishing the truth.
523
 This can lead to allegations of abusing natural justice in a 
Kangaroo Court or Inquisition type of procedure. ―Kangaroo Court‖ is an Americanism 
that means ―an unfair, biased, or hasty judicial proceeding that ends in a harsh 
punishment.‖524   
 
Inquiry proceedings have also been likened to the Star Chamber, due to their extensive 
coercive powers and tendency to interfere with individual rights such as the right to 
privacy, the right to liberty and the right to due process.
525
 The Star Chamber was a 17
th
 
century English Court that sat in the Palace of Westminster, mostly associated with King 
Henry VII. It was composed of Privy Counsellors and Common Law Judges, and 
supplemented the activities of the Courts by trying prominent people considered too 
powerful to be convicted by ordinary courts. It was characterised by secret proceedings, 
with no indictments, no right of appeal, no juries, and no witnesses. The only evidence 
allowed was written evidence. It is therefore not surprising that it evolved into a political 
weapon and became a symbol of the abuse of power by the English monarchy and courts.  
 
Present day inquiries, particularly those that investigate governmental wrong-doing have 
also been accused of witch-hunting, of being used to tarnish and get rid of political rivals 
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and opponents.
526
 This is because the inquisitorial mode allows damaging allegations to be 
made against persons who may or may not be wholly responsible for the wrong that 
occurred. Such persons would inevitably feel unfairly treated and that their right to due 
process had been violated. Keeton says that the issue is to weigh this negative aspect of 
the inquiry process with the positive role they play in enhancing accountability and decide 
whether the price to be paid for ―the truth‖ is worth the discomfort and displeasure to a 
few individuals.
527
  
 
In a country such as Uganda where legal literacy levels are quite low, people may mistake 
inquisitorial proceedings for criminal trials. This lack of clarity can be taken advantage of 
by the regime to legitimate itself to the citizens by showing that it is committed to anti-
corruption and has put some officials on trial. On the other hand, as I will show in chapter 
6, this has had a delegitimizing effect in the long term, when people become disappointed 
that the ―trial‖ did not result in any convictions.  
 
4.3.7  Evidence  
In some countries such as Australia, Canada and even Uganda, Commissions are given 
powers to summon any witnesses and examine them under oath, and to order for the 
production of documents. Thus, anyone summoned to appear before the inquiry is 
compelled to do so under pain of being referred to the Director Public Prosecutions to be 
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prosecuted for contempt of the inquiry.
528
 However, this provision has never been invoked 
in Uganda as people summoned to appear have generally done so. Even the President of 
the Republic was willing to testify before the Commission of Inquiry into the Purchase of 
Junk helicopters by the Ministry of Defence, in spite of the fact that the Commission had 
to move to him and conduct its hearing at his official residence.
529
 
 
The issue of witness compulsion has been the subject of litigation in Australia, in the cases 
of Attorney General or Commonwealth Australia v. Colonial Sugar Refinery Company
530
 
and in McGuiness v. Attorney General of Victoria
531
, and in both instances the Court held 
that the right not to be compelled to testify is sacrosanct under Common Law, and cannot 
be taken away by a Commission of Inquiry. Of course this position is overruled by the 
above statutory provision in Uganda.  
 
The discussion above shows that inquires are a unique device that is versatile and flexible 
and can be utilised to achieve a variety of purposes. Moreover, their structural features 
encapsulate many key components of the good governance discourse. These include: 
judicial independence, which is enabled when judges are appointed to chair inquiries; 
media freedom, promoted through the media‘s reportage of proceedings; civil society 
participation, promoted through public hearings where members of the public are free to 
attend; and transparency and accountability which are promoted when government 
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officials are literally made to account for their decisions and actions. These features of 
inquiries make them amenable to donors because they provide evidence that good 
governance is working; to the state because it can show that it is a good governor; and to 
the citizens because they are given an opportunity to see state officials ―on trial.‖ In the 
next section, I analyse the theoretical proposition that what makes inquiries popular is 
their ability to enhance regime legitimacy. 
 
 4.4 The Role of Commissions of Inquiry in Governance 
 
4.4.1 Why appoint a Commission of Inquiry? 
The circumstances under which inquiries are appointed differ greatly, but generally the 
appointment of an inquiry is preceded by allegations and rumours of official wrongdoing, 
omission or error, leading to national crises of confidence in the integrity, ability and 
discretion of public authorities. ―Public suspicion that something morally unacceptable has 
happened is often accompanied by a strong public sentiment that something should be 
done about the wrongdoing and that a ‗cover-up‘ must not be allowed.‖ Thus follows a 
need for ―truth finding‖ in order to restore public confidence in the machinery of 
government.
532
 In Uganda where the state is beleaguered by accusations of corruption, 
inefficiency and of being ―neo-patrimonial,‖ appointing a Commission of Inquiry can be a 
way of reiterating the legal-rationality of the State and its commitment to ―good 
governance.‖  
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Prasser offers a catalogue of the various reasons why governments appoint inquiries: to 
provide an independent response to a crisis; to investigate allegations of impropriety; to 
obtain information; to define policy problems; to provide government with policy options; 
to review policies, programs or organisations; to resolve public controversy; to help 
governments manage policy agendas; to justify government decisions and to help 
governments decide what to do about previous promises.
533
  However, it would appear 
that there are always underlying unstated political reasons for their appointment. As 
Ashforth observes,  
although governmental inquiries typically engage in fact-gathering and argument in 
order to produce policy-oriented recommendations, their labours rarely produce 
policy results commensurate with the effort and expense of the inquiry. Nor are 
they usually accorded the time and resources to fully investigate the matters with 
which they are charged... (hence)...it would seem reasonable to assume that there 
might be reasons for the existence of Commissions which go beyond their 
expressed purposes.
534
 
 
Many scholars have cynically suggested that they are intended to obfuscate and delay or to 
‗white-wash‘ the government‘s image, to forestall criticism, ‗reassure the public that 
something is being done,‘ buy time and breathing space following a scandal; or to find 
scape-goats and apportion blame.
535
  Such inquiries would fall in the category of what 
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Arendt refers to as the ―mass manipulation of fact and opinion;‖ ―modern political lies that 
deal efficiently with things that are not secrets but are known to practically everybody;‖ 
―image-making... supposed not to flatter reality but to offer a full-fledged substitute for 
it.‖536  
 
However, Ashforth argues that these cynical reasons ―cannot suffice in accounting for the 
abiding significance of the institution, nor its widespread manifestations in States of 
various forms.‖537  Hence, scholars have begun to dig deeper and try to go beyond 
conventional understandings of inquiries. Sulitzeanu-Kenan sought to empirically 
investigate why, despite the labelling of inquiries as ―whitewash‖ by the public, they are 
highly sought by the public in the aftermath of a disaster or a scandal. Using the Hutton 
Inquiry into the Death of Dr. David Kelly as a case study, she offers the hypothesis that 
public inquiries play a ―providing confirmation‖ role. This happens when political rivals, 
the press and the public demote the event that led to the inquiry on the public agenda, due 
to the government‘s willingness to be criticised and in a way, ―pay‖ for the misdeed 
through the prospect of a negative authoritative evaluation.
538
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Ashforth and Gilligan put forward the theory that when viewed through various lenses, 
inquiries‘ major purpose in modern democratic polities is that of legitimation.539 
Legitimacy is a political psychological construct. Tyler gives a definition which is useful 
in explaining Ashforth and Gilligan‘s theoretical perspective on the role of inquiries: 
Legitimacy is a psychological property of an authority, institution, or social 
arrangement that leads those connected to it to believe that it is appropriate, proper, 
and just. Because of legitimacy, people feel that they ought to defer to decisions 
and rules, following them voluntarily out of obligation rather than out of fear of 
punishment or anticipation of reward. Being legitimate is important to the success 
of authorities, institutions, and institutional arrangements since it is difficult to 
exert influence over others based solely upon the possession and use of power. 
Being able to gain voluntary acquiescence from most people, most of the time, due 
to their sense of obligation increases effectiveness during periods of scarcity, crisis, 
and conflict.
540
 
 
Legitimation is therefore a useful all-encompassing theory for understanding the role of 
inquiries, because it can apply whether inquiries are intended as a white-wash, a scape-
goating mechanism, and a blame avoidance or blame acceptance mechanism. At this 
point, I will consider the theory of legitimation in greater detail. 
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4.4.2 Commissions of inquiry as legitimation devices 
Burton and Carlen‘s analysis of official discourse first proposed a view of inquiries as 
devices for repairing crises of legitimacy in government. Using Marxist theory and 
Foucaultian discourse analysis, they argued that governments use the ‗lay intelligentsia‘ of 
judges and experts to transmit forms of knowledge into political practices, thereby 
replenishing official arguments with both established and fresh ideas.
541
  Ashforth 
observes that this in turn allows the powers that be to govern according to principles of 
knowledge generally deemed to be ‗true.‘ Through political struggle and debate, inquiries 
produce a rational and scientific administrative discourse which is crucial to governing.
542
   
 
When appointed to inquire into a particular crisis, their task is to ―represent failure as 
temporary, or no failure at all, and to re-establish the image of administrative and legal 
coherence and rationality.‖543 The process of inquiry aims at reconstructing the ―State‘s 
fractured image of administrative rationality and democratic legality.‖544 This is pertinent 
in ―neo-patrimonial‖ Uganda, where administrative rationality is not merely fractured but 
regarded as a farce.  
 
Also, it is important to note that reconstructing an image of democratic legality was 
especially important in the late 1990s and early 2000s when the NRM government was 
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under pressure to abandon the ―movement system‖ in favour of multipartyism. Thus, 
inquiries were crucial in the production of an anti-corruption discourse that would 
legitimate the NRM government before its donors as being legal-rational (as opposed to 
patrimonial); democratic and not dictatorial. This role of inquiries in promoting 
accountability within democratic states was analysed by Thomas, who alluded to them as 
―democratic pluralism at work.‖545 They represent an attempt by the state to illustrate its 
commitment to heeding public opinion. The public establishment of facts through an 
inquisitorial process is a good demonstration of democratic conflict resolution and action. 
Thus they provide a ―modicum of accountability.‖546 In States like Uganda which are 
under pressure to demonstrate that they are democratic, inquiries can be viewed as ―good 
governance‖ in action. 
 
Gilligan notes that inquiries are legitimating either actively, by findings that exonerate or 
justify state action, or passively, by remaining silent about key failures by state agents. 
Other inquiries can be subversive, taking positions that are contrary or even hostile to the 
state. Nevertheless, I propose that the distinction proposed by Gilligan is redundant, 
because ―subversive‖ inquiries too, can have a legitimating effect.547  Indeed, in a status 
quo characterised by intense media scrutiny, it may be in the government‘s favour if the 
inquiry findings are contrary or even hostile towards it in order to avoid claims of white-
washing. Moreover, according to Sulitzeanu-Kenan, the importance of inquiries lies 
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primarily in the fact that the government pays for its misdeeds through submitting to a 
negative authoritative evaluation.
548
  
 
A recent example of an inquiry that has been decried for performing a legitimating 
function is the Hutton Inquiry into the death of Dr. David Kelly, a government scientist 
involved in the issue of whether or not there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. 
Despite being hailed for the quality of his investigation, Lord Hutton‘s report was later 
dismissed as a whitewash because it minimised the role government in Dr. Kelly‘s suicide, 
and instead laid the blame at the feet of the BBC.
549
  It would appear that any inquiry that 
exculpates the government of wrong doing or chooses to be silent about government 
wrong doing while laying the blame on some extraneous factor is generally bound to be 
dismissed as a whitewash. On the other hand, an inquiry that is critical of the government 
and squarely apportions blame to particular officers or departments is bound to be 
regarded as more authentic and in keeping with the demands of justice and accountability, 
indeed, thereby ultimately achieving a legitimating effect. 
 
A subversive inquiry is regarded by Gilligan as one that embarrasses the government and 
its agencies, and uncovers unexpected truths.
550
 A commonly cited example is the 
Macpherson Inquiry into the death of British teenager Steven Lawrence, who was killed 
for racist reasons. The investigation into his murder was subsequently bungled by the 
                                                 
548
 Sulitzeanu-Kenan, op. cit. 
549
 Wring, D. (2005). "Politics and the Media: The Hutton Inquiry, the Public Relations State and Crisis at the BBC." 
Parliamentary Affairs 58 (2): 380-393 
550
 Gilligan, op. cit. 
  
217 
 
Police, leading to an acquittal of the accused and the subsequent inquiry. The inquiry 
found that the Metropolitan Police was ―institutionally racist,‖ and has become one of the 
most positively regarded inquiries in present-day Britain.
551
 One commentator referred to 
the outcome of the inquiry as ―one of the most important moments in the modern history 
of criminal justice in Britain.‖552 Hence, subversion ultimately served a legitimation 
purpose and Gilligan‘s distinction is unnecessary. 
 
The ability to be legitimating through whitewashing, or to legitimate in a more subtle way 
through exposure of governmental wrong doing is what makes inquiries an ideal anti-
corruption mechanism for a country such as Uganda, whose polity has a multiplicity of 
intersecting and yet contradictory interests, that is, the donors, the state and the civil 
society as represented by the media and unco-opted elite.  Inquiries as ―good governance 
in action,‖ enable the state to show the donors that it is complying with conditionality, 
whilst simultaneously showing the citizens that the regime is committed to anti-corruption. 
In the case of Uganda, the ability of an inquiry to reach a conclusion that is disfavourable 
to the State, has a legitimating effect because the government is thereby seen to pay for its 
misdeeds through a negative authoritative evaluation by the judiciary. Moreover, it 
reiterates the independence of the judiciary and the authenticity of the inquiry process; 
thereby reiterating the State‘s legal rationality and democraticness.  
 
                                                 
551
  Report of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry by Sir William MacPherson of Cluny, 1999.  
552
 BBC News, Q & A: Stephen Lawrence Murder,  05 May 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3685733.stm, last 
accessed 09 February 2011. 
  
218 
 
4.4.3 Legitimation through truth-finding 
 
Whereas the findings and recommendations of an inquiry as contained in the report are of 
great importance to the legitimation purpose, this thesis emphasises that the inquiry 
proceedings themselves, that is, the cross examination of witnesses under intense public 
scrutiny, are just as important as the final report in the legitimation process. After all, in 
inquisitorial-style proceedings such as those adopted by inquiries, fact-finding and the 
attribution of fault go hand in hand. Furthermore, the recommendations made by 
commissions of inquiry are not binding upon the government, which is free to ignore or 
modify them as it sees fit. I therefore agree with Sheriff  who maintains that it is the form 
and structure of the inquiries that is important, and not necessarily their stated purpose as 
contained in the terms of reference.
553
 In particular, she draws attention to public 
participation as the factor which enables inquiries to promote social harmony. Similarly, 
research geared towards evaluating the effectiveness of UK Prison Inquiries showed that 
for a significant number of people, the strength of inquiry (relating to questioning and 
cross-examination) was a significant factor and that the outcome of the inquiry regarding 
follow-up action did not matter as much as the process itself.
554
  
 
However, the truth-finding process of inquiries is a potentially controversial one, due to 
the nebulous nature of ―truth.‖ As Mcmullan and Mcclung emphasise, 
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Truth… is a difficult concept. Its definition, identification and verification are 
rarely uncomplicated and almost always implicated in complex political and 
communicative processes involving perception, representation and interpretation. 
Yet civil proceedings, public courts, criminal investigations, special state tribunals, 
coroner‘s inquests, judicial reviews, public inquiries and truth commissions all 
claim, in theory at least, to offer mechanisms, rules and procedures by which 
‗‗truth‘‘ can be  aggregated, evaluated, confirmed and denied.555 
 
Taking into account the above view, and without digressing into post-modernist arguments 
about what constitutes the truth or whether truth can be said to exist, this study takes the 
position that the importance of ―truth‖ lies more in the process of establishing it rather 
than the outcome.  
 
McMullan and McClung note that ―simple truth‖ is a myth and that establishing facts can 
be controversial. Crocker observes that even a Truth Commission may have a difficult 
time agreeing on what constitutes the truth. Members may disagree on who or what is 
responsible for wrongs that happened, resulting in minority reports, which can undermine 
the entire process of the inquiry and the resulting report.
556
 Indeed, this is what befell the 
2002 Commission of Inquiry into Uganda Revenue Authority, where two of the 
Commissioners dissociated themselves from the final report due to disagreement over the 
manner in which the Commission Chair had apportioned blame for corruption in Uganda 
Revenue Authority. In a subsequent civil case challenging the report, the High Court held 
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that the resulting report could not be said in law to be a report of the Commission, because 
it was signed only by the Chair and the Secretary and not by all the members of the 
Commission of Inquiry.
557
  
 
Foucault notes that truth is produced by power and each directly impact one another.
558
 He 
further notes that there are four questions about truth-telling that are of vital importance: 
‗‗who is able to tell the truth, about what, with what consequences, and with what relation 
to power.‘‘559 Thus, inquiry findings are regarded as objective truth because they are 
chaired by judges assisted by other persons of ―public standing‖ who are supposedly 
impartial and expert in their field of knowledge, and presumably therefore, incapable of 
lying.
560
  
 
In agreement with Foucault, McMullan and McClung  say that ―truth‘‘ is often registered 
by and through professions who strategically ‗‗take charge‘‘ of social issues. These groups 
- scientists, business managers, doctors, lawyers; produce ‗‗official discourses‘‘, and 
induce effects of power through claims-making. Such ‗‗disciplines‘‘ are accredited as 
authoritative news sources about health, war, crime, the economy, social disasters.
561
 
Hence, judges and other prestigious members of inquiries are taken as the ideal profession 
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or discipline to dig up the truth during crises and make appropriate recommendations. 
Judges, rather than politicians are crucial because as Arendt observes, ―no one has ever 
doubted that truth and politics are on rather bad terms with each other, and no one... has 
ever counted truthfulness among the political virtues. Lies have always been regarded as 
necessary and justifiable tools not only of the politician‘s or the demagogue‘s but also of 
the statesman‘s trade.‖562 In Uganda, the reliance on judges is even more pertinent because 
judicial independence is a key element of the good governance discourse,  and proof of it 
is therefore one of the conditions attached to foreign aid. A commission of inquiry chaired 
by a judge provides an ideal forum where such independence can be clearly exhibited.  
 
The ―truth‖ that emerges from an inquiry process is notable not only because of the source 
from which it emerges (members who are lawyers, judges or other persons of ―good 
public standing‖) but also because of its mass appeal, enabled by the media‘s role in 
broadcasting it widely. We saw earlier on in this chapter that the media‘s role in 
transmitting the proceedings of inquiries is crucial to the ―publicness‖ of inquiries. Hence, 
media coverage is inextricably linked to the truth-finding process and legitimation 
function of inquiries, as was earlier argued by the Warwick Inquest Group ―reporting... 
becomes the justification for holding (the inquiry).‖ 563  We saw in the previous chapters 
that promoting media freedom has been a key element of good governance discourse, and 
that indeed the Uganda government has allowed some space for media freedom and public 
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debate.  By allowing extensive media coverage of public proceedings, judicial inquiries 
facilitate the Uganda government‘s ability to show all the parties concerned that it is a 
good governor.  
 
4.4.4 Inquiries as “theatres” of legitimation 
The enduring fascination with the truth-finding process of the public inquiry lies in their 
politically symbolic value as inquisitorial devices for establishing facts. Symbolic politics, 
according to Edelman‘s hypothesis, emphasises the emotional and psychological aspects 
of symbols in politics, particularly the role they play in reassuring the public. One of the 
relevant examples he gives are public exercises in self-criticism that are popular in 
Communist regimes. He describes them as verbal recounts of political acts which are 
geared towards bringing gratification that something is being done about the situation. 
Such dramatic symbolic gratification is useful in various political situations including 
election campaigns, policy battles and international relations; and is the substitute for 
taking concrete action.
564
 Inquiries are therefore symbolic devices for self-criticism and 
public reassurance.  
 
The quasi-judicial setting within which inquiries take place serves to further strengthen 
their symbolic appeal. Edelman notes that political settings involving formal government 
proceedings are highly contrived.
565
 Kiss says that inquiries direct a ―staging of a national 
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morality play.‖566 As quasi-judicial proceedings, it would not be far-fetched to compare 
inquiry proceedings with analyses of judicial proceedings as theatrical forms. Jeremy 
Bentham early on described a courtroom as a ―judicial theatre‖ or ―theatre of justice.‖567  
Although lacking in the costumery and ceremony of the courtroom, the fact that the 
membership of inquiries is dominated by members of the legal profession is a stark 
reminder of the similarity between inquiry proceedings and public trials. The attendance 
of members of the public at proceedings has been likened to the audience, an essential 
feature of theatrical performances. Add to this the atmosphere of conflict and suspense 
created by the questioning and cross-examining of witnesses, and the resulting effect is an 
artful production.
568
  
 
The drama production that is an inquiry process has also been referred to by Carlen as a 
―play of governance.‖569 Carlen‘s reminder of the impossibility of arriving at an absolute 
truth reiterates that ―the play‘s the thing.‖  The view of public inquiries as a form of 
theatre was also reiterated in a study by the Warwick Inquest Group on the process of 
inquest.
570
 These views acknowledge the value of legal processes aimed at establishing 
truth is in the process itself and not in its end result. Since final resolution is impossible, 
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pragmatism demands that the process of resolution itself must suffice. This would explain 
the conundrum as to why inquiries continue to be in demand despite scepticism that they 
would be nothing more than a whitewash.
571
  
 
The theatrical production of a public inquiry is however, not for entertainment, but for 
penance. It is a theatre where interested parties and particularly, aggrieved members of the 
public can hope to gain some sort of recompense by watching the alleged culprits being 
cross-examined and embarrassed by having to answer difficult questions. Inquiries serve 
as trials, not for the determination of guilt and innocence, but for establishing morality - 
who was right and who was wrong; who was to blame? In the Iraq inquiry, interested 
members of the British public, particularly relatives and friends who lost loved ones 
during the Iraq war, looked forward to the day when former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, 
who made the decision to go to war, would be questioned by the members of the inquiry. 
Many were disappointed when they perceived the cross-examination as not being rigorous 
enough. One could infer that the public was disappointed that the questions were not asked 
in a manner that would have left Tony Blair embarrassed and in a tight-corner. They were 
disappointed that the inquiry members were ―soft‖ on him, enabling him to justify his 
decision to go to war without offering an apology. An apology by Blair would have been 
the high point of the inquiry and would have served the needs of restorative justice. 
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Failing this, at the end of his testimony, he was booed and heckled, and cries of ―It‘s a 
whitewash!‖ rang across Britain.572   
 
Nevertheless, such is the power of the inquiry process that Blair was in any case shamed 
in the media for avoiding the shame and the blame. Despite his adamant refusal to 
apologise, the inquiry process has given those who disapprove of his actions a visible 
platform to voice their disapproval of him. Thus, inquiry proceedings allow all the 
interested parties to confirm their personal decisions concerning who is innocent or guilty. 
Where the report resonates with their ex ante decisions, well and good; where it finds 
differently, it will be dismissed as a whitewash. It is this factor that diminishes the 
importance of the inquiry report. 
 
Accordingly, the event or process of inquiry can be viewed as a form of ―truth as justice‖ 
as envisaged under the paradigm of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission whether or not explicitly intended as such.
573
 The ―telling‖ and ―exposure‖ of 
illegal or immoral acts that were carried out behind closed doors is supposed to embarrass 
and shame corrupt officials, and thus fulfil the demands of restorative justice. Restorative 
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justice focuses on admission of wrong-doing by the offender, acknowledgement of the 
harm caused to the victim(s), and reparation for the harm.
574
   
 
Even where those implicated in wrong doing do not acknowledge their wrong, the 
inquisitorial process allows for res ipsa loquitur  - for the facts to speak for themselves as 
omissions and commissions by various people comes to light. Thus, the ―justice‖ 
envisaged is not in the positivist sense of the word, but more in tune with natural law 
conceptions of what is right and wrong. In this way, truth as justice not only serves the end 
of justice and accountability, but those of morality as well. The concept of shaming is after 
all, one which is based on ostracising as punishment for the violation of particular norms. 
It can also be said that inquiries also serve as forums for the reinforcement of social norms 
and morals, where the norm that is violated would depend on the subject of the inquiry. 
Indeed, one can argue that the huge public outcry that precedes and necessitates a 
Commission of Inquiry is usually due to the fact that a norm or a moral value has been 
violated. Hence, the Iraq inquiry was necessary because the war was regarded as an 
immoral and unjustified attack on a Sovereign country which cost Britain the lives of 
many of its citizens. Those who lost their lives during the war did not die justly as soldiers 
fighting for their land, but died unnecessarily under what is regarded by some as the 
selfish whims of Tony Blair and George Bush.
575
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4.5 Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter has shown that inquiries are popular throughout the world, due to their 
unique features and functions that enable governments to use them as devices for 
legitimation. Their uniqueness lies, firstly, in being ad hoc quasi-judicial bodies that are 
appointed by the executive yet independent from it; secondly, in their ability to allow 
public participation in an inquisitorial fact-finding process that takes place under intense 
media scrutiny; and lastly, in the fact that in many countries, the government retains 
discretion regarding implementing the findings and recommendations of the inquiry. Thus, 
they combine a number of distinctive features that no other governmental body can 
replicate. Keeton observes that despite their shortcomings, there is no other means 
available within the apparatus of government that can satisfy the demands for 
independence, impartiality and rigorous fact-finding during a time of crisis.
576
  
 
The legitimation function of inquiries is linked to their role as truth-finding devices. 
During times of crisis, they help to establish ―whodunit‖ through a participatory 
inquisitorial process that enables the various parties concerned to reach their own personal 
conclusions about who was responsible, regardless of the inquiry‘s outcome.  In this way, 
truth equals justice as public officials responsible for the crisis are publicly named and 
shamed. By thus paying for its misdeeds through a negative authoritative evaluation, the 
government restores its legitimacy. Indeed the possibility that the recommendations will 
be ignored or substantially modified illustrates the point that the process matters more than 
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the outcome. This potential irrelevance of the final outcome is what renders inquiries 
symbolic ―theatres‖ of legitimation. 
 
In Uganda, a donor-funded neo-patrimonial state, it is likely that the government‘s 
preference for inquiries to address corruption is due to the factors discussed above. We 
saw in chapter two that the Uganda PRSP and PRSP Progress reports have frequently 
mentioned commissions of inquiry as evidence of the government‘s commitment to 
fighting corruption, which they justify as the best approach in cases ―where the situation is 
not amenable to conventional auditing and investigation procedures.‖577 Although the 
government does not elaborate on this point, we can infer from the above discussion that 
commissions of inquiry are preferred because of their unique characteristics outlined 
above. These are, the fact that they are headed by judges whose independence is a 
requirement for ―good governance; ‖ the highly publicised inquisitorial fact-finding 
process which exhibits the aspects of good governance that emphasise transparency, media 
freedom and public participation; and the public shaming of government officials which 
exhibits a modicum of accountability.  
 
Inquiries are therefore a political strategy which enables the government to show that it is 
fulfilling conditionality by being transparent and accountable, fostering judicial 
independence, media freedom and public participation; all of which are requirements of 
the good governance agenda.  In addition, commissions of inquiry enable the government 
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to placate its citizens that something is being done about corruption whilst ultimately 
protecting the patronage system by ignoring the recommendations for the actual criminal 
trial and conviction of the implicated public officials. In chapters 5 and 6, I present and 
analyse the findings of the field study to illustrate how this has been achieved.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Commissions of Inquiry into Corruption in Uganda (1999-Present) 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I look at the role judicial commissions of inquiry into corruption have 
played in governance in Uganda. I start by looking at the legal framework that governs the 
appointment and proceedings of inquiries in Uganda. I then look at inquiries since 1986 
when the present NRM government took power and embarked on a process of economic 
and political reform within the context of the ―good governance‖ agenda prescribed by the 
International Financial Institutions and bi-lateral donors, before focusing on the 
corruption-related inquiries that are the main focus of this study. 
 
The 1999 Commission of Inquiry into the Uganda Police Force marked the beginning of 
what I suggest was a new era of inquiries in Uganda, an era marked by intense media and 
public interest in inquiry proceedings which enabled them to serve not merely as 
conditionality fulfilment or patronage preservation devices, but also as good governance/ 
anti-corruption-discourse generating theatres. The 2000 inquiry into the purchase of junk 
military helicopters (Junk Helicopters inquiry) came close on the heels of the Police 
Inquiry and has had a lasting impact on society in Uganda, particularly in exposing the 
corruption in the National Resistance Movement (NRM) ruling regime‘s top leadership. It 
was followed by the 2002 commission of inquiry into allegations of corruption in Uganda 
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Revenue Authority (URA inquiry). Finally, the 2005 Commission of Inquiry into the 
Mismanagement of the Global Fund on HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria (Global Fund inquiry) 
regarded by some as probably the most ―successful‖ inquiry in the recent history of 
Uganda and also ironically seems to mark the end of the ―inquiries‖ era, at least for the 
time being. 
 
 5.2 The Legal and Administrative Framework for Commissions of Inquiry 
Commissions of Inquiry are governed by the Commissions of Inquiry Act of 1969.
578
 
They may be appointed by the President or by a Minister.
579
 They are established by a 
Statutory Instrument known as a Legal Notice. Such Legal Notice lays down the terms of 
reference, the time frame for the commission‘s work, the methods of work it may adopt as 
well as explicit naming of the chair, commissioners, secretary and counsel of the inquiry. 
Once appointed, Commissioners enjoy immunity from prosecution or civil liability.
580
  
 
There are two notable issues concerning the fact that appointment of inquiries in Uganda 
is by the President on an ad hoc basis. Firstly, because the government is beholden to 
donors for its funding, the President is able to quickly respond to crises in governance 
arising from corruption scandals in order to reiterate that he is committed to the principles 
of good governance. This tactic worked successfully with the Global Fund inquiry, which 
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I will discuss shortly. Secondly, as the appointing authority and the one to whom the 
report is presented, he can use his authority to suppress a report that is not favourable to 
him, as he did with the Junk Helicopters Inquiry report where he was implicated for 
influencing the award of the tender. 
581
 
 
The choice of commissioners is in theory, an administrative matter handled by the 
Solicitor General from his metaphorical ―book of the great and the good.‖582 During the 
period under review (1999-present), there has however, been a marked preference for 
Justices Sebutinde and Ogoola, as table 3 shows.
583
 In reality, it cannot be denied that 
political factors influence the appointment of the inquiry. For example, Justice Sebutinde, 
although appointed routinely to chair the 1999 Police inquiry, became a popular choice for 
subsequent inquiries due to the perception that she had done an excellent job with her 
unrelenting cross examination that left public officials literally lost for words.
584
 Justice 
Ogoola‘s appointment on the other hand, may have been influenced by his comparatively 
milder approach to examining witnesses, after the URA inquiry was nullified on the 
grounds of Justice Sebutinde‘s disregard for natural justice during the cross-examination 
of witnesses. He was also, notably, respected for his seniority as Principal Judge, his 
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commercial law expertise and his international work experience as a former employee of 
the IMF.
585
 
 
The wording of section 2 of the Act, which provides that inquiries ―may‖ appoint a 
commission of inquiry, points to the fact that they are appointed on an ad hoc basis under 
Executive discretion. Thus, they are temporary and exist outside the day-to-day apparatus 
of government. This factor may enhance their function as legitimating devices. When a 
corruption scandal revealing that government funds have been stolen erupts, appointing an 
ad hoc Commission outside the normal anti-corruption apparatus shows that the 
government is taking the matter very seriously and can have a placating effect on the 
angry public as well as the donors. This tactic worked especially well when it was found 
that the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS and Malaria was being mismanaged by the Ministry 
of Health. The Global Fund headquarters in Geneva suspended the grants to Uganda, but 
when an inquiry was instituted, the suspension was lifted.
586
  
Commissions of inquiry have the power to determine their own modus operandi, subject to 
section 2, which provides that the proceedings shall be held in public. Nevertheless, 
Commissioners have discretion to transfer the proceedings to be held in Camera if they 
deem fit.  Section 8 provides that ―Commissioners acting under this Act may make such 
rules for their own guidance, and the conduct and management of proceedings before 
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them, and the hours and times and places for their sittings, not inconsistent with their 
commission, as they may from time to time think fit, and may from time to time adjourn 
for such time and to such place as they may think fit, subject only to the terms of their 
commission.‖   
Invariably, the procedure chosen has  involved inquisitorial proceedings, which have been 
said by Keeton to be unavoidable to the fact-finding function of such bodies.
587
 In Uganda, 
a number of public officials appearing as witnesses before inquiries have been deeply 
offended by the inquisitorial style and what they perceive as the unjust imputation of guilt 
upon them. One of them who was a respondent to this study likened the Global Fund 
Commission of Inquiry in Uganda to a Kangaroo Court.
588
  In Annebrit Aslund versus the 
Attorney General
589
, the plaintiff was the Commissioner General of Uganda Revenue 
Authority, which had been subjected to an inquiry process for allegations of corruption. 
She successfully sought an order of certiorari to quash the inquiry report and record of 
proceedings on grounds that the inquiry chairperson had abused natural justice when she 
called her incompetent and a liar during cross examination without giving her a chance to 
respond to the allegations.  
Under section 9, the Commissioners have the powers of the High Court to summon 
witnesses, to call for the production of books, plans and documents and to examine 
witnesses and parties concerned on oath. Where the commissioners consider it desirable 
                                                 
587
 See Keeton (1960) op. cit. 
588
 Personal Interview, 21 July 2009. 
589
 High Court Miscellaneous Application No. 441 of 2004. 
  
235 
 
for the purpose of avoiding expense or delay or for any other special reason, they may 
receive evidence by affidavit or administer interrogatories and require the person to whom 
the interrogatories are administered to make a full and true reply to the interrogatories. In 
Uganda, the wide investigatory power of inquiries is one of the factors that makes them a 
better alternative to conventional criminal proceedings. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
the investigatory process for corruption cases in the criminal justice system is greatly 
hampered by lack of skilled and motivated staff and lack of equipment. There are frequent 
delays and cases are often abandoned due to lack of evidence. Inquiries have a time limit 
within which to present their findings. They are also able to combine investigation and 
fault-finding, which can help to address the evidence gap by allowing oral testimony to 
supplement the often inadequate paper trail. Moreover, intense public scrutiny ensures that 
public officials are wont to comply with the inquiry process, as opposed to low-key 
criminal investigations that could be more easily compromised.  
When proceedings are concluded, commissions of inquiry are required to report to the 
President or Minister as the case may be, in writing. The report should detail the result of 
the inquiry and furnish a full statement of the proceedings of the commission and of the 
reasons leading to the conclusions arrived at or reported.
590
 The report is then reduced to a 
―White Paper‖ by the Solicitor General‘s chambers, which is forwarded to Cabinet for 
discussion.
591
 Cabinet may accept or reject the conclusions reached by the Commission. 
Moreover, Cabinet proceedings in Uganda are subject to a high degree of secrecy and are 
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even included in the category of information to which the public has no right of access 
under the Access to Information Act.
592
 There is no legal obligation to publish the report 
or to implement the recommendations made by the inquiry. While this has caused endless 
consternation among donors and the public, it reiterates my earlier assertion that 
commissions of inquiry‘s chief importance lies in the proceedings, and not in the outcome. 
Moreover, in this ―media‖ age, the government‘s reluctance to publish an inquiry‘s report 
serves little purpose because the truth has already been published by the media‘s reporting 
on proceedings. 
 
5.3 Commissions of inquiry in Uganda (1986-1996) 
Between 1986 and 1996, the NRM government busied itself with consolidating power and 
delivering on its promises to turn around politics and governance in Uganda. In his 
swearing in speech as new president on 29th January 1986, Museveni said: 
No one should think that what is happening today is a mere change of guard; it is a 
fundamental change in the politics of our country.
593
 
This statement established the benchmark by which Museveni‘s regime has since been 
evaluated, particularly with regard to corruption and its response to it.  
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The inquiries that were set up in the initial years of NRM rule reflected this commitment 
to reform and righting the wrongs of previous regimes. Immediately it took power, the 
government appointed a commission of inquiry to ―investigate violations of human rights, 
breaches of the rule of law and excessive abuses of power committed against persons in 
Uganda by the regimes in government during the period from 9 October 1962 to 25 
January 1986.‖594 Dubbed Uganda‘s ―Truth Commission‖ this inquiry did an excellent job 
of uncovering myriad atrocities committed by state agents of previous regimes against 
Ugandan citizens.
595
 As a result, subsequent analyses of its role assert that the 
Commission only served as a political strategy to provide legitimacy to the current 
government by discrediting previous regimes.
596
  
When the NRM took over power in 1986, their manifesto ―the Ten Point Programme‖ 
declared the elimination of corruption as one of their priorities. Hence, it was not long 
before corruption and mismanagement in public offices and state-owned enterprises 
became the subject of inquiries. In 1988, the government set up an inquiry into, among 
others, ―corruption, misappropriation, coercion, embezzlement and general 
mismanagement of finances, property and staff of Uganda Tourist Development 
Corporation.‖597 There were similar inquiries into the East African Steel Corporation, in 
which the government of Uganda had shares, as well as the Uganda Posts and 
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Telecommunications Corporation in 1991 and 1992 respectively.
598
 These inquiries 
provided the legitimacy and justification for the privatisation of state-owned enterprises 
that was under way at that time. Even though privatisation was obviously being carried out 
at the behest of the IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Policies and their 
successor PRSPs, there was still a need to find local justification for the process, 
especially given the fact that Museveni and the NRM originally embraced Marxist-leaning 
ideologies on the role of the state and economic regulation and was being accused of 
―selling out‖ by acquiescing to the demands of the IFIs.599  
 
5.4 Commissions of inquiry into corruption during the “good governance” era 
(1996- present)  
 
The ―good governance‖ era, discussed chapters 2 and 3, brought about many changes in 
the political, economic and social set up of Uganda. Aside from the privatisation of state 
enterprises and other macro-economic reforms, there also began a new era of electoral 
democracy, increased judicial independence, media freedom and participation of civil 
society organisations in government. The NRM government  embarked on a series of 
populist reforms outlined in their takeover manifesto known as the Ten-Point-Programme. 
These reforms included the establishment of a Constitutional Review Commission, which 
eventually culminated in the first ever democratically enacted Constitution of 1995 by an 
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elected Constitution Assembly. In 1996, there followed presidential and parliamentary 
elections. Uganda was then still governed through the Movement system based on 
individual merit as opposed to political parties. The presidential elections, supposedly 
based on individual merit and ―no-party democracy,‖ were contested by incumbent 
Yoweri Museveni and Paul Ssemogerere of the Democratic Party, who was required by 
law to stand as an independent candidate and not as the leader of his party.  The former 
won with 75% of the vote. 
 
The late 1980s and 1990s were a golden era in Uganda – Museveni and his NRM enjoyed 
the favour and support of both IFIs and donors as well as the local population. Museveni 
was hailed as one of a ―new breed of African leaders‖ by President Bill Clinton and other 
key figures in the international community such as then UK Minister for Overseas 
Development, Clare Short.
600
  The economy was booming, inflation was under control, 
public infrastructure was expanding. Government was more participatory than it had ever 
been, FM radio and TV Stations were opening up all over the country, and the air was full 
of optimism.
601
  
 
Nevertheless, the return to competitive politics in 1996 when the first elections in 16 years 
were held showed that Uganda still had significant problems. Firstly, they showed that the 
idea of a ―broad-based government‖ based on the ―the movement‖ to which all Ugandans 
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belonged had holes in it; as the northern region of the country voted overwhelmingly 
against Museveni. During this time, there was a guerrilla war waged by Joseph Kony and 
the Lord‘s Resistance Army raging in northern Uganda, and the vote against Museveni 
was thought to be largely due to his failure to contain the war. Moreover, the elections 
were heavily characterised by use of money and other material inducements to influence 
the vote. The Parliamentary elections that were held soon after the presidential elections 
were also marred by monetisation. This exposed the level and extent of political 
corruption in Uganda and inevitably cast the spot-light on other forms of corruption that 
bedevilled the country. 
602
   
 
Hence began the publication of numerous corruption scandals in the newly liberalised 
media. These scandals mainly concerned the involvement of senior government officers 
and members of the National Resistance Movement in the privatisation process, which had 
started in the early 1990s. For example, it came to light that brother-in-law to President 
and Investment Minister Sam Kutesa divested Entebbe Airport Handling Services to 
himself, and Museveni‘s brother General Salim Saleh connived to obtain majority shares 
in Uganda Commercial Bank and Uganda Grain Millers Ltd.
603
 Corruption in the 
privatisation process came to light thanks to the vigilance of the newly elected Parliament, 
working hand in hand with the media. The Chair of the Parliamentary Parastatal 
Committee, Yona Kanyomozi, was a member of the opposition Uganda Peoples‘ Congress 
                                                 
602
 Muhumuza, William (1997) Money and Power in Uganda‘s 1996 elections. Afr.j. polit. sci., Vol. 2 No. 1, 168-179. 
603
 BBC News (Africa) (1998) ―Corruption mars Uganda Privatisation.‖ Sunday December 20 th 1998, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/239072.stm, last accessed 25 September 2010. 
  
241 
 
(UPC) party and proved to be a vocal critic of the government‘s handling of privatisation. 
The furore resulted in the establishment of a Parliamentary Select Committee on 
Privatisation, whose investigations confirmed that there was wrong-doing by Kutesa, 
Saleh and Matthew Rukikaire, Minister for Privatisation. While the latter two resigned 
their government positions, Kutesa adamantly refused to resign and was censured by his 
fellow parliamentarians. Despite the revelations, there were no criminal investigations or 
prosecutions of those implicated.
604
  Tangri and Mwenda suggest that this lack of action 
was because those implicated, as well as the Attorney General, the Inspector General of 
Government, the Head of the Criminal Investigations Department and the Director of 
Public Prosecutions were all from the same ethnic region and hence there was a massive 
cover up going on.
605
 
 
Corruption in the privatisation process continued to be a key item on the media and hence 
the national agenda. There was outcry from Parliamentarians as well the general public 
regarding the lack of decisive action against those who had been implicated. The issue was 
also causing the government a lot of embarrassment before the international community 
and the donors, and rhetorical promises to take action were made. Unfortunately, as earlier 
discussed in chapter two, the donors were unwilling to admit that all was not well with 
their ―showcase‖ and ―star pupil‖ Uganda, and never came out strongly to decry what was 
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happening, although it is said that they did so in their private conversations with 
government officials.
606
  
 
It was in this climate of mounting allegations of corruption against members of the first 
family and ruling elite that the judicial inquiry into the Uganda Police Force was 
appointed. Could it have been a ruse to distract the public from the discredited 
privatisation process and focus it instead on the failings of the Police Force? For Police 
corruption had always been a problem in Uganda, but was now being overshadowed by 
the revelations of grand corruption in the highest levels of government. Following the 
1999 police inquiry, other inquiries into corruption-related matters were instituted in quick 
succession over the next 7 years; so that for a time, it appeared that there was always a 
corruption-related judicial inquiry going on. In 2000, about 6 months after the police 
inquiry concluded its work, the helicopter inquiry, was set up.
607
 It completed its work in 
2001 and was followed in 2002 by the Uganda Revenue Authority inquiry, which went on 
until 2004. This was then followed by the Global Fund inquiry in 2005; which was the last 
one at the time of this study. I will now look at each of these inquiries in turn, before 
analysing why they were established and what the implications of their appointment were 
for governance in Uganda. 
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Table 3: Commissions of inquiry into corruption Uganda (1999-Present)  
1.  1999 To generally investigate allegations of corruption 
within the Police force and where necessary, make 
recommendations for the purpose of improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the Police Force 
Justice Julia 
Sebutinde 
2.  2000 To inquire into all the circumstances pertaining to 
the procurement, purchase, acceptance, delivery 
and payment for MI-24 helicopters for the army 
Justice Julia 
Sebutinde 
3.  2002 To inquire into Allegations of Corruption in 
Uganda Revenue Authority 
Justice Julia 
Sebutinde 
4.  2005 To inquire into Allegations of Mismanagement of 
the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria 
Justice James 
Ogoola 
 
5.4.1. The Police Inquiry 1999  
Background  
The afore-mentioned 1986 Commission of Inquiry into human rights violations by 
previous regimes had thrown the spot-light on the Police Force as having been responsible 
for perpetrating various cases of torture, murder and other forms of abuse against the very 
civilians whom they were supposed to protect. That commission of inquiry noted that 
there was widespread corruption and abuse of office in the Police which had to be 
completely eradicated in order to restore confidence in the force as a protector and not an 
abuser of the citizens of Uganda.
608
   
The bad reputation of the force was further exacerbated by the bungling of an 
investigation into the murder of prominent businessman, and rally driver, Gerald Kiddu, in 
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1997.
609
 This caused public outcry as well as concern from the Executive branch of 
government. Accordingly, in 1999, the President appointed a Commission of Inquiry into 
Corruption and Abuse of Office in the Uganda Police Force. Lady Justice Julia Sebutinde 
was chosen as Chair.  A Legislative Drafting expert educated at the University of 
Edinburgh, Justice Sebutinde had recently returned to Uganda in 1996 after working at the 
Commonwealth Secretariat in London and for the Namibia Government.
610
  
The terms of reference of the inquiry were: 
To generally investigate allegations of corruption within the force generally and 
make recommendations for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
Police;  
To investigate specific allegations of corruption made against Chris Bakiza 
Director Criminal Investigations Department (CID), George Galyahandere 
Assistant Police Commissioner(ACP) for Crime, and Clever Byamugisha of the 
CID that they interfered in the investigations of various crimes after being bribed; 
611
 
To investigate the mismanagement by the Police, of criminal investigations 
relating to various cases of murder.  
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Proceedings 
Proceedings commenced in May 1999 and continued for a year until May 2000. As soon 
as the public hearings commenced, the commission captured the attention of the whole 
country, not only because it made the daily newspaper headlines, but also because it 
conducted hearings outside the capital Kampala, in a number of towns such as Hoima, 
Mbarara and Mbale. In this way, the commission became a truly national phenomenon. 
The Commission‘s presence in these towns caused immense excitement, not least because 
the chair, Justice Sebutinde, had been assigned presidential protection guards who would 
travel ahead of her in an open-topped army Jeep at high speed and honking loudly to warn 
hapless villagers to keep out of its path. The halls where the hearings took place were 
always fully packed.
612
 
 
The excitement caused by the commission was enhanced greatly by Justice Sebutinde‘s 
manner of conducting the proceedings. This was characterised by reaching out to the 
public, showing them sympathy and reassuring them that she would play her role in 
helping them to achieve justice. For example, during a hearing in which the commission 
considered the case of the unlawful killing of a young man, she said to his mother: 
―Justice must be done for this old woman. I want to assure you that whoever is implicated 
will pay.‖613 
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Her approach to members of the public was juxtaposed with impatience and near hostility 
to police officers. Journalist Matsiko wa Mucoori, who covered the proceedings for The 
Monitor newspaper, described it thus: 
Visibly alarmed and upset by the miscarriage of justice and perpetuation of 
criminality by the police, Sebutinde lost patience. She went full blast, roasting and 
castigating police officers. It was an interesting scenario seeing Sebutinde grill and 
roast the pot-bellied senior police officers like small boys... The Police officers who 
had turned themselves into village lords were humbled before the eyes of the very 
wananchi
614
 they had been harassing at will...Scared district and regional police 
commanders humbled themselves as little kids awaiting punishment from a father. 
At one instance a district police commander failed to speak and Sebutinde offered a 
cold drink to improve his voice. It was an exciting moment for the public but to the 
police, it was the most embarrassing experience they had probably ever had in their 
lives of service in the force. You could read fear all over their faces; shaking and 
shivering when asked to defend themselves.... Sebutinde charged like a wounded 
lion and the police officers scampered whenever she would order for a particular 
file from a police station.
615
 
 
Sebutinde did not spare other senior government officials who appeared before the 
commission. While cross-examining Minister for Information Basoga Nsadhu over 
allegations that he had connived with the Police to arrest a Lt. Guweddeko, she is reported 
to have lost her temper and said: 
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 Order – Basoga, please! You are not going to tell us what you want us to hear. We 
 are the ones asking. Answer our questions!‖616 
 
She interrupted South Western regional police commander, Okwaringa, in the midst of his 
testimony, and ordered him to sit down because he was ―talking rubbish.‖617 
 
While the public was ecstatic about the proceedings, Sebutinde‘s outbursts are reported to 
have caused a concern among some Ministers and members of the legal fraternity. It was 
reported that lawyer and then Minister for Ethics and Integrity, Mrs. Miria Matembe, as 
well as Minister for Internal Affairs Ms. Sarah Namusoke Kiyingi, summoned her to 
discuss her methods of work. Mrs. Matembe admitted having a meeting with Justice 
Sebutinde, but denied that the purpose of it was to discuss her methods of work. In an 
anonymous letter to the editor of The Monitor newspaper, a police officer criticised her 
methods of work, saying she had exceeded her terms of reference and was showing 
partiality by accusing some police officers of crimes and declaring them guilty as though 
the inquiry were a court of law. This officer felt that Justice Sebutinde was being unfair to 
the police, painting them all with the same brush and thereby ignoring the historical 
context of policing in Uganda: 
It is my view that such a commission requires a mature approach  and it would have 
served better if the appointing authority had assigned a judge who has lived in this 
country all through the turbulent years when every organ of the government 
                                                 
616
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underwent some form of decay. Justice Sebutinde returned to Uganda in 1996 from 
Southern Africa where she had spent a considerable number of years getting out of 
touch with the realities in Uganda.
618
 
 
Here again we see Sebutinde‘s cosmopolitanism as a factor in her chairing of inquiry 
proceedings, which may have endeared her to the appointing authority but proved to be a 
sore point with those that she was investigating.   
 
Aftermath and outcome of the Police inquiry 
Despite the criticisms of Justice Sebutinde‘s handling of the inquiry, it is clear that she 
made into a momentous event for the whole country. Matsiko wa Mucoori observed that: 
From a little known High Court Judge, Sebutinde has emerged into a national 
personality popular across the country. I wouldn‘t like to bet on it, but believe me, 
if Sebutinde was to contest with the 1996 presidential election candidates, she 
would beat them hands down.
619
 
 
I would further add that Justice Sebutinde transformed not just herself, but also the entire 
notion and concept of the role of a judge and the role of a commission of inquiry.  She 
made an impression on the public, the donors and the State as the champion of anti-
corruption. She took on a highly symbolic role as the outraged and shocked voice of all 
those who considered themselves aggrieved by corruption in Uganda‘s government. Her 
stance may be regarded as a form of judicial populism or judicial activism, depending on 
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the observer. In any case, her conduct of the proceedings represented a symbolic moment 
for the judiciary and the country at large, a moment in which she broke free from the 
traditional restrained and constrained role of a dignified adjudicator to a become the 
people‘s voice and vanguard in the struggle against corruption.  
 
By conducting hearings in towns outside the capital, she turned inquiries from an elite 
phenomenon and gave them a national character and mass appeal. Even though many 
subsequent inquiries did not conduct hearings all over the country, they were able to 
attract national attention because of Sebutinde‘s fame, and by extension, the fame of 
commissions of inquiry as an institution. Secondly, her style of cross-examination, even 
though it was regarded by some as offensive, was symbolic because for the first time in 
the history of the country, people in positions of power were being made to account for 
their actions in public. It was symbolic of the beginning of a new era of accountability.  
 
At the end of the proceedings,  the public eagerly awaited the report but it was another 
year before it would be published by the government.
 620
 However, it is difficult to tell 
whether the government would have published it anyway, because excerpts from it were 
published by The New Vision in October 2000 before its release and publication by the 
government. The Managing Director and Editor-in-Chief of the paper was interrogated by 
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the Police over the incident.
621
 When the report was eventually published a few months 
later, it was in an abridged form, purportedly because there were ―certain aspects that 
might compromise the security of the country.‖  
 
The abridged report highlighted that there was widespread evidence of corruption, 
including the institutionalisation of bribery, false accounting and insider trading. 
Investigating officers were involved in inducing complainants to drop charges and 
illegally releasing suspects from custody. Furthermore, the police extorted money from 
complainants to do their duties; concomitantly suspects could be let off the hook if they 
could pay a bribe. Files could be ―disappeared‖ for a fee. Bribe sharing was 
institutionalised to such an extent that those police officers in positions where they 
interacted with members of the public were expected to pass some of their daily takings to 
their superiors. The Commission found that impunity was so widespread that the police 
Criminal Investigations Department (CID) had become a ―Mafia-type‖ organisation where 
policemen connived with criminals to commit crime and then offered them protection 
against prosecution.
622
 Many police officers had amassed enormous amounts of wealth far 
in excess of their earnings. In addition, the commission was shocked by the brutality of the 
force, with shooting of suspects on sight, suspects shot in custody and other similar 
instances of unlawful killings.
623
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The inquiry had recommended the reorganisation and re-structuring of the police force, 
including the dismissal from office and prosecution of a number of senior officers.  
However, some Senior Police officers such as Mr. Chris Bakiza head of the CID had 
resigned even before the inquiry concluded proceedings. No prosecutions were ever 
launched. Some recommendations, particularly those relating to the leadership and 
management of the force, were implemented with modification. Ironically, some of the 
officers who had been recommended for disciplinary measures have since been promoted, 
and more than ten years later, today, allegations of corruption and abuse of office in the 
Police Force continue to abound.
624
  
 
The lasting impact of the inquiry was that recommendations to improve the leadership, 
management and organisation of the Police were used to justify the militarisation of the 
Police and its infiltration by the army. In April 2001, the Inspector General was relieved of 
his duties and replaced with General Katumba Wamala.  Few eyebrows were raised about 
this disturbing development because of the degree of corruption unearthed by the 
Sebutinde Inquiry. Thus, the inquiry was used as a confirmation tool- to confirm in the 
public‘s mind that the Police was corrupt to the core and hence justifying and legitimating 
its militarisation.  And while it was expected to be a one-off appointment, General 
Wamala was subsequently replaced by another army general, Major General Kale 
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Kayihura, who is from the same ethnic group as the President.  Today, over 40% of Police 
Officers are from Western Uganda. Hills notes that: 
The police remain a core security actor and presidents rarely ignore them. 
Presidents do not want an effective or efficient police answerable to parliamentary 
committees or judicial inquiries (some have committed so many crimes that they 
cannot afford to), but they value the police as a tool for enforcing political 
decisions, maintaining order, regulating activities and regime representation.
625
 
 
Hence it is not surprising that President Museveni used the inquiry to consolidate his 
control over the force. As a former guerrilla leader, of the National Resistance Army 
(NRM) President Museveni has a natural affinity for the military. It is alleged that in the 
early days of his regime, he wanted to disband the police force entirely because of its 
reputation for corruption and indiscipline; and replace it with NRA soldiers who had a 
reputation for hard work and discipline.
626
 Furthermore, the Police was used by former 
Obote‘s regime to counter rebel activity by Museveni‘s guerrilla NRA,  and thus when the 
rebels became the leaders they had a negative attitude towards the Police Force. Matters 
have not been helped by the fact that Police Officers have consistently voted against 
President Museveni in presidential elections.
627
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 With the ―army head successfully grafted onto a police body,‖628 few questions were 
asked when the force began to metamorphose into various paramilitary units such as the 
Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JATT), Rapid Response Unit, the Black Mamba Squad 
and the Kibooko squad, a ruthless unit of plain clothes stick wielding officers who have 
been officially disowned by the Police and army even though they frequently work 
alongside uniformed riot police officers. The establishment of these units has gone hand in 
hand with an increasing prevalence of security operatives masquerading as plain clothes 
policemen, fomenting the lack of accountability by the Police Force.
629
  These units are 
staffed by ―security operatives‖ who are hybrid policemen-soldiers-intelligence agents. 
The para-military units are known for their brutality and are frequently deployed to quell 
riots and to scatter peaceful demonstrations organised by the opposition.
630
 It is also 
important to note that these units have been enabled, facilitated and funded by the USA, 
UK and Israel as part of the ―War on Terror,‖ confirming the argument in chapter two that 
this war is one of the factors that  undermines the stated intentions of the good governance 
discourse.
631
  
 
Hence, as observed by the editorial of the Monitor Newspaper, "The police are 
increasingly being mistaken to be the armed wing of the ruling NRM government.
632
 
Indeed, the Police Inquiry was a typical case of using inquiries as a regime consolidation 
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tool.  The timing of the inquiry shortly after the landmark 1996 Presidential elections was 
crucial. These elections were the first that had happened in the country since 1981, and 
they marked a return to democracy and inevitably, to opposition. A number of scholars 
have argued however that Museveni is intolerant of any form of political opposition, hence 
providing further insight into his need to control the Police Force. 
 
The Police inquiry and its aftermath is testimony to Museveni and the NRM‘s politically 
cunning ability to democratise whilst simultaneously becoming more authoritarian.  For 
the NRM has always sought to project the army, (formerly the rebel National Resistance 
Movement and now the national armed forces known as the Uganda Peoples‘ Defence 
Forces) as a disciplined and pro-people force in contrast to the armies of the previous 
regimes of Amin and Obote which were widely known for their high-handedness and 
torture of civilians. By militarising the Police Force, Museveni has managed to retain the 
good image of the military, whilst anathematising the Police Force not just as a corrupt 
one, but now also as a repressive one.
633
  This strategy enables him to retain the loyalty of 
the army which remains crucial to his hold on power, as well as ensuring that the Police 
Force is now ultimately under his control and direction.
634
 Thus, we see the Police Inquiry 
as an example of the NRM‘s usage of inquiries as a political strategy aimed at regime 
consolidation. 
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5.4.2 The Junk Helicopters Inquiry, 2000 
 
Background 
 
The Commission of Inquiry into the purchase of helicopters by the Uganda Military, 
popularly known as the ―junk helicopters inquiry,‖ was appointed in November 2000 to: 
...inquire into all the circumstances pertaining to the procurement, purchase, 
acceptance, delivery and payment of MI-24 helicopters for the army, and in 
particular, to establish whether any loss was occasioned to Government; to 
establish whether any officer of the UPDF or any other person corruptly received 
any gratification as an inducement for any act or omission regarding the 
transaction; to establish whether there was an negligence on the part of any officer 
of the UPDF, any officer of Government, or any other person in the transaction; 
and to inquire into any other incidental matter.
635
  
 
Justice Sebutinde was once again appointed as chair, assisted by Mr. Geoffrey Kiryabwire 
as the second commissioner and Ms. Maureen Owor as Lead Counsel. Ms. Owor had also 
served as Lead Counsel for the Police Inquiry, whereas Mr. Kiryabwire (now Justice) was 
then Managing Director  of a local private company, Pan World Insurance. 
 
The background to the inquiry was that the government of Uganda had purchased two 
Russian-built M1-24 combat helicopters from Belarus at the cost of $6 million in 1998, 
largely as the response to the Lord‘s Resistance Army (LRA) guerrilla war that had been 
ravaging northern Uganda since 1986. The helicopter gun-ships were considered ideal for 
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firing at escaping LRA guerrillas who would have been difficult to track on the ground in 
the expanse of northern Uganda‘s Savannah grasslands.636 However, the air force pilots 
later refused to fly them on the ground that they were not airworthy. The helicopters had 
been supplied by a company known as Consolidated Sales Corporation (CSC), owned by 
entrepreneur Mr. Emmanuel Katto. The media picked up the story from sources at the air 
force base, thus creating a scandal at a crucial time when elections were going to be held 
in 2001. Thus, the President appointed the inquiry to quell the rising public disquiet about 
the huge loss of tax-payers‘ money.637   
 
Proceedings 
Riding on the wave of publicity that had been generated by the Police Inquiry, the Junk 
helicopters inquiry was equally sensational and attracted daily newspaper headlines. 
Testimony after testimony showed that the whole transaction was fraught with 
irregularities and that there were no clear procurement guidelines in the Ministry of 
Defence. According to one of the former Commissioners, the practice in the Ministry of 
Defence was ―procurement by executive directive‖ in disregard of the formal 
administrative procedures.
638
  
 
Notably, the company that supplied the helicopters, Consolidated Sales, was 
recommended to General Salim Saleh by another businessman with links to the first 
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family, Mr. Kwame Ruyondo.  Gen. Salim Saleh, (also known as Caleb Akandwanaho) is 
the President‘s younger brother and was formerly a Presidential Advisor on Defence but 
had resigned following the revelations of his involvement in the irregular privatisation of 
Uganda Commercial Bank and Uganda Grain Millers. During the inquiry, it emerged that 
Gen. Saleh used his influence with the President to ensure that Consolidated Sales was 
awarded the deal, and the President personally wrote to the Ministry of Defence issuing a 
directive seconding the said company to supply the helicopters.
639
    
 
Justice Sebutinde‘s approach to cross-examination in this inquiry was much calmer than 
the one she had adopted with the Police Force. There were no media reports of her losing 
her temper or causing Ministry of Defence officials to ―wither‖ in her presence. 
Nevertheless, the high profile of the people implicated, such as Gen. Salim Saleh and 
President Museveni himself, may explain why the inquiry monopolised the news headlines 
during its public hearings, which lasted from April – June 2001.  
 
The defining moment of the inquiry and its most significant finding was that Gen. Saleh, 
with the President‘s knowledge and acquiescence, was offered a commission worth US$ 
800,000 from CSC as part of the deal. Gen. Saleh, however, testified before the 
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Commission that he had never received the commission.
640
 The President also testified 
before the Commission and confirmed that he was indeed aware that Gen. Saleh had been 
offered a commission, and that he had told him to accept it but use it to redevelop northern 
Uganda which had been ravaged by civil war, and not to keep it for personal use. His 
testimony was broadcast on national television and reported verbatim by the two main 
dailies, The New Vision and The Monitor. He justified his involvement in the helicopter 
deal thus: 
The reason why I invited the commission of inquiry into helicopters to talk to them 
is I want to sort out 5 punts. It‘s my duty to help not only this commission but the 
country to understand what is going on in this important institution known as the 
army. Some of the witnesses have created the impression that it‘s out of order for 
the president to involve himself in army affairs. From what I was reading in the 
papers- that President Museveni is interfering in army matters. That I was 
interfering in army matters by advising the army to buy helicopters to defend our 
country. That I should not have done it. That I should have left it to I don‘t know 
whom. That one I do not accept and I will not accept it as long as I am president of 
Uganda because that‘s one of my primary jobs. I will guide this army until it‘s a 
mature army....
641
 
 
The president‘s testimony was an admission of his involvement and interference in the 
procurement process. However, he justified his actions as being in the best interests of the 
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army and of the country. He insisted that his actions could not be interpreted as corrupt. 
Similarly, he later defended his younger brother Salim Saleh: 
I have seen people saying that Saleh was not put in prison. Saleh could not be put in 
prison by anybody who was serious... he is the one who reported to me that he was 
offered a bribe. I then reported to the Minister of State Kavuma and Saleh 
cooperated fully... We are the ones who are fighting corruption in Uganda, not 
anybody else and I cannot tolerate corruption. It is the Movement which will stop 
corruption, not these nomadic commentators.
642
 
 
 The President‘s attitude to this matter belied his tolerant attitude towards corruption, as 
already discussed in chapter 3. In spite of the glaring facts of his influence over the 
procurement process, he explained away his actions with ease. At the same time, he made 
much of the fact that he was a different kind of leader who was prepared to provide 
accountability for his actions before a commission of inquiry, even though it was he and 
not the commissioners who controlled the proceedings. The President‘s exculpation of his 
brother and justification of his actions makes one wonder what could have been the 
political purpose behind the appointment of the inquiry. I will return to this issue shortly. 
 
Aftermath and outcome 
In its report and recommendations, as revealed by journalist Mwenda who leaked excerpts 
of it in The Monitor,  the Commission of Inquiry recommended that Emma Katto be 
prosecuted for offering a bribe and Salim Saleh for abuse of office. The Commission of 
Inquiry pinned the blame for the botched deal on Saleh, whom it says ―exhibited the 
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highest form of greed, self interest and corruption, the type that is proscribed under the 
Prevention of Corruption Act 1970, Section 1(a).‖643  It further said that Saleh‘s 
confession of the offer of a bribe ―was not impressive or even exculpatory because it was 
not given voluntarily. It came after the president had complained, and was too late after 
the contract had been signed.‖ The report observed that ―The inducements offered to 
Ruyondo and Saleh jeopardized transparency, eliminated healthy competition and 
guaranteed contractual terms that favoured the seller rather than the buyer… both 
gentlemen [Saleh and Ruyondo] acting under the promise of inducements did all they 
could to ensure that Katto was awarded the contract.‖644 
 
The report criticized President Museveni for advising Saleh to take a bribe from CSC, the 
suppliers of the helicopters. Although Saleh called it a commission, the report insisted that 
it was a bribe: ―Whereas we appreciate the need at the time for a speedy delivery of the 
helicopters,‖ the report says, ―we feel that the president‘s advice to Saleh, however well 
intended could easily be misunderstood by Ugandans as a double standard. Saleh enjoyed 
a special relationship with the president as fraternal brothers. Under such circumstances, 
the president‘s advice can be interpreted as a means of protecting or exculpating his 
brother.‖ The report was very critical of President Yoweri Museveni‘s role in the purchase 
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of the helicopters specifically, and in the purchase of all classified military equipment 
generally.
645
 
 
Dr. Kizza Besigye, the logistician in the Ministry of Defence at the time, who was at the 
time of the inquiry running for President against Museveni, was exculpated. Mwenda 
reported that: 
On the basis of this, the report clears Besigye who was army Chief of Logistics and 
Engineering. He travelled to Belarus to do pre-shipment inspection on the 
helicopters. The report also clears Amama Mbabazi, then minister of state for 
Defence and Dr. Ben Mbonye, then Permanent Secretary and accounting officer. 
―These officials understood their role as being limited to the speedy 
implementation of the president‘s directive,‖ the report says. ―Considering the 
established practice regarding classified procurement in the MOD, and the tone of 
the presidential directive, the commission is of the view that the failure by these 
officials to vet Consolidated Sales Corporation (CSC), although inexcusable was 
understandable in the circumstances.‖646. 
 
Justice Sebutinde‘s critical report was hushed up by the government, who refused to 
publish its contents despite the fact that the cat had already been let out of the bag during 
the public hearings. Moreover, it was not until five years later in 2005 that charges were 
brought in respect of the scandal. Although the inquiry had recommended a number of 
people for prosecution, including Mr. Ruyondo, who introduced Mr. Katto and CSC to 
Gen. Saleh, as well as Gen. Saleh for abuse of office for his role in the purchase, only Mr. 
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Katto, the director of the company that supplied the helicopters, was prosecuted for 
corruption under the 1970 Prevention of Corruption Act. Instead, Mr. Ruyondo was called 
as the first prosecution witness and Salim Saleh was called as the second prosecution 
witness. Given the turnaround from the recommendations, it was not surprising that the 
prosecution was not successful, and that the DPP did not appeal against the judgement. A 
close scrutiny of the facts shows that the available evidence could never sustain a criminal 
charge of bribery, as revealed in Magistrate Margaret Tibulya‘s Judgement: 
The state evidence was that in 1996/97, PW1 (Mr. Ruyondo) introduced the 
accused to Lt. Gen. Saleh (PW2) for purposes of helping him secure a contract with 
the Ministry of Defence. 
PW2 was then in the Reserve Force. He had by then formed a company  M/S Caleb 
International, a marketing company.  
The accused sought PW2‘s company‘s assistance in marketing his services to the 
Ministry of Defence. 
PW2 accepted to do so for a Commission. This commission has never been paid to 
PW2. He had acted as a private businessman in marketing the accused’s services to 
the Ministry of Defence. By then, PW2 was entitled to do private business. (My 
emphasis).
647
  
 
Thus we see the facts of the case being framed in such a way as to emphasise Gen. Salim 
Saleh‘s role in the army to be merely that of a Reserve Soldier and his main occupation is 
reiterated as a businessman and not a member of the Armed Forces. The offer of an 
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inducement by Mr. Katto is framed as a legitimate commission and not as a bribe. 
Accordingly, it was not surprising when the Chief Magistrate concluded: 
The State‘s own evidence is that no felonious giving, promising or offering of any 
gratification as an inducement ever took place. 
The star witness (PW2) was clear that what was negotiated was a commission, 
which according to him was quite proper since he was not an officer or a servant of 
a public body at that time. PW2 was running a marketing company M/S Caleb 
International, which the accused approached to market his services for a 
commission.  
This evidence renders the corruption charge irrelevant. There is no evidence of 
corruption in circumstances where two businessmen agree to do business, or to give 
each other a business opportunity as was the case… I find no merit in the charges. I 
acquit the accused… 
 
From the above, it would not be farfetched to infer that the purpose of the inquiry was to 
try to get rid of political opponent Dr. Kizza Besigye, who had a short while before the 
inquiry, announced that he would be challenging Mr. Museveni for the presidency in the 
2001 elections. This view is lent credence by the fact that shortly before public hearings 
were due to start, The New Vision, a government owned newspaper, ran a story suggesting 
that the inquiry would be seeking to question Dr. Besigye for his involvement in the 
helicopter purchase. Dr. Besigye, Retired Colonel, was a ―historical‖ member of the NRM 
and one of the original 27 who started out with Museveni in his guerrilla war. He was 
formerly a Logistician in the Ministry of Defence and had at the time fallen out with the 
NRM Party on grounds that the party had diverted from its original ideals and become 
intolerant. Shortly afterwards, he announced his candidature for the presidency.  The New 
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Vision article was regarded by the inquiry as an attempt to politicise the inquiry, and 
suggested that Dr. Besigye was to be held responsible for the scandal. The Monitor 
newspaper‘s verbatim recording of the inquiry chair‘s opening remarks throws light on the 
matter:
648
 
Justice Julia Sebutinde: I welcome you to the first sitting of the commission of 
inquiry into the purchase of military helicopters... This concerns the members of 
the press. There is a tendency for the press to politicise this inquiry. It‘s wrong; this 
inquiry is expected by law to be fair. If it starts on a wrong ground that this 
commission is against or is in favour of so and so, it‘s very bad. This is very 
important. Please, I ask you to refrain from politicising this inquiry. I want to 
particularly refer to an article that appeared in the Sunday Vision. This article 
quotes me as having been interviewed by this reporter. It‘s not true. No one 
interviewed me. Don‘t cook up stories. There have already been two inquiries in 
this inquiry which were held in camera. It is in your (the media) interest that this 
part of the inquiry is public. If you continue twisting the truth, I will not hesitate to 
turn this inquiry to be held in camera. 
 
The timing of the inquiry (2001), whereas the transaction in question had occurred in 
1996, also points to the fact that there was more to it than met the eye. Moreover, there 
were other procurement scandals that had occurred in the Ministry of Defence, for which 
no process of accountability was ever initiated, such as army uniforms that were several 
sizes too small, dilapidated tanks, and expired food rations.
649
 This lends credence to the 
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claim that the inquiry‘s main aim was to tarnish Dr. Besigye‘s name ahead of the 2001 
elections. 
 
The government‘s mala fides in appointing the inquiry can be seen in the failure to 
prosecute Saleh and Ruyondo as recommended by the report and its unabashed 
attempts to cover up the truth by not publishing the report. It is therefore not 
surprising that the report was a ―tightly guarded secret,‖ as Minister Amama 
Mbazazi said on radio
650
 and that during my research, an official from the Ministry 
of Defence told me that the report ―cannot be found anywhere and even the 
computers which were used by the Commission were taken.‖651  There is no official 
version available either in the Ministry of Justice or at the Government Printers. A 
former Commissioner who is a High Court Judge and had a copy of the report in his 
chambers was also unable to find it when this researcher asked for his assistance – it 
―disappeared mysteriously‖ from his chambers. 
 
5.4.3 The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) Inquiry 2002 
 
Background 
The reform and reorganisation of taxation administration in developing countries was part 
of the macro-economic reform package promoted by IFIs such as the World Bank and the 
IMF. In Uganda, this had started in 1991 by delinking revenue collection and tax 
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administration from the mainstream ministry of finance and establishing the Uganda 
Revenue Authority as a semi-autonomous statutory authority under the Ministry of 
Finance.
652
  The URA was both then and now, regarded as one of the most corrupt 
government institutions.
653
 In announcing the inquiry, then Finance Minister, Mr. Gerald 
Sendaula, said:  
URA officials are alleged to have a house after 6 months in office. Those 
allegations should be substantiated. I could not close my ears to the outcry. I asked 
URA whether the allegations were true and naturally they could not admit to 
committing an offence, so we felt the need to clean up and improve on revenue 
collection. 
654
 
 
Although Sendaula did not admit it at the press conference, the World Bank and IMF had 
a hand in the appointment of the inquiry and had specifically requested for Justice 
Sebutinde to chair it, given her track record with the Police and Junk Helicopter inquiries. 
Their interest was to use the inquiry as a launch pad for restructuring the organisation, 
which it was hoped would subsequently raise revenue collection from about 10% to at 
least 15% of GDP in line with the Sub-Saharan Africa average prevailing at that time.
655
 
Accordingly, the commission of inquiry into allegations of corruption in Uganda Revenue 
Authority was appointed in 2002 to: 
Generally investigate allegations of corruption in the Uganda Revenue Authority; 
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To investigate specific allegations of corruption made against individual officers 
and to establish inter alia – 
(i) Those employees of the authority who in the course of their 
employment, had acquired significant wealth that cannot be shown to 
have been received from legitimate means; 
(ii) Those employees who have corruptly received gratification or 
inducement in the course of their employment in Uganda Revenue 
Authority; 
 
To inquire into any other appropriate matter incidental or relevant to the foregoing; 
 
To make recommendations concerning URA employees who should be dismissed 
from service or who should be subjected to criminal prosecution or both;
656
 
 
To make recommendations for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
Uganda Revenue Authority. 
 
Proceedings 
Public hearings begun in June 2002, with a major focus on verifying the assets of URA 
employees. For this, the commission of inquiry was reliant upon the public to volunteer 
information on the assets of URA employees, which information could then be verified by 
the Commissions‘ investigators and verified against the URA employees‘ asset declaration 
forms. However, when information was not forthcoming, the inquiry made an appeal to 
the public and decided to allow anonymous complaints and memoranda.
657
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commission also considered allegations of tax evasion by a few companies, although these 
did not generate as much media attention as the asset verification hearings. This was due 
to the fact that from the start of the inquiry, there had been a keen interest in URA 
employees‘ illicit enrichment. 
 
Unlike the Junk Helicopters inquiry, Justice Sebutinde‘s approach to cross examination in 
this inquiry was on a number of occasions, confrontational; re-echoing her handling of the 
Police Inquiry. For example, on one occasion, she said to some URA officials: 
All of you belong in jail. If I had anything to do with it, I would throw all of you in 
jail and begin afresh...Our suspicions have been confirmed. There is laxity, 
incompetence and most probably fraud. You have been abetting tax evasion.
658
 
 
On another occasion, when a member of the Internal Audit and Tax Investigation 
department Mr. Kyeyune was testifying before the Commission, she said to him, "Isn't it a 
pity that you were investigating fraud and you helped the enemy? Don't you think you are 
going to Luzira?... All you in the audit team belong in Luzira.‖659 
 
Some months into the inquiry, matters relating to the finances of the inquiry attracted 
press attention when a dispute between Justice Sebutinde and Ms. Annebrit Aslund, the 
Commissioner General of URA, spilled over into the public domain. The dispute 
concerned the taxation of Justice Sebutinde‘s honorarium of nine million Uganda 
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shillings. According the 1995 Constitution, judges‘ earnings and emoluments are tax 
exempt. Sebutinde argued that her honorarium as chair was therefore exempt from 
taxation. The URA requested for legal advice from the Solicitor General, who advised that 
the honorarium was subject to taxation. ―The law is clear. A judge‘s salary is not supposed 
to be  taxed. However, any other earnings are subject to taxation.‖ The Solicitor General 
argued that the Commissions of Inquiry Act did not specify that a Judge should be chair of 
the inquiry. Justice Sebutinde‘s chairing of the inquiry was therefore not in her capacity as 
a judge, but as a person of good public standing. Sebutinde subsequently decided to appeal 
to the High Court against the taxation decision in accordance with the Income Tax Act.  
She averred that the decision had been motivated by animosity, an allegation which the 
Authority denied. The High Court referred the matter to the Constitutional Court for 
interpretation, and it would be over a year before judgement was made.
660
  
 
The Constitutional Court agreed with the Solicitor General that under the Commissions of 
Inquiry Act, a  Commission of Inquiry is not a ―Court‖ and neither does it exercise judicial 
power: 
In Uganda, commissions of inquiry do not conduct their business as judicial 
tribunals. Their decisions are merely recommendations and advisory. They do not 
follow and are not bound by rules of evidence and procedure. Their procedures are 
not conducted as nearly as possible to those of courts of justice. The method of 
appointing their principal officers are quite different and whereas the 
commissioners are not independent, that is the hallmark of the courts of justice. 
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Whereas a judicial inquiry is manned by a judicial officer or officers and their 
decisions are binding, there is no requirement that the chairperson or any of the 
commissioners be a judicial officer. 
 
The work undertaken by Justice Sebutinde in chairing the inquiry therefore did not fall 
within the ambit of Article 128 of the Constitution of Uganda which exempts judges‘ 
earnings from taxation.  
 
This was a significant judgment that explained the legal role and purpose of commissions 
of inquiry in Uganda. It highlighted that their purpose is merely advisory, and therefore, 
indirectly emphasised that it is a misunderstanding to expect anything much to come out 
of them. The Constitutional Court also pointed out the weaknesses of inquiry procedure, 
especially the sensationalist nature of the evidence which might not stand under legal 
scrutiny. In effect, this judgment threw cold water over the high status that commissions of 
inquiry had acquired in Ugandan society up to this point in time. 
 
Aftermath and outcome of the URA Inquiry 
It should be noted that the above judgment was made at least one year after public 
hearings had ended in March 2003, and was a reflection of several factors that befell the 
inquiry in the aftermath of the public hearings. Despite the dispute between Justice 
Sebutinde and the URA, the public eagerly awaited the report, which was finally 
submitted to the Minister of Finance in August 2004.  
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Perhaps the delay in submitting the report should have sent alarm signals that all was not 
well with the inquiry. The country was nevertheless taken by surprise when it came to 
light that two of Justice Sebutinde‘s fellow commissioners, Mr. James Kahooza, former 
and long serving Auditor General, and Ms. Fawn Cousens, an expatriate Accountant and 
member of the Tax Appeals Tribunal, had not signed the final report. They called a news 
conference and distanced themselves from the report. They argued that the report that 
Justice Sebutinde had submitted to the Finance Minister and the President could not be 
regarded as a report of the inquiry because they had not signed it; indeed, they did not 
even know that the report had been finalised and was being formally presented! They said 
that the final report had been compiled by the Chair Justice Sebutinde and Secretary Mr. 
(now Justice) Geoffrey Kiryabwire without their input, and that the comments they had 
made on the draft had been disregarded. They accused Justice Sebutinde of sidelining 
them from the report-writing process and treated as assistant commissioners instead of full 
commissioners in their own right.
 661
 
 
Ms. Cousens and Mr. Kahooza questioned the contents of the report, the draft of which 
they had read, in which the inquiry attacked certain URA officials on matters that were not 
considered by the commission. For example, Commissioner General Annebrit Aslund was 
accused of showing contempt, animosity and resistance towards the Commission. Ms. 
Cousens and Mr. Kahooza maintained that this finding was based on the dispute regarding 
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the taxation of the Chair‘s honoraria, which was not in any way connected to the inquiry‘s 
terms of reference.
662
  
 
However, Justice Sebutinde accused the two of ―vanishing‖ from the Commission, 
claiming that they had not reported for work since an incident in which Justice Sebutinde‘s 
residence was attacked by gunmen.
663
 She accused them of dishonesty and said they 
should have written a minority report if they disagreed with her findings. Soon after this, 
an anonymous letter titled ―Are all of you objective in your inquiry or do some of you 
have something to protect?‖ appeared in the press. The letter alleged that Mr. Kahooza 
too, had a conflict of interest with the URA, as his wife‘s company Kaka Catering 
Services, had been supplying food to URA since 1996.  By 2002, it had supplied food 
worth 300 million Uganda shillings to the authority and yet it was not paying taxes. It was 
also alleged that Mr. Kahooza‘s son, Mr. Anthony Kagaba, was an Assistant Revenue 
Officer in the URA, and that he had obtained the job in 1994 upon the recommendation of 
Mr. Kahooza, then the Auditor General, without doing an interview.
664
 Ethics and 
Integrity Minister, Mr. Timothy Lwanga, then entered the fray, declaring that Mr. 
Kahooza had acted unethically by not declaring that his family supplied food to the URA. 
Mr. Kahooza defended himself saying the issue had never come up before the 
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Commission, and that he was merely being framed by Sebutinde to cover up her own 
misdeeds.
665
 
 
In the ensuing battle, fought in the press, the Attorney General Francis Ayume advised the 
government not to act on the report, saying it was invalid because it had not been signed 
by two of the three commissioners. Justice Sebutinde retorted:  
With due respect, the Attorney General should not confuse the Cabinet and the 
Public. The Commissions of Inquiry Act does not say that it is a requirement that 
the members must sign. The Secretary and myself signed the cover letter... By the 
way, he is misleading the public. When he says the report is not legally binding, he 
is saying the obvious. Reports of commissions of inquiry are not legally binding. 
Their contents are at best, advisory. Their evidence only offers clues for further 
investigation. There is no basis for a challenge in Court.
666
 
 
Justice Sebutinde was referring the press reports that Ms. Annebrit Aslund had applied to 
the High Court to have the report quashed by an order of certiorari, seeking to have the 
report quashed and expunged from the public records of Uganda. The grounds for her 
application were that the process of compiling the report was flawed since it did not 
involve all the Commissioners, and that in the report, Justice Sebutinde made a baseless 
and biased finding that she was incompetent to head a big financial institution such as the 
URA. In defending the report, the Attorney General argued that the High Court had no 
jurisdiction to grant the said order, because it had no powers of judicial review over a 
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tribunal constituted by a judge. However, Ms. Aslund‘s lawyers maintained that under the 
Uganda Commissions of Inquiry Act, a commission of inquiry was not in any way 
referred to as a judicial tribunal, but was merely a commission of inquiry. In his ruling, 
Justice Katutsi agreed with counsel for the applicant that although the Act gave the 
Commission the powers of the High Court to call for the attendance of witnesses and the 
production of documents, it did not equate the inquiry to the High Court or specify that 
any of the commissioners should be a judge.  He held that: 
It was clear that the report had jettisoned impartiality to the wind.... the issues of 
taxation and incompetence of the Commissioner General of the URA were outside 
the terms of the commission. These were ultra vires. All in all there is nothing good 
to speak about this report. It was not a report of the commission. It was in complete 
breach of Legal Notice No. 3 of 2002 and a nullity ab initio.... I have no slightest 
hesitation (sic) in declaring the Sebutinde Report submitted to the Minister of 
Finance... not a report of the Commission established by Legal Notice No. 3 of 
2002 to inquire into allegations of corruption in URA and a nullity in law.
667
 
 
That was supposedly the final nail in the coffin of the URA inquiry report. Yet, the verbal 
exchanges continued. Talking to journalists about the judgement, Justice Sebutinde said: 
My learned brother seems to be re-writing the law as we know it. According to the 
jurisprudence of judicial review, a judicial officer is not allowed to review the work 
of another judicial officer at the same rank. We all have equal discretion and the 
judge did not have a right to review my work and this is very clear in the Judicature 
Act. I have critically looked at this judgment but I have failed to understand it. But 
my brother is entitled to his opinion. ... Trashing this report by the High Court is as 
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good as the government shelving the previous Commissions of Inquiry I have 
handled... they all have no effect. This is not a question of my integrity as a judge 
or Sebutinde‘s image. Sebutinde is just a small insignificant aspect in this whole 
saga. This is about Uganda as a country and how it is managing its granary, the 
URA. He (Justice Katutsi) should have ruled that the 1% touching Aslund should 
be disregarded, but why do you have to cancel the 99% which the applicant did not 
attack?
668
  
 
This commission of inquiry drew attention to the problems and pitfalls of the institution of 
the commission of inquiry operating in a context such as Uganda. First of all, this was the 
first inquiry to draw attention to the enormous expense of holding a commission of 
inquiry, as a result of the taxation dispute between Justice Sebutinde and the URA 
regarding her honorarium. By drawing attention to the fact that she was earning 9 million 
shillings a month, twice her normal salary as a judge and way above the average salary of 
civil servant, the Chair ignited the journalists‘ curiosity, who were then able to establish 
the total cost of the inquiry, estimated to have cost over 1 billion Uganda shillings, or over 
1 million US dollars for its duration of one year. This raised questions about the costs 
versus benefit of inquiries, many of which do not have their reports published or 
recommendations implemented.  
 
Secondly, the inquiry exposed the inadequacy of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. 
Transplanted to Uganda by the British in 1914, the Act has not undergone any changes to 
bring it into line with the times. For example, the discretion of the executive to publish or 
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not publish the report is a reflection of colonial arrogance and is against the right to 
freedom of information. Furthermore, the lack of clarity on the modus operandi of 
commissions of inquiry is a glaring loophole, through which the URA inquiry fell when its 
commissioners could not agree on the findings and recommendations. These problems are 
a hangover from the royal commissions of inquiry in Britain, which were established by 
royal prerogative and exercised as it were, the sovereign powers of the Crown. Such 
powers have no place in a republic such as Uganda, as they merely present opportunities 
for authoritarian leaders to exercise their tyranny. Moreover, Britain itself has since moved 
on, with the Tribunals of Inquiry Act 1921, as recently amended by the Inquiries Act 
2005. The Act contains detailed provisions on the membership of the inquiry, its 
proceedings and its reporting requirements.
669
 Sierra Leone too, has enacted a 
constitutional provision governing inquiries that democratises the inquiry process.
670
 
Article 147 provides that the President may appoint an inquiry by Constitutional 
Instrument, if the Cabinet advises him to do so or if the Parliament passes a resolution that 
an inquiry is necessary to resolve a matter of public importance. Article 149 gives the 
President discretion to publish or not to publish the report, but reasons for non-publication 
must be furnished. This is a provision that maintains the unique status of inquiries as ad 
hoc investigatory devices, yet respects the people‘s right to information by obliging the 
President to furnish reasons for non-publication. Therefore, the debacle of the URA 
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inquiry and report shows that it is time the Uganda Act was reformed to bring it in line 
with modern democratic thinking and practice.  
 
The URA inquiry also highlighted the dangers of using judges in political inquiries, as it 
clearly put Justice Sebutinde‘s judicial integrity on the line. Also, the nullification of the 
report by the High Court showed the inconsistencies of the Ugandan State, characterised 
by the ability to circumvent the law when politically convenient as discussed in chapter 3, 
as well as the possibility that the rule of law can be effectively enforced when necessary.  
 
The fiasco also exposed the double standards of the donor community in their dealings 
with Uganda. They championed the rule of law, but did not hide their displeasure when 
the High Court nullified the URA inquiry report, in which they had invested more than 1 
million USD. Following the ruling of Justice Katutsi, the Danish government threatened to 
withhold a grant of US $ 2 million to URA unless the government made public the report 
and implemented its recommendations. According to a press report on the reaction by 
DANIDA in which unfortunately, no one was quoted directly, it was implied that the 
government had connived with the judiciary to quash the report.
671
Matters were not helped 
by the fact that President Museveni was uncharacteristically silent about the developments 
in the URA inquiry.  
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What then, were the political implications of the URA inquiry? Despite the nullification of 
the report, restructuring of the URA went ahead, and many of the officials who had 
appeared before the commission of inquiry did not have their contracts renewed. On the 
other hand, it was of significance that Mrs. Allen Kagina, a Psychology graduate, who had 
formerly been a Commissioner in charge of Customs, was promoted to become the 
Commissioner-General of the URA after Swedish-born Annebrit Aslund‘s contract 
expired. It was alleged in the Ugandan media that the government had always been 
unhappy with Ms. Annebrit Aslund‘s appointment to head the URA.672 She was regarded 
as a donor imposition whereas the government would have preferred to have one of their 
own heading this very important body. Mrs. Kagina is from the same  village as the 
President, Nyabushozi, which leaves ample room for speculation as to why she was the 
government‘s choice to head the URA. 
 
All in all, the legacy of this inquiry is not the corruption that was unearthed in URA. The 
subject matter of the inquiry was greatly over-shadowed by the ensuing dispute between 
Justice Sebutinde and URA boss Ms. Aslund, the disagreements between the 
Commissioners, the court cases which resulted in the nullification of the report by the 
High Court.   
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5.4.4. The Global Fund Inquiry 2005 
Background to the inquiry 
The Global Fund (GF) to fight  HIV/AIDs, Tuberculosis (TB) and Malaria is an 
international public/private partnership established in 2002 following the UN General 
Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS that took place in June 2001. The GF is 
dedicated to attracting and disbursing additional funds to fight the three named diseases. 
Its  headquarters and secretariat are in Geneva, Switzerland, but it works with 
governments, civil society, the private sector and affected communities in various 
countries including Uganda to supplement existing efforts dealing with HIV/AIDS, TB 
and Malaria by providing financial resources.  
 
Justice James Ogoola, Principal Judge, was appointed to Chair the Inquiry. He was to be 
assisted by Margaret Mungerera, a prominent psychiatrist who was then the chair of 
Uganda Medical Association, and Mr. Emmanuel Mutebile, the Governor of the Bank of 
Uganda.  
 
The main reason for the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry into the Alleged 
Mismanagement of the GF was the suspension in August 2005 of all the five Global Fund 
grants to Uganda and the disbandment of the administrative unit (Project Management 
Unit: ―PMU‖) in the Ministry of Health (MOH) which had been managing the operations 
and activities of the Global Fund in Uganda. The GF Secretariat reiterated that the 
suspension would continue until the Government of Uganda (through its Auditor General) 
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had carried out a satisfactory audit of the finances and activities of GF Uganda and had put 
into place a caretaker mechanism to attend to the life - threatening and strategic needs of 
the Project pending comprehensive resolution of the underlying issues.  
 
This was not only the first time the GF had taken such a decision worldwide, it was also 
the first time that donor conditionality was being so strictly enforced in Uganda. Uganda 
had for long not measured up to many of the good governance indicators that donors 
upheld; being a de-facto one-party state under the ―Movement‖ system of government and 
also due to increasing evidence of rampant corruption. And yet, donors had displayed an 
unprecedented level of patience with Uganda, hailing it as an economic success story. As I 
argued in Chapter 2, this turning a blind eye to corruption in Uganda was not only because 
of it being a success story, but also because of its geo-strategic importance. However, 
Museveni had put his special relationship with donors especially the US in jeopardy by 
unilaterally invading the Congo, which led to a cooling of the hitherto warm relationship 
he had enjoyed with them.
673
  
 
In addition, donors had expressed their displeasure over a constitutional amendment 
passed in June 2005 that removed presidential term limits, thereby allowing Museveni to 
run for a third term, and indeed to embark on what was seen by many as ―President-for-
Life‖ project. The British High Commission was particularly unsatisfied with the 
prevailing situation, prompting Mr. Nikesh Mehta (the Second Secretary on Political 
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Issues at the British Embassy in Kampala) to issue a statement withholding up to £5m 
($10m) of funding to Uganda. This was followed by a further warning to cut aid by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, which 
comprise most of Uganda‘s top donors. In response, the government warned foreign 
diplomats accredited to Uganda to stop making public statements about political 
matters.
674
 Thus, due to a number of complex reasons, the hitherto rosy relationship 
between the donors and the NRM government was on the rocks. 
 
According to the GF Secretariat, the decision to suspend the grants to Uganda arose from 
the findings and recommendations of an August 2005 report by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC). PwC was commissioned by the Global Fund headquarters in Geneva to commence 
investigations following information from a whistleblower, who reported that the activities 
and operations of Global Fund Uganda were being mismanaged – including the giving of  
kickbacks for certain disbursements; non-reporting and misreporting by Global Fund 
beneficiaries and outright concoction of accountabilities. The beneficiaries were a variety 
of NGOs, Private Sector Organisations as well as government departments that had 
fulfilled the criteria for sub-recipients, the Government of Uganda being the main 
recipient. PwC therefore proceeded to investigate a random sample of only 30 sub-
recipients, even though by that time over 400 agencies had received GF monies.
675
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As soon as the suspension of funding was announced, the President wasted no time in 
setting up a Commission of Inquiry into the matter.  Subsequently, images of a jovial 
Secretary to the Treasury shaking hands with the Chief of Operations from the GFATM 
Secretariat were relayed by the news media, showing donors‘ approval of the steps that the 
government was taking to remedy the situation. Indeed, the appointment of the inquiry 
enabled a partial lifting of the ban on funds, as the GF agreed that it would disburse a 
portion of the funds. A GF official was quoted saying that the Secretariat had been 
convinced to lift the suspension because the government had ―promptly acted in a manner 
satisfactory to the GFATM and other stakeholders to rectify the situation…‖ and was 
pleased with the government for taking ―a quick and proactive role in addressing the 
serious concerns that we all shared.‖ 676 
 
The Commission‘s terms of reference were to investigate allegations of grave 
mismanagement of and corruption in the Global Fund; and to recommend possible 
redesigning of the Global Fund‘s operations; recovery of funds irregularly used or lost; 
redress against the culprits; and measures to stop a repeat of the mismanagement and of 
the financial losses. 
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Proceedings of the Global Fund inquiry 
Justice Ogoola‘s approach to chairing inquiries was noticeably different from that of 
Justice Sebutinde; indeed, this could have influenced his appointment to chair this inquiry 
after the URA one had ended in disaster.
677
 Despite this, the inquiry captured public 
attention and commanded the news headlines for the time of its duration, if not for the 
Chair‘s style, for the shocking revelations about corruption in the project.  Also, the 
inquiry was broadcast live on Wavah Broadcasting Services (WBS) Television, thereby 
making the inquiry a momentous national event. It was the first inquiry to be entirely 
broadcast live on TV. From the very beginning, the country was mesmerized by tales of 
political interference, nepotism, cronyism, and outright theft; all conducted with utmost 
impunity. For instance, it emerged that then Minister for Health, Jim Muhwezi, dictated to 
the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry that no recruitment to the project should take 
place without his clearance. The Minister then directed that Dr. Muhebwa, who had no 
project management experience, be hired to head the project over the preferred candidate 
for the job, a Dr. Mutumba. From that point onwards, recruitment to the PMU took on a 
highly informal style typical of a neo-patrimonial mode of governance. There was no 
advertising or interviews, but head-hunting. Technical expertise and qualifications took 
second place to political ―know-who‖ based on kinship and friendship ties.  For instance, 
Julius Mugisha, the son of the State Minister for Health, Dr. Alex Kamugisha, was 
employed as the Data Management Officer despite being a fresh graduate with a business 
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degree. Many of the other staff were similarly unqualified for their jobs and it was unclear 
on what basis they had been hired.
678
  
 
Even more shocking were the terms and conditions of the PMU staff. Their salaries and 
benefits were far higher than those of other public servants. Whereas staff of ad hoc donor 
funded projects generally earn higher salaries than the average public servant, the Global 
Fund was clearly being treated as a bonanza. In addition to their very high salaries, (for 
example, a driver was earning 1,000 USD, about the same as a University Professor), they 
awarded themselves allowances such as hardship allowance, facilitation allowance, and 
others whose existence could not be justified.  
 
Furthermore, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health, Mr. Kezaala, authorised 
GF monies for activities that did not fall under the project‘s docket. Whenever he would 
be asked by the Minister to fund activities which the Ministry of health Budget could not 
cover, he would ―borrow‖ from the GF PMU and cover his tracks by issuing false 
vouchers and invoices.  This led to speculation that some of the money was used in the 
2006 presidential and parliamentary election campaigns.  Circumstantial proof that the 
monies were used for political campaigns can be gleaned from the fact that many 
―immunisation campaigns‖ or ―ghost supervision visits‖ were undertaken by the Minister, 
                                                 
678
 Global Fund Inquiry Report, p. 5. Despite the fact that these goings-on were portrayed by the Global Fund Inquiry 
report as anomalies, it is well known that recruitment in many public service positions in Uganda follows a similar 
trend. As observed by  Mwenda and Tangri, the bureaucracy and public service positions in Uganda are extensively 
used by the regime to reward supporters, and thus resulting in distortion of the recruitment process. See Mwenda and 
Tangri (2005); op. cit. See also Mwenda, A. ( 2007) "Personalising Power in Uganda." Journal of Democracy 18(3): 
23-37. 
  
285 
 
Deputy Minister and Minister of State, all of whom were Members of Parliament with 
constituencies to woo and win.
679
  It was also reported that the Office of the First Lady, a 
non-constitutional office with unclear status and accountability lines, had also received 
money from the GF.
680
 This provides a vivid example of how donor funds are diverted to 
prop up and consolidate corrupt regimes in countries such as Uganda.
681
  
 
The inquiry also found that there was widespread corruption and financial irregularities 
amongst the sub-recipients, that is, public, private and NGO sector organisations that 
applied for and were given GF monies. Particularly with the NGOs, there was rampant 
misuse of funds, which were banked on personal as opposed to organisational accounts, 
used for personal purposes and false accountabilities issued. A number of individual 
directors of bogus NGOs that received money but did not carry out any work were 
recommended for further investigation and prosecution. One interviewee observed that: 
The Global Fund Inquiry was interesting because the government has used it to 
illustrate that corruption is not just in the public sector but in the private NGO 
sector as well, as many of the culprits who misused Global Fund money were 
NGOs. 
682
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Another  revelation that emerged from the GF inquiry was the manipulation and cunning 
that characterised the project‘s foreign exchange transactions. Grants from the 
headquarters in Geneva were issued in US dollars and banked on the PMU Foreign 
Exchange account with the Development Finance Company of Uganda (DFCU). 
However, from time to time, the PMU needed to withdraw money in Uganda shillings to 
conduct its day-to day operations. The audit by PwC showed, and the inquiry was able to 
verify that local currency would be withdrawn at exchange rates far below the market rate, 
in order to enable the bank as well as an intermediary law firm that acted as a ―broker‖ to 
make a huge profit on the transaction.  By the time of the inquiry, this ―broker‖ had made 
a ―commission‖ of Uganda shillings 295 million (about USD 147,500) from these foreign 
exchange transactions. This event took on a new twist when it was revealed that the Chief 
Executive of DFCU, Mr. Katuntu, and the Minister of Health Mr. Muhwezi, were ―golf 
buddies‖ and exchanged numerous phone calls on the days on which foreign exchange 
transactions took place.
683
 
 
Also of interest was the fact that the inquiry itself became embroiled in the corruption it 
was supposed to be investigating. Criminal Investigation Department (CID) Officers 
attached to the Commission of Inquiry were found to be colluding and conniving with 
some of the witnesses implicated in the scandal to divert the inquiry process by hiding and 
distorting evidence available to the inquiry. For example, Detective George Komurubuga 
was alleged to have received a bribe of U Shs. 5 million to destroy evidence pertaining to 
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allegations of corruption by Paula Turyahikayo, the PMU Assistant Public Coordinator. 
Both Ms. Turyahikayo and Inspector Komurubuga are being prosecuted for this.
684
 
 
As happened in the Junk Helicopters inquiry, some of the officials involved pointed a 
finger at the President as having sanctioned their irregular decisions. For example, 
Minister Jim Muhwezi told the inquiry the President had authorised him to withdraw 
money from the project to finance the treatment of Mr. Matthew Rukikaire, former 
privatisation Minister and an NRM ―historical‖  at Nairobi Hospital. 40 million shillings685 
was promptly withdrawn from the fund and used to settle Mr. Rukikaire‘s hospital bills.  
 
The Commission‘s most memorable moment was the testimony and cross-examination of 
Jim Muhwezi, then Minister for Health, which descended into a heated exchange between 
Justice Ogoola and the Minister regarding which one of them was more patriotic than the 
other. At the end of Muhwezi‘s testimony, Justice Ogoola said he owed it to the people of 
Uganda to ―do the right thing‖ and apologise for the Global Fund mess.  
The affairs of state have gone singularly wrong under your stewardship. The body 
politic has been deeply wounded... the wound has festered under your nose. The 
filth and dirt has accumulated under your leadership. My personal message to you 
is that is in times like this that men stand up out from boys . It is in crises like this 
that statesmen stand out from politicians. You Jim Katugugu Muhwezi have the 
opportunity to look in that camera and with a straight face tell the President who 
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appointed you and the people of Uganda who elected you to lead them all these 
years that you are sorry.
686
 
 
To which Muhwezi retorted: 
I would like to say that when there has been a call for patriotism and statesmanship 
I have been there. I do not know my lord where you were at the time but the peace 
and tranquillity and rule of law which prevails today I was part of... I do not posture 
when I am doing things even when I am here. I am a real person, Jim Muhwezi. I 
think I have not failed my appointing authority and my people. My lord, if it was a 
question of taking responsibility in that fashion, you would have resigned when two 
judges were alleged to have been bribed but you did not.
687
 
 
Justice Ogoola‘s statement on this occasion showed that he too, had taken on the symbolic 
role of being the Ugandan people‘s voice to express outrage against the corruption of the 
regime. Like Justice Sebutinde had done in previous inquiries he too, stepped out of the 
confines of a traditional judge‘s role, to take on the cause of anti-corruption. Indeed, Mr. 
Muhwezi later complained that by asking him to apologise, Justice Ogoola had turned the 
inquiry into a Kangaroo Court. The exchange also illustrated existing tensions between the 
executive and judicial branches of government in Uganda, as previously discussed in 
Chapter 3.
688
  
 
 
                                                 
686
 See Luggya, J. & P. Nyanzi (2006) ―The Highs and Lows of the Justice Ogoola Commission of Inquiry into the 
Global Fund,‖ The Monitor, 16 April 2006, at http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200604170160.html, last accessed 
12 February 2011. 
687
 Ibid. 
688
 See chapter 3, at 3.2.2. 
  
289 
 
Aftermath and outcome of the Global Fund inquiry 
After hearing testimony from about 150 witnesses and reviewing more than 450 
documentary exhibits,  it was no surprise that the GF inquiry report was a staggering 600 
page narration of what the Chair referred to as a ―pile of filth.‖689 Corruption and abuse of 
office were part and parcel of the PMU‘s establishment, staff recruitment, and day-to-day 
methods of work. According to one of the State Attorneys in the DPPs office, the findings 
revealed a total of 400 criminal cases of corruption.
690
 However, a notable innovation of 
the Global Fund inquiry in Uganda is that under the Terms of Reference, it was 
empowered to direct that any misappropriated funds be refunded.
691
 As a result, many 
individuals and organisations were ordered to refund money even when they were not 
recommended for prosecution. As of April 2010, U Shs. 2.3 billion had been deposited 
into the central bank by individuals and organisations implicated in the inquiry. Diverse 
agencies including Local Governments, the National Chamber of Commerce, the Ministry 
of Finance, Ministry of Education and even the Solicitor General‘s office received Global 
Fund Monies but did not account for them, and have since refunded the money.
692
 
 
After amalgamation and combining charges from the 400 issues recommended for 
prosecution, 144 cases are undergoing further investigations with a view to prosecution. 
This is a daunting task that will take many years to fulfil. At the time of the field study, 
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investigations had been completed for less than 10 of these cases despite technical 
assistance from fraud experts from the United Kingdom and European Union Serious 
Fraud Offices. Three cases have been successfully prosecuted, and the culprits have been 
jailed. 1 case is in the Court system but hearing has not been completed. 5 are nearing 
completion of investigations and will soon be filed before the Anti-Corruption Court.   
 
The big fish that the public and donors would like to see in the dock are the three 
Ministers who were responsible for health at the time –Mr. Jim Muhwezi, Captain Mike 
Mukula – Minister of State and Dr. Alex Kamugisha, Deputy Minister. The inquiry report 
recommended that all three be prosecuted for perjury, causing financial loss and uttering 
false documents. In particular, all three ministers undertook numerous ghost trips around 
the country under the guise of supervision visits. The falsity of the visits was proven by 
the fact that petrol receipts for fuelling stations outside the capital, Kampala were 
submitted as accountability, and yet on those same days that the Ministers were supposed 
to have travelled outside the city, they had signed the Parliament Register in Kampala and 
attended parliamentary proceedings.
693
  
 
However, there are presently no plans to prosecute the three ministers; the DPPs office 
says there is insufficient evidence.
694
 Indeed, in a separate personal interview one of the 
Ministers indicated that as a Minister, no wrong doing can be proven against him as he did 
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not personally handle any of the funds. The fall has to be taken by the Permanent 
Secretary Mr. Kezaala and the Ministers‘ Personal Assistants because the evidence 
available points to them. Although all three Ministers of Health were dropped from 
Cabinet, they retained their Parliamentary Seats. They are being considered for 
prosecution only for the relatively minor crime of perjury against the inquiry. 
Nonetheless in an interesting twist of events, in 2006 the President directed the then 
Inspector General of Government (IGG) Mrs. Faith Mwondha to investigate the Ministers 
for the alleged misappropriation and misuse of funds from the Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI), which sounds very similar to the Global Fund but is 
a completely different matter that was not the subject of the judicial inquiry. The IGG 
subsequently brought criminal charges against the three ministers and a State House 
official named Alice Kaboyo for the alleged misappropriation of GAVI funds.
695
 The 
criminal proceedings are on-going and the outcome is awaited.  
 
So far, successfully completed prosecutions from the Global Fund Inquiry include that of  
Dr. Teddy Ssezi Cheeye, former Director of the Economic Monitoring Internal Security 
Organisation, and so far the biggest fish to have been netted. He was convicted for 
misappropriating U Shs. 110m allocated to an organisation he founded to take advantage 
of the Global Fund ―windfall‖ called the Uganda Centre for Accountability and sentenced 
to 10 years in prison. However, he is currently out on bail pending an appeal. The hearing 
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of the appeal commenced in April 2010 and judgment is awaited.  Other convicts are Mr. 
Salongo Kavuma, former director of programmes in Uganda Television, who 
misappropriated shs. 49 million and was sentenced to 5 years‘ imprisonment. Ms. 
Annaliza Mondon and Ms. Elizabeth Ngororano were also sentenced to 5 years each for 
failure to account for money they received personally on behalf of an NGO Value Health 
that they founded.
696
   
 
Global Fund the most successful inquiry? 
The Global Fund Inquiry was described by one respondent as the ―most successful‖ yet.697 
It is regarded as such because the report was published immediately after it was handed 
over, and also because prosecutions are on-going and money that was misappropriated is 
being refunded. The success of the inquiry has been attributed to two main factors; firstly, 
the insistence by the Chair Justice James Ogoola that he would agree to chair the inquiry 
only if he could release the full report to the media at the same time as he handed it over to 
the President. This was reportedly done informally, as there is no indication of this 
publication requirement in the inquiry‘s terms of reference.  It ensured that there was no 
cover up of any of the findings. In addition, the Secretary noted that the overwhelming 
public response with many members of the public volunteering evidence and information 
enabled the inquiry to do its work quickly and successfully. Notably, the inquiry also 
received technical expertise from the UK and EU Serious Fraud Offices.
698
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However, the untold story of the Secretary‘s boast about the success of the inquiry is the 
subject matter of the inquiry, which related to the misappropriation of HIV/AIDS funding. 
Firstly, Uganda is purportedly an International HIV/AIDS success story, having managed 
to reduce HIV/AIDS infection rates from 30% of the population to just 7%. The Lancet 
observed: ―The Global Fund's decision to suspend Uganda's five grants sent shock waves 
through the country, whose robust response to AIDS is a point of national pride.‖699 
President Museveni has personally been credited for much of the country‘s HIV/AIDS 
response, due to his personal involvement in spearheading open and frank discussion 
about AIDS and sexual behaviour.
700
 At the time when the scandal broke in 2005, 
Museveni had already begun to lose credibility due to his third term / presidency for life 
project. Hence he could not afford to lose further credibility as an internationally 
renowned HIV/AIDS activist by appearing to be lenient on those who were stealing AIDS 
money.  
 
In addition, it is evident that donor pressure in the instance of the Global Fund has been 
particularly heavy, as shown by the immediate action to suspend the grants. Indeed not all 
of the grants have been reinstituted to date, as the GF maintains that Uganda has still not 
made the necessary arrangements to ensure that the funds are protected.  Amongst donors 
in general, there was dissatisfaction with the government‘s slow progress in prosecuting 
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700
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those responsible for the scandal. An official from the Norwegian embassy in Uganda 
expressed concern over the government‘s delay to prosecute those implicated, and wrote 
to the Geneva-based Inspector General of the fund expressing disapproval of the fact that 
nobody had been prosecuted two years after the commission of inquiry.
701
  
 
As a result, the Inspector General of the Fund visited Uganda and found that there were 
still insufficient measures to guarantee that the Global Fund Money in Uganda is in safe 
hands.
702
 The grants were subsequently withdrawn from the government and been put 
under the oversight of a civil society organisation known as The AIDS Support 
Organisation (TASO).
703
 This decisive action by donors appears to be a  change in tune 
from their hitherto more lenient approach to corruption in Uganda. As Mwenda and Tangri 
observe, ―donors have begun to realise belatedly that they are/ have been propping up a 
corrupt regime in Uganda.‖704 While there may be some truth to this, it is more likely that 
donors have been knowingly propping up a corrupt regime in order to further their own 
interests, as we saw in chapter 2.
705
  
 
At this point, I will turn my attention to analysing the role that judicial commissions of 
inquiry have played in Uganda‘s governance, particularly in light of the arguments I have 
made in the previous chapters.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Analysing the role of commissions of inquiry in Uganda: how to be a good 
governor without undermining your support base (part II) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to analyse the role that judicial commissions of inquiry play in Uganda 
through the views of primary respondents to the study, secondary respondents whose 
views were obtained from newspapers, internet blogs, internet discussion forums, radio, 
theatre and other art forms.  In Chapter two, we saw how the Uganda government, through 
its PRSP and PRSP progress reports has frequently relied on judicial commissions of 
inquiry to show that it is complying with aid conditionality. In Chapter three it was shown 
that the Uganda government agrees to the formal requirements of good governance but 
subverts them in various ways, creating a gap between anti-corruption rhetoric and reality.  
 
Chapter four suggested that the unique characteristics of inquiries, such as quasi-
judicialness and public inquisitorial proceedings that result in non-binding 
recommendations, is what makes them amenable to governments in myriad countries for 
handling all sorts of crises, and indeed to the Uganda government as a means of being 
seen as a ―good governor‖ without undermining its support base. The previous chapter has 
provided a narrative of the highlights of four inquiries that were chosen as case studies for 
this research. 
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In this chapter, I present and analyse the views of the public on the role and impact of 
commissions of inquiry.  Most of the views expressed indicate that judicial inquiries are a 
mere public relations exercise or a white-wash; a strategy of appearing to do something 
about corruption, whilst ultimately doing nothing. This is in line with a number of 
scholars‘ views on the role of inquiries. However, as suggested previously, such a view of 
inquiries would not explain their enduring appeal to both governments and citizens as a 
crisis-response mechanism. Indeed, why would any self-interested government attempt to 
dupe its citizens  knowing that they would eventually realise that they had been duped? 
Therefore my analysis of respondents‘ views digs beneath the surface in the search for a 
deeper understanding of why the Uganda government appoints inquiries into corruption 
and why the public retains an interest in them despite the prevalent pessimism regarding 
their role in governance.  
 
6.2 Deciphering the role of commissions of inquiry in Uganda  
 
6.2.1 Respondents’ views: inquiries are “useless!” 
Due to the failure to prosecute those implicated in corruption by inquiries, many 
respondents to this study and other commentators have given a negative evaluation of 
commissions of inquiry. Below I reproduce various views that show that many Ugandans 
regard inquiries in a negative light due to their perceived limited impact on corruption.  
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Journalist and Scholar Andrew Mwenda calls them a ―mockery of justice:‖  
These inquiries have been political vehicles to legitimise an extremely corrupt 
system by demonstrating to an unsuspecting public that something is being done. 
This politicised and pedestrian approach to fighting corruption will not help 
Uganda. Year, 2000! A policeman, with a wife and four children in Kampala is 
paid Shs 70,000 per month (about US$35). It cannot help him survive even for a 
week. He takes a bribe to make ends meet. Who is being immoral here: the 
government which pretends to employ the policeman, or the policeman who makes 
a genuine attempt to feed his family? Whose morality are we talking about? Take 
URA for example: The wages in that organisation were set in 1994 and have never 
been revised. People are promoted on the basis of tribe, supporting the Movement 
or third term rather than on demonstrated competence and probity. The president 
constantly writes lists of people (he calls them cadres) to be hired by the 
organisation. The URA does not offer long term career rewards, job insecurity is 
high. Under such circumstances, it is illusory to expect staff to pursue corporate 
goals. Instead, they pursue individual maximisation – steal as fast and as much as 
you can before you lose your job. These are the political and institutional sources of 
corruption that we need to deal with. Sebutinde-like commissions seek to name and 
shame the corrupt. That will not help.
706
  
 
Dr. James Rwanyarare, Chairman of the opposition UPC, had this to say about 
commissions of inquiry: 
We are getting uncomfortable with reports done by Ms. Sebutinde. She appears to 
be the government‘s person in the legal hatchets to serve Mr. Museveni‘s whims.707 
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Mrs. Miria Matembe, former Minister of Ethics and Integrity, speaking on KFM Hotseat, 
a radio call in talk show, said: 
What about the helicopter saga which was the subject of the Commission of 
Inquiry? The President hailed and praised Sebutinde… but what happened to those 
recommendations? I have been the Minister – all these white papers we make… 
what happened? Billions lost! His brother, who has been central to all this 
corruption, was made a witness! What is lacking is not investigation… what is 
lacking is government‘s will to prosecute and punish the corrupt. The government 
of Museveni has no will to fight corruption. In fact it has made corruption very 
lucrative… 708 
 
One of the interviewees in this study, an official of Uganda‘s foremost anti-corruption 
NGO ACCU also had no kind words for inquiries:  
Inquiries are completely useless money and time-wasting mechanisms. The work 
they do could easily be done by other agencies like the Auditor General and other 
established agencies. The government uses them to buy time and to protect certain 
individuals while sacrificing others. Cheeye was convicted but it is probably 
because the government wanted to get rid of him….There is no shame associated 
with being corrupt therefore they cannot be a naming and shaming mechanism. 
Although they can be said to promote public debate and discussion, the limelight 
and publicity are short lived. It is all about the rule of law and how many heads can 
be said to roll after the inquiry. As long as there is no rule of law the inquiries are 
useless. It is also about political will to fight corruption. But how can there be 
political will when the top government executives are part of the gravy train and it 
is well known that the proceeds of corruption are used to finance election 
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campaigns and such? The real issue with corruption is psychological and involves 
attitudinal change. No amount of laws and institutions will help unless attitudes 
change.
709
  
 
Discussions by different individuals in the news media reveal a similar attitude towards 
inquiries. James Ikuya, a ―radical‖ member of the NRM, calls them ―public relations 
stunts to hide facts‖: 
Our many years of NRM administration were to bring new hope for this country, 
but it appears that we have also developed a knack for meaningless inquiries… 
many of the findings have not been made public…. The only safeguard to misrule 
in our country is to base governance on defined systems and institutions instead of 
depending wholly on the moods and favours of individuals. It is by adherence to 
the observation of rules by all that it becomes legitimate to assign commissions to 
reveal extraordinary events of violation and flouting of social norms for the purpose 
of uprooting indiscipline. Without this, inquiries can only be hypocritical, serving 
as public relations stunts to hide facts. 
710
 
 
Moses, a discussant on the government‘s political will to fight corruption said on the New 
Vision Online Discussion Board: 
My brother, don‘t get so carried away by the false belief that his report 
(CHOGM)
711
 will come to anything so important and that the thieves will end up in 
Luzira!!!!
712
 This is the usual everyday trick, first still(sic) the money then make a 
hullabaloo about nothing. Institute a commission of inquiry, it comes up with its 
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final verdict that clearly points out that money was unquestionably stolen. Then 
send a few to Luzira for a few days owing to the fact that their super rich fellow 
thieves will bail them out and head straight to their ungodly mansions with a few 
phone calls to State House to announce their victories, while they sip a cold bottle 
of  Bell lager, Johnnie Walker and smoke a cigar while the Wananchi (citizens) 
continue to gasp!!!!!!!!! By the way, how many inquiries have they so far 
instituted?????? Global Fund, GAVI, Junk Helicopter, UCB Purchase, fake 
Military Uniforms, Ghost soldiers….. What have they come to in the end????? By 
the way, don‘t forget that the brother... had a big and deep hand in both the Junk 
helicopter and UCB bogged up deals!!!!????
713
  
 
Similarly, Journalist and blogger Gerald Bareebe says: 
I  have never been convinced that the President is committed to fighting corruption 
in Uganda… a lot of corrupt NRM Cadres have been left free after being implicated 
in corruption scandals because they support the ruling government or they are close 
associates of President Yoweri Museveni….Ask yourself what has been done after 
the recommendations of Justice Sebutinde‘s report into the junk helicopters which 
couldn‘t even fly from Entebbe to Kampala and yet they were bought to fight Kony 
in Northern Uganda? What of the current crisis of supplying fake seeds and pangas 
to the IDPS? What of the GAVI funds. Don‘t also forget the Global Fund. Name 
them… If the fight against corruption is to be taken seriously then Salem Saleh and 
Kahinda Otafiire should be in prison for buying fake helicopters and plundering 
Congo respectively…714 
 
In an FGD I conducted with young Ugandans who are professional in various fields, aged 
24-35, the views on inquiries were similarly sceptical: 
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What I recall about the junk choppers is that there was too much hullabaloo and a 
lot of scintillation by the media and then nothing, total silence as if nothing had 
happened. I actually remember thinking about the futility of it all, I thought it was a 
waste of time because in Uganda "bush war heroes" are not held accountable. 
(Sheila) 
 
It appears that these inquiries are just political tools to hoodwink the public into 
thinking that something is being done but in actual sense nothing at all is seen to be 
happening. The unlucky few who become 'insignificant' to the regime are sacrificed 
and the corruption continues. (Apio) 
 
Of course the president had to forgive his brother. It really hurts that in the end, it‘s 
the taxpayers who have to make up for these losses but I‘ve reached a point where I 
believe that those who are found to be corrupt will never be punished in Uganda, 
and it amazes me how they always get around the law, maybe the law is not too 
strict/strong on corrupt officials. Even those who are arrested get out on bail! 
(Referring to Teddy Cheeye who was convicted for his role in the Global Fund 
corruption scandal but has since been released on bail pending appeal.) So in the 
end the commission‘s efforts are futile.... (Filda) 
 
The junk chopper probe exposed the lack of political will by Museveni's 
government to stamp out corruption from among their own ranks. For the president 
to tell the nation that he ordered his brother to INJECT (participant‘s emphasis) the 
USD 800,000 bribe into the war against LRA was criminal and the two should have 
been prosecuted. As for Saleh, he - and alleged thieves (laughter from 
participants)… but that is what they are! Museveni's family continue to enjoy the 
protection from the president and as such making Museveni part and parcel of the 
entrenched corruption in the country (Akwat). 
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The corruption inquiry committees are always very loud yet the results can be 
hardly seen. They should involve a large legal team so as to aid establish 
incriminating evidence (Namono). 
 
You know…something is only useful in so far as it serves its purpose; inquiries in 
Uganda are totally useless, as they do not serve their objective of holding culprits 
accountable. It is actually wastage of public funds to appoint a commission of 
inquiry and do absolutely nothing about its findings. It is actually frustrating to the 
public because we are made aware of these atrocities and we see no justice; 
TOTAL WASTAGE (Participant‘s emphasis; (Sheila).  
 
I really don‘t see the purpose of identifying the corrupt and they are never brought 
to justice. The commission should be given enough authority to sentence such 
officials and there should also be political will to fight corruption. If it‘s not there, 
the commission‘s efforts are in vain. (Filda) 
 
I will agree with Sheila, the inquiries are a further waste of public funds. The 
reports are never implemented by the Museveni government - mainly because of 
lack of political will. They are only helpful for us to know the politically influential 
people that seem to enjoy total confidence of the president (Akwat). 
 
Well, the commissions serve their purpose in part when they expose the various 
perpetrators of so many ills; however, the poor implementation of their 
recommendations is always a sad mockery of the whole process. The citizenry need 
to see real justice! (Nuwagaba) 
 
Thus we see a high level of scepticism and cynicism from members of the public, many of 
whom are journalists or professional Ugandans with internet access, as well as Ugandans 
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in the Diaspora. However, even less educated Ugandans in the informal sector, who 
constituted one of the FGDs I conducted, expressed their views on the futility of inquiries: 
But sometimes you even just see that someone is stealing money. They have so 
much property even beyond what their salary can accommodate, and then you say 
you want to inquire. Inquire about what, when it is obvious? After all, once they 
discover the report has named someone who "fought", they hide the report. They 
are relatives who are just sharing the country's money. It is even embarrassing 
Uganda in the eyes of the world. I hear they even say we were the third in 
corruption in the world.  (Abayo)
715
 
 
But even if we say these things, there is nothing going to be done. Even those who 
―eat‖ money, there is nothing going to be done. It's like educating a child and 
giving it all the right information, but when it goes in the field (gets a job and starts 
working), it does something totally different. You'll just have wasted your time. 
(Clever J). 
 
Thus we see that inquiries are regarded by respondents to this study as useless and time-
wasting, mainly because they have not led to the conviction and punishment of those 
implicated in corruption. They are seen as farces, public relations stunts, and disguised 
attempts to cover up the truth.  This is line with the analyses of scholars such as Sedley, 
Hart, Drewry, Wells and others, discussed in Chapter 4.
716
 The respondents‘ views show 
that they are aware that the tangible results of inquiries will be negligible; therefore they 
are not hoodwinked. Accordingly, if indeed inquiries were public relations stunts, they 
have failed miserably. Why then, would the government appoint them?  
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6.2.2 Legitimation before the Ugandan public by creating a space for criticism and 
resistance to the regime 
According to Ashforth; Gilligan & Pratt; it behoves us to conduct a deeper analysis on the 
purpose of inquiries that goes beyond the conventional view of inquiries as white-
washing, public relations exercises.
717
 As argued in chapter four, such a deeper analysis 
would lead us to view inquiries as ―reckoning schemes of legitimation,‖ to borrow 
Ashforth‘s description. I would agree generally that in Uganda too, the main purpose of 
inquiries is legitimation, that is, to enhance the rational acceptability of the government 
before those to whom it is accountable, donors on one hand, and citizens on the other.  I 
will first consider how commissions of inquiry legitimate the government before the 
citizens of Uganda and consider legitimation before the donors in the next sub-section. 
 
I suggest that the Uganda government knowingly takes the risk that the people will think it 
is trying to hoodwink them because ultimately, a negative authoritative evaluation by a 
commission of inquiry creates a space and opportunity for people, especially those who 
are opposed to the NRM, to air out their dissatisfaction with the regime. Providing such a 
space and opportunity presents that government as tolerant of criticism and therefore 
democratic, especially in comparison to previous regimes such as that of notorious dictator 
Idi Amin. Despite the fact that there is growing opposition to the NRM government, it 
should be borne in mind that countrywide, NRM supporters who are mostly peasants, still 
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constitute the majority as I will illustrate shortly.  It may be inferred that the NRM is well 
aware that on the whole, its supporters outnumber its critics, and the threat to its power 
arising from non-implementation of recommendations is only a minimal one. By creating 
a space and forum where those opposed to the government can vent their frustrations, 
inquiries ultimately serve to legitimate the NRM as a regime that is tolerant of criticism 
both the public and the judiciary.  
 
In the same vein, the public continues to keenly follow the proceedings of inquiries, 
despite knowing that they will not amount to much. The public (as delimited by my urban 
study population) maintains interest in inquiries because the sensational revelations of 
corruption provide evidence/confirmation that the current regime is corrupt and therefore 
unfit to rule. This is pertinent, given the fact that urban areas are opposition strongholds in 
Uganda, while the regime‘s support base is mainly in the rural areas. In the previous 
Parliament whose tenure ended in March 2011, of the 14 municipality parliamentary seats 
in the country including the capital Kampala, the NRM controlled only 4 and the 
Opposition, the other 10. Out of the 8 parliamentary seats in the city, the NRM had only 
one, while the opposition had 7 seats. One can therefore speculate that the voting patterns 
show that the urban population is engaged in resistance to the regime.  This is the 
population that participates in the inquiry process by attending proceedings, watching 
them on TV, listening to them over the radio or reading the newspapers. One may infer 
that the public acquiesces to the appointment and process of commissions of inquiry 
because their hostility to the ruling regime is temporarily placated by the naming and 
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shaming of corrupt government officials during inquiry proceedings.  Such proceedings 
enable them to reach their own verdicts about the guilt of particular individuals and indeed 
of the whole NRM regime.  Inquiry proceedings ―dig up dirt‖ and therefore provide the 
fodder for resistance to the regime. 
 
Indeed, the failure to publish inquiry reports, and above all, failure to implement the 
recommendations of inquiries, has come to epitomise the NRM government‘s lack of 
political will in the fight against corruption and one of its key failings as a regime. Jasper 
Tumuhimbise, a prominent anti-corruption crusader and formerly head of ACCU Uganda, 
says  
There have been so many inquiries like the Congo timber saga, the Junk 
helicopters, Global fund and the police inquiry, but implementing the 
recommendations either takes a long time or is not followed up. And as long as this 
is still going on, we have failed as a country.
718
  
 
Mr. John Kazoora, formerly a member of the NRM and now a member of the opposition 
FDC, wrote an opinion piece in the newspaper which also reflects that many have not 
forgotten the numerous scandals and subsequent inquiries: 
Two years down the road, what has the Auditor General uncovered, absolute filth 
right from the Vice President, Prime Minister‘s office, Foreign Affairs, Works, 
Local Government, ICT ministries and many others. The usual gaiety leaders 
mastered their game. ―Chogm was a success, those who don‘t see so are enemies of 
the Movement and Development, they are trying to settle political scores,‖ as one 
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involved minister has claimed! He further hisses ―We are not bothered by his (PAC 
Chairman‘s) hype. I know some donors are behind it, but we are used to this.‖ His 
churning of tripe however, should be taken with a pinch of salt… This arrogance is 
only equalled by the Chicago untouchables, the Mount Kenya Mafia and now the 
“Our turn to chew Uganda Alliance”. But as for most Ugandans, life continues and 
are comforted by Arsenal and Chelsea as coffers are bled dry. Who cares whether it 
is Tri-Star, Temangalogate, Chogmcon or Helicopter Junk when they all have the 
backing of the Ssabagabe (King)… 719  
 
Mr. Kazoora‘s comment laments corruption in general but specifically questions the 
legitimacy of the regime by comparing it to the Chicago untouchables and the Mount 
Kenya Mafia, and naming it the ―Our turn to chew Uganda Alliance.‖ In doing this, he 
denigrates the NRM as being similar to previous corrupt regimes from whom they 
purported to liberate the country when they took power in 1986. 
 
Dr. Muniini K. Mulera, a Ugandan Paediatrician in Canada with a popular column in The 
Monitor, and member of the opposition FDC also observes: 
As a certified Chinua Achebe Addict, I am forever hearing the voices of his varied 
characters in his great novels. Reading the Chogm report last week promptly 
triggered the voice of Mr. Green, the detestable European boss of Obi Okwonkwo 
in No Longer at Ease.  
Mr. Green, in conversation with his British Council Friend, assures him that he 
understands why Okwonkwo, a UK-trained Nigerian Bureaucrat, took a bribe for 
which he now stands accused. ―The African is corrupt through and through,‖ Mr. 
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Green says. Oh how I hated that statement the first time I read it more than four 
decades ago! Yet how many times our continent‘s rulers have given reality to the 
fictional Mr. Green‘s damning of my race! One gets depressed reading through a 
catalogue of the known corruption scandals of the Museveni regime.  Bank Paribus, 
Uganda Commercial Bank, junk helicopters, etc…720 
 
Mulera‘s comment contains elements of the international discourse on corruption, which 
focuses a great deal on ―African‖ corruption. Mulera goes on to say that if only Museveni 
would ensure that the corrupt are prosecuted, he would have Mulera‘s vote in the February 
2011 elections. Thus, Mulera identifies failure to punish those who have been implicated 
in corruption scandals as the key reason he will not vote for the NRM. One of the 
participants in the FGD for non-elites said, ―If the president eliminated corruption, he 
would rule forever and ever!‖ implying that the failure to eliminate corruption will be the 
main cause of Museveni‘s downfall. 
 
Ordinary people view the regime as callous and insensitive to the plight of the poor, and 
are aware of the fact that corruption hinders the realisation of their human rights, as 
revealed by various comments in the FGD with urban poor people: 
If those choppers had come in time and in the quality that was required, Kony 
would have killed less people. He (Salim Saleh) ―ate‖ the money for the choppers 
and we can blame him for Kony killing more people in the process due to lack of 
efficient machinery (Musisi, commenting on the Junk Helicopters Inquiry). 
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These people are keeping the country backward. It hurts me for the children to die. 
Those people's children are born from outside the country and they even move in 
air (planes). They have no feelings for our children (Jalia, commenting on the 
Global Fund Inquiry). 
 
Jalia‘s comment is pertinent and points to two pressing development issues in Uganda: 
maternal and child mortality. Her reference to the ―moving in planes‖ is a reference to the 
revelation that President Museveni‘s eldest daughter Natasha was transported to Germany 
aboard the presidential airplane jet to have her second baby.
721
   
 
The comments above show that people are disillusioned with the regime, and the role that 
inquiries have played in fomenting disillusionment.  However, it is important to note that 
such freedom to express dissatisfaction with the regime is a relatively new phenomenon in 
Uganda, indeed, one that coincides with the NRM regime and the era of good governance. 
Ugandans have not always been free to express their disillusionment with the rulers, 
especially in public forums such as newspapers and blogs.
722
 Despite this, it may early 
days yet to celebrate freedom of expression in Uganda, especially given the fact that 
journalists and other critics of the government have suffered harassment from the Police 
and other security agencies as discussed in chapter 3.
723
 Nonetheless, it would appear that 
at the very least, a window of opportunity is created for the public to criticise the 
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government regarding its corruption before, during and after inquiry proceedings.   In this 
way, the regime is able not only to legitimate itself as being democratic, it is also able to 
absorb and diffuse criticism against it and opposition to its rule, and hence to prolong its 
stay in power. One could say that the government lifts the lid a little to allow some of the 
steam to rise up and bubble away, thereby lessening the danger of an explosion 
occurring.
724
  I will now deal with the issue of how commissions of inquiry help to 
legitimate the NRM regime as a ―good governor.‖  
 
6.3 Commissions of inquiry as conditionality compliance mechanisms 
 
Former President of the opposition Democratic Party, Mr. Paul Ssemogerere, says that 
inquiries are meant to hoodwink the international community. He said:  
Mr. Museveni has been carrying out these inquiries not to find the truth. The reason 
has been to hoodwink the international community.
725
  
  
We saw in chapter two how the government frequently cites the appointment of 
commissions of inquiry as evidence of its commitment to anti-corruption in the PRSP 
conditionality framework. Thus, on the face of it, it may indeed appear that inquiries are 
meant to hoodwink the international community, especially when one recalls that as soon 
as the government appointed the global fund inquiry, the Global Fund headquarters in 
Geneva lifted the ban on grants to Uganda. Indeed, donors expressed their satisfaction 
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with the steps taken by President Museveni. Said Richard Feachem, the Executive 
Director of the Global Fund:   
The openness and thoroughness with which President Museveni addressed the 
Global Fund‘s concerns about the management of the grants it finances in  Uganda 
has shown an example for how allegations of corruption should be dealt with. By 
conducting a public inquiry under the competent leadership of Justice James 
Ogoola, Uganda has given a clear message that the abuse of money meant for those 
suffering the consequences of malaria and AIDS is unacceptable.
726
 
 
However,  it seems naive to assert that inquiries are meant to hoodwink the international 
community; it is an over-simplification of the complexity of international relations in 
general, aid donor-recipient relationships as a whole, and in particular, Uganda‘s 
relationship with her aid donors.  Despite the appearances, I do not think that the 
international community is hoodwinked by the appointment of commissions of inquiry. In 
chapter 2, we saw donors‘ exasperation with the government for not implementing the 
recommendations of commissions of inquiry, which has frequently been the subject of 
donor-government dialogue. Despite such exasperation however, we must remember that 
for many years, donors voiced their dissatisfaction but never actually reduced 
development aid to Uganda for its failure to comply with conditionality. The non-
enforcement of conditionality is largely due to self interest – the career dilemma, strategic 
interests and the war on terror.  
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Due to the above factors, it would be short-sighted to assume that the donors are genuinely 
concerned when conditionality is breached through the non-implementation of inquiry 
recommendations.  This is a fact many Ugandans are aware of, and recent attempts to 
enforce conditionality have met with scepticism. The comments posted below an online 
news article about a threat by donors to cut aid because of corruption illustrate this: 
Barking dogs: Donors just speak to show they are tough. Even after a stolen 
election victory they will just endorse the ―winner‖ as long as they s/he can 
guarantee their own interests. Ugandans should not wait for donors to fight our own 
war against government corruption. We should rise up against thieves and make 
their lives hell. The press should be relentless in exposing the robbers of our 
national wealth. The population should deny a vote to those who steal from the 
public to enrich their families and clans.
727
 
 
Keep your money donors: All that is happening in the third world and in particular 
Uganda, is because donors have failed to see the truth. This money they give failed 
states has always gone to a few individuals‘ pockets. By threatening to put a halt to 
the money they give us- this has all along been the same song over and over. 
Elections are rigged but surprisingly they (donors) are the number ones (sic) to say 
that elections have been free and fair! CHOGM, AIDS and Malaria money should 
have been an eye-opener. Stop wasting your tax-payers‘ money... Keep your money 
and leave us alone with your corruption. Please donors if you have to give the 
money manage it yourselves is the only way (sic) otherwise you are wasting your 
taxpayers earned money. 
728
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I wonder how long donors call them development partners will take us for granted. 
If year in year out they send money and it is stolen let them stop at that. Then M7 
(Museveni) will run short of funds to run state machinery against opposition. This 
is not the time for letters but rather action. Fellow Ugandans, do not even be 
hoodwinked by these donors, I am actually tempted to think they also eat from this 
corruption.
729
 
 
Where was the donor group when Museveni stole the votes to assert himself as 
president? Where were you when he changed the constitution to lift term limits? 
I‘m sure you were busy under dodging with him, as long as he could serve your 
interests – steal minerals from DR Congo and Sudan. Now what is the matter with 
corruption? Enjoy your salaries.
730
  
 
These statements show that Ugandans are aware of donors‘ hypocrisy when they express 
dismay about the government‘s failure to enforce anti-corruption law and policy. Similar 
statements expressing disaffection with the government‘s failure to implement the 
recommendations of commissions of inquiry ring hollow. We saw in chapter two that 
Uganda is considered an important ally in the war against terror, firstly, as a bulwark 
against the southward spread of Islamic fundamentalism, and also due to Uganda‘s 
involvement on behalf of the US in Somalia. These factors reduce ―good governance‖ to a 
cat and mouse game, to a drama show. Both the donors and the government know this, 
hence commissions of inquiry may be looked at as one of the means by which the ―catch 
me if you can‖ drama unfolds.  
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Therefore, the drama of commissions of inquiry is not just about anti-corruption, but  has 
been used to legitimate the NRM government before the international community as a 
democratic regime, ―a good governor,‖ consistent with its existing status as a ―star-child‖ 
and ―show-case‖ success story for the World Bank‘s development discourse. Inquiry 
proceedings, widely broadcast by the media, make a show of complying with various 
aspects of good governance conditionality, including judicial independence, media 
freedom, public service reform and so on. The play is not necessarily for the donors per se, 
whose motives and intentions at any given moment may fluctuate from altruism to self-
interest.   The ―good governance‖ show is conducted also for the benefit of the tax-payers 
in the donor countries, a fact which is brought out in international press coverage of 
Ugandan inquiries
731
, and summarised in this statement by Ugandan donors: 
It is becoming increasingly difficult for us, as donors, to explain this (corruption) to 
our taxpayers at home who currently provide just under half of the Government of 
Uganda budget.
732
 
 
6.4 Commissions of inquiry as “the play of good governance,” in Uganda 
 
Following on from the analysis above, Commissions of inquiry appointed to investigate 
corruption in Uganda can be viewed as a ―game‖ or ―theatre,‖ a metaphor that some 
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scholars have used to analyse inquiry proceedings. In particular, Carlen‘s metaphor of the 
―play of governance‖ is useful in understanding the significance of inquiries in Uganda. 
Carlen argues that the inherently contradictory nature of the inquiry process, arising from 
the impossibly Utopian ideal of establishing the truth, shows that  it‘s all about ―the 
play.‖733  
 
The metaphor of the theatre as an apt description of the inquiry process is not lost upon 
Ugandans. Don Wanyama, Chief Sub-editor of The Daily Monitor Newspaper, in his blog 
describes inquiry processes as theatrical productions of entertainment, as a satirical 
reference to the fact that this is all they ever amount to since nobody is prosecuted as the 
result of an inquiry: 
There is a play showcasing in a theatre called Parliament. It is a comedy, to be 
precise. The protagonist is a gentleman called Nandala Mafabi
734
, whose theatrical 
group is named the Public Accounts Committee. Their latest production that elicits 
laughter to the point of tears is called Investigation into the abuse of funds during 
the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting….That is the comedy showing 
at Parliament. It would have been a great show and I would have recommended that 
you go and watch this play. But the problem is that there have been such shows 
before. The same theatre hosted a play Investigations into Corruption in the Police 
Force and another production titled Probe into Junk Choppers. But beyond 
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bringing into prominence an actress called Julia (Sebutinde), there have been no 
tangible lessons…735 
 
Similarly, political commentator and journalist Joachim Buwembo used the metaphor of 
theatre to describe commissions of inquiry in Uganda. Talking about the ―boring‖ inquiry 
into the closure of Commercial Banks, he observed: 
 If Minister (of Finance) Sendaula can‘t take his boring acts off the stage, the 
snoring from the audience might bring the theatre roof down. Why bother anyway? 
Everyone knows that commission of inquiry reports are never acted upon and are 
left to gather dust. The least the Ministers can do for the abused public is to select 
more interesting subjects for the commissions at least. Ssendaula has under him the 
Uganda Revenue Authority for example. Why can‘t he entertain the poor tax payers 
with that?
736
 
 
The play has various themes, actors and actresses, for example, Don Wanyama points out 
that Justice Sebutinde is the ―chief actress‖ in the play of ―good governance,‖ whose 
themes involve the key tenets of good governance discourse, such as judicial 
independence, media freedom, civic participation, electoral democracy and so on. The 
purpose of the play is to further legitimate the State as a ―good governor,‖ as a regime that 
is committed to accountability and transparency, judicial independence, media freedom 
and so on.   
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6.4.1 Showcasing judicial independence as part of the play of good governance 
 
 
Judicial commissions of inquiry provide a unique opportunity to exhibit judicial 
independence. When judges chair inquiries and become directly involved in investigating 
governmental wrong-doing as opposed to being mere arbiters in a civil or criminal case 
where the investigation has been done by other people, it transforms the inquiry into a 
highly symbolic exercise in horizontal accountability between the different arms of 
government.  
 
In chapter three I mentioned that a fairly independent judiciary has actively resisted 
executive power by delivering anti-government judgements, much to the annoyance of the 
regime. In the same way, independent judges have fearlessly held public officials to 
account through inquiries. In particular, Justice Sebutinde, who has chaired three inquiries 
into government corruption (Police, Uganda Revenue Authority, and Junk Helicopters) is 
regarded by the public as having played an important role in exposing corruption and 
bringing the government to account, starting with the Police inquiry.
737
  Casting her as 
chair of three out of four of the inquiries in this study was significant for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, it was the first inquiry to be chaired by a woman judge, at a time when 
Uganda had constitutionalised the principle of affirmative action in 1995 and was seeing a 
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rise in the number of women holding public office and showing off that it was ―gender 
sensitive‖ another common parlance in development discourse. For the first time, Lead 
Counsel for the inquiry was also a woman Maureen Owor, then a Senior State Attorney. 
On the other hand, Tripp has argued that the appointment of Sebutinde to head inquiries, 
with Owor as her female Lead Counsel, was in line with the thinking that women leaders 
were outside mainstream patronage networks and therefore capable of cleaning up 
excessively corrupt institutions. She quotes a Transparency International report of two 
studies (by the University of Maryland's IRIS Centre and the World Bank) that show that 
higher levels of female participation in public life are associated with lower levels of 
corruption worldwide.
738
  Popular columnist Charles Onyango Obbo, a Journalist and 
political commentator with two weekly columns in the Daily Monitor and The East 
African newspapers, also picked up on the significance of appointing a female judge to 
chair the Police inquiry: 
The master-stroke in the Sebutinde Commission is the choice to appoint a woman 
to chair it. It ensured the chair was unlikely to have chummy old boy links to the 
Police but a total outsider, who brings totally different values to the probe. If the 
chair had been a man, you would have a cover-up, complete with back-room deals 
being cut to soft-pedal on some of the boys. And because Sebutinde is well 
educated, cosmopolitan, holds the high office of Judge, and is beautiful, she has 
presented the male establishment with a force the boys simply don't know how to 
deal with.
739
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Sebutinde‘s no-nonsense approach to the conduct of the inquiry, unrelenting cross-
examination of witnesses and sometimes abrasive style of addressing witnesses captured 
the media‘s and indeed the entire public‘s attention. As observed by one commentator: 
The police had become an absolute nuisance and untouchable. People just thought 
it (the inquiry) was a waste of time. She just said, 'I don't care who you are. I am a 
judge and you will answer my questions.' People were amazed.
740
 
 
Sebutinde‘s candidness with senior government officials including Ministers, was a novel 
experience in a neo-patrimonial context where government officials, especially Ministers, 
are highly revered. As Obbo observed: 
Sebutinde, a petit, baby-faced combative judge, came to national fame two years 
ago when she chaired the probe into corruption in the Police force. Sebutinde 
literally ate police officers for breakfast, and since her report all the top cops she 
fingered have been disgraced and sent home. 
741
 
Her exploits were reported in the Christian Science Monitor, where she was described as 
―Uganda's answer to corruption: fiery 'Lady Justice.'742  She has been described by the 
media as ―Uganda‘s Probe Queen,‖ and ―the most feared judge in Uganda.‖743 In a news 
report about her appointment to the United Nations Special Court for Sierra Leone, she 
was described thus: 
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Sebutinde, a 50-year-old mother of two daughters, is one of the better known 
judges in Uganda especially for her role starting in the late 1990s as the 
government‘s judge of choice in the crusade against corruption…. She would 
subject those testifying before her to withering grilling; reminding them she was a 
judge whose questions had to be answered fully and truthfully. That abrasive style 
had many who were facing her squirm in their seats… Her tough as nails show got 
Ugandans riveted and shocked by some of the revelations of grand larceny that 
emerged from the probes. Sebutinde became a celebrity, with photo-journalists 
following her everywhere.
744
   
This allusion to Sebutinde‘s celebrity status reinforces the idea of commissions of inquiry 
as theatre or drama, and pop culture‘s preoccupation with celebrity actors and actresses. 
Indeed, members of the public who participated in both FGDs also had a high regard for 
Justice Sebutinde and credit her for her personal effort in holding officers accountable for 
corruption. When asked about their recollections of judicial inquiries, one participant said 
he could not clearly remember what the inquiries were about, but he had a keen memory 
of the Lady Justice: 
I remember Sebutinde, because she was a tough woman and she even made big 
men cry. (Clever J., FGD participant) 
I remember the police inquiry because of the vehement Chairperson Julie 
Sebutinde, and her conduct of the whole exercise was smart, professional and well 
informed. (Namono) 
I recall the inquiry into URA because of the chairperson Lady Justice Julia 
Ssebutinde. She is a high profile judge and she has a reputation for being tough, 
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and I actually recall that she was very tough on the people who appeared before the 
commission. I do not remember much else from that commission… (Sheila) 
 
I must admit that the Commission of inquiry into the URA stands out among them 
all. The personality of the Chairperson Lady Justice Julia Ssebutinde was one issue, 
her fiery take on issues and apparent miscarriage of the process of law cobbled 
together a feast for media houses. (Apio) 
 
It was the first time I heard about Justice Sebutinde and I was amazed at how she 
was able to get confessions from the officials, after they had pleaded innocent at 
first. (Filda) 
 
The police probe chaired by Justice Ssebutinde had a very admirable style, seeing a 
lady grill the likes of Chris Bakiza with bullish ease! (Nuwagaba) 
 
Thanks to Sebutinde‘s ―style,‖ to this day, public inquiries into corruption, be they judicial 
or parliamentary, capture the nation‘s attention in a manner that few other official 
proceedings do, making them a potent forum for accountability unknown prior to the 1999 
Police Inquiry.
745
 Thus, we can conclude that cross-examination of public officials by a 
Judge showcased ―good governance in action‖ with the theme of judicial independence.  
 
6.4.2 Show-casing media freedom through extensive reportage of inquiry proceedings 
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Inquiries provide an opportunity to exhibit that the media is free, through allowing 
extensive coverage and analysis of inquiry proceedings in the media. Media freedom is 
one of the tenets of good governance, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the ability to name and shame public officials in such extensively 
publicised proceedings was a new development in Ugandan public life. The freedom of 
journalists and others to criticise the government for its failures is also a relatively new 
and significant development. Hence judicial inquiries constitute or embody an intense 
democratic moment in Uganda, where the public, participating by watching, following and 
commenting on the inquiry; have been able to call public officials to account for their 
actions, to exercise their right to participate in government, as well as their right to 
freedom of expression and freedom of the media.  
 
In Chapter 3, we saw that the independent media has played a role in anti-corruption in 
Uganda, particularly in the creation of scandal and matters of public outcry that necessitate 
a Commission of Inquiry. In addition, the media plays a crucial role in relaying inquiry 
proceedings to the general public. It facilitates debate on the process, findings and 
recommendations of inquiries through radio call-in talk shows, letters to the editor, and 
articles by a number of columnists. In recent years, debate has also been facilitated by the 
introduction of on-line versions of newspapers, where the public can post comments on 
articles as well as chat rooms hosted by various media houses. All the leading newspapers 
and magazines in Uganda - the New Vision, The Daily Monitor, The Independent and The 
  
323 
 
Weekly Observer have online versions. The New Vision hosts a chat room called the 
discussion board where members of the public can discuss and debate political issues 
including corruption. The Weekly Observer, The Independent and The Daily Monitor have 
facilities for posting comments below news articles in addition to opinion pieces by 
respected political commentators such as Charles Onyango Obbo, Andrew Mwenda, 
Ibrahim Ssemujju Nganda and various others.  The introduction of web versions of 
newspapers has gone hand in hand with the introduction of easy to access archives of new 
articles going several years back. This explosion of information has had numerous 
implications for the significance of inquiries in Uganda‘s governance process.  
 
Firstly, beginning with the Sebutinde Police inquiry, the media greatly enhanced the 
―publicness‖ of inquiries, making them a national item of mass consumption. The 1999 
Police Inquiry was remarkable and memorable because it started a hitherto unprecedented 
interest in covering corruption-related matters by the Ugandan media. It marked a 
watershed because of the amount of media attention it commanded, with daily coverage 
every day for the entire length of the proceedings which went on for nearly a year. Thus 
begun a trend of sensational and headline-grabbing coverage of inquiry proceedings which 
continues to this day. Previous inquiries such as the 1986 one into human rights violations 
had been broadcast by the media, but at that time there was only one state owned 
television channel which broadcast only to Kampala and a few other major towns. There 
were only two major newspapers, one of which (The New Vision) was government owned 
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and the other, (The Weekly Topic) was privately owned. Similarly, the radio airwaves were 
completely dominated by the state-owned radio Uganda.  
 
This has ensured that inquiries serve as a forum for transparency and accountability where 
governmental wrong-doing is exposed and public officials are named and shamed. The 
existence of privately owned media enables the leaking of information to journalists, as 
happened with the helicopter inquiry report which the government refused to publish but 
which was then leaked to the privately owned Monitor newspaper. In addition, the media 
has enabled the creation of a public memory of inquiry proceedings and reports as 
journalists and members of the public continually refer to past inquiries to interpret current 
events. This has rendered futile the government‘s unwillingness to publish inquiry reports. 
 
As I discussed above, because of the chair, Justice Sebutinde, the Police Inquiry was able 
to capture the public‘s attention while others registered a mere bleep on the country‘s 
radar. A look at Appendix 1 shows that there were a good number of inquiries from the 
time the NRM took power in 1986 up until 1999 when the Police Inquiry was 
commissioned. The growth and expansion of the media can only partly explain why, 
beginning with the Police Inquiry, inquiries became a key item on the national agenda. 
Looking at the other inquiries appointed during this time, I opine that that there were two 
other factors that made a difference – firstly, the subject matter of inquiry; and second, 
Justice Sebutinde‘s approach to the inquiry. With regard to the subject matter, although 
the 1999 Police Inquiry was not the first into corruption and abuse of office under the 
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NRM government, it received a lot of media attention because of the nature of the 
institution – a nationwide institution with close links to the whole population, one that 
young and old, rural and urban, poor and elite could relate to.  Other inquiries that 
occurred during the same period were into particular state-run enterprises or Local 
Government Councils and therefore did not have as much national appeal as the Police 
Force.  The media turned the Police inquiry into a key item on the national agenda because 
it was of interest to the entire population of Uganda.  This was further enhanced by the 
fact that the inquiry conducted hearings in various towns all over the country and did not 
just limit itself to the capital, Kampala. 
 
The confrontational style of the Chairperson, Justice Sebutinde, to questioning witnesses, 
had the entire nation riveted to their seats, as I have demonstrated above. This ensured that 
the inquiries made headline news every day. In this way, the government was able to 
demonstrate not only that it could tolerate the public interrogation of senior officials, but 
also allow for the process to be widely reported by the media. As mentioned above, this 
strategy is not just for the local media, but also allows the international media to report on 
what is going on in Uganda and therefore show that taxpayers‘ money that goes into 
funding the aid industry is being well spent.   
 
6.4.3 The Ugandan public: spectators or co-producers? 
What is the role of the Ugandan public in this game or theatrical production? I suggest that 
they are not passive spectators, but participate in its reproduction by talking about it. We 
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saw above that as a part of and as a result of commissions of inquiry, there is a vibrant 
ongoing discourse about corruption in Uganda, a discourse which has been enabled and 
informed by the daily media coverage of inquiry proceedings over many years. This 
reiterates my previous argument that the process of the inquiry is more important than the 
outcome.  The proceedings are the most memorable part of the inquiry anyway, since not 
only are the recommendations not binding, but also because the formal reports are not 
usually published, and even if they were, are usually complicated and voluminous and not 
suited for mass consumption. As seen from the respondents‘ views, what is most 
memorable about inquiries is the cross-examination process, especially when it 
degenerates into name-calling and accusations of guilt as happened in the case of 
Sebutinde‘s examination of Minister Nsadhu in the police inquiry, and Justice Ogoola‘s 
exchange with Jim Muhwezi about statesmanship and patriotism. 
 
Ugandans‘ discussion about corruption arising from inquiries shows that they have been 
intentionally or unintentionally co-opted into the ―good-governance‖ discourse through 
the institution of commissions of inquiry. However, the vibrancy of the discourse, vis-a-
vis the fact it has not brought about any significant changes in anti-corruption, is a further 
reflection of the inherent contradictions of ―good governance,‖ revealed in its potential 
both to promote and to hinder anti-corruption. The discourse has promoted good 
governance by promoting awareness of bad governance and its effects, but corresponding 
impact regarding actually bringing about positive changes in  governance has not matched 
the rhetoric. Thus, the impact of good governance discourse in Uganda has been to 
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reproduce itself continually, from the PRSPs to the commissions of inquiry and thence to 
the media and popular culture, ultimately retaining and reinforcing the relationships of 
power that produce and perpetuate it.  
 
On the other hand, the participation of Ugandan citizens in this manner can be regarded in 
a more positive light, by contrasting it with periods in Uganda‘s history when it was 
unheard of for public officials to be publicly interrogated in such a manner. In this way it 
can also be regarded as the beginning or foundation of Ugandans‘ asserting their right to 
transparent and accountable government.  
 
6.5 Commissions of inquiry and the preservation of the patronage system  
 
Indeed, that inquiries merely reproduce and perpetuate the power relationships that give 
birth to them can be seen from the fact that the NRM government has used commissions 
of inquiry to consolidate its rule in Uganda. We saw in chapter five that following the 
Sebutinde inquiry, the Police Force underwent a major restructuring and reorganisation 
exercise which transformed its main role from one of keeping law and order to that of 
maintaining the NRM regime in power. We also saw that with regard to the URA inquiry, 
one of the most significant outcomes was the ascent of Mrs. Allen Kagina, who is from the 
President‘s ethnic group and even home village, to head the tax body. 
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Another important aspect of using inquiries as a power maintenance strategy it that they 
are used to obfuscate or delay concrete action against corruption, that is to say, 
prosecution. The government has been adept at deflecting the findings of inquiries through 
what I have named the ―vicious cycle of investigation,‖ that is, investigations that simply 
lead to other investigations with no closure. This is typified by the Global Fund Inquiry, 
which was itself based on investigations by PwC and the Auditor General, and is currently 
being re-investigated by the Criminal Investigations department with assistance from the 
UK SFO. As former Lead Counsel to the Global Fund Inquiry put it: 
Why are they spending so much time re-investigating? I would say there was 
sufficient evidence of fraud in most of the cases. There is no need to investigate 
each case thoroughly. It would be sufficient if culprits could be got on at least one 
offence; that would still be significant.  At this rate some of those implicated could 
leave the country because investigations have been very slow.
746
 
 
While it may be true that the government deliberately forestalls investigations in order to 
undermine anti-corruption, it is important to acknowledge the difficulty of compiling 
evidence that would be sufficient to discharge the burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that is required in a criminal case. As one of the respondents, formerly a staff of the 
Police Inquiry and now the head of one of the donor anti-corruption projects put it: 
The challenge facing COIs and anti-corruption in Uganda generally is the 
information deficit. The inadequate births and deaths registration, proper addresses, 
                                                 
746
 This statement, while valid, also points to the nature of legality, and the importance that it places on ―proof‖ or 
evidence; which can be difficult to marshal in corruption cases. Corruption in the circumstances of the Global Fund 
Inquiry was evidently a ―syndicate‖ crime, which makes discharging the burden of proof even more difficult, as those 
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national IDs etc makes it easy for people to hide assets and even to hide from the 
law if need be. For example, the Police Inquiry was greatly helped by witnesses 
who were everyday people, because the police closely interact with civil society 
and the corrupt wrongdoers could be pointed out. COIs are demanded for by donors 
because of their credibility. The justice system is weak and has many loop-holes… 
you are only as strong as your weakest link…747 
 
One of the State Attorneys working on Global Fund files put it thus:  
The cases are complex and keep expanding. Investigation may reveal various 
aspects and this is time consuming and worsens delays in getting the cases to court. 
Other challenges include the fact that witnesses are uncooperative. I do not know 
whether they are being intimidated or bought off, but they are unwilling to come 
and testify. They switch off their mobile phones. We might be forced to compel 
them to attend through arrest warrants.  
 
Former Lead Counsel to the Global Fund Inquiry also admitted the problem of proving 
corruption cases: 
Forensic investigations in this country are hampered by the lack of sufficient 
records. For example, in the DFCU global fund forex scandal, the firm involved 
would withdraw cash. This would have been very difficult to trace if there had not 
been an insider whistleblower who told us exactly what to look for. Due to the 
nature of record keeping, the fight against corruption still relies heavily on whistle 
blowers. This is why they need protection. 
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As pointed out by the respondents and discussed in chapter 3, there are many challenges to 
prosecuting corrupt officials in Uganda. Poor record keeping makes it difficult to establish 
the paper trail that would prove corruption. Lack of births and deaths registration allows 
for identity fraud that easily enables corrupt officials to escape justice. Proof from 
whistleblower witnesses may assist inquiry investigations but such witnesses may be 
unwilling to testify before a formal court hearing. They may face threats to their lives, 
family and property, due to the insufficient culture of rule of law as well as significant 
vestiges of authoritarian military rule that continue in Uganda. Thus, while it is true to a 
large extent that there has been no political will in prosecuting those implicated by 
inquiries, it is more complex than that because in many cases, there is indeed no sufficient 
evidence to uphold a criminal charge. 
 
In any case, the endless cycle of investigations promotes impunity and shows how the 
government uses commissions of inquiries as a political strategy for regime consolidation. 
Indeed, one could say that the government, aware that prosecution is unlikely to succeed, 
uses commissions of inquiry as a compromise between not doing anything at all, which 
would be bad for its image, or doing something that would still ensure the survival of its 
patronage system.  
 
The strategy appears to have worked to a certain extent, as shown by the fact that despite 
the many corruption scandals, a recent opinion poll by the Daily Monitor and the 
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Donor/NGO Deepening Democracy Programme showed that 68% of Ugandans are 
generally satisfied with the manner in which Museveni has led the country over the past 
24 years, even though they think he should retire as soon as possible.
748
 Similarly, a study 
by the Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda (ACCU) in their Fame and Shame book  
showed the same contradictory results, Museveni ―famed‖ by respondents for his role in 
anti-corruption policy but simultaneously ―shamed‖ by a number of them for reappointing 
censured Ministers and inaction against those implicated in corruption scandals.
749
  This 
kind of contradiction shows the NRM‘s cunning approach to anti-corruption policy and its 
ability to walk the tight rope of appearing to do something about corruption whilst 
ultimately doing nothing.  
 
The contradictions in anti-corruption, necessitated by the need to appear to be doing 
something whilst protecting the patronage system are also evident in people‘s attitudes 
towards people implicated in corruption scandals. For example, while Salim Saleh who 
was blamed for the junk helicopters scandal may be derided by some, he is still regarded 
by many as a hero and a man of the people. As reported in The New Vision when he was 
appointed to cabinet in 2006: 
It was matter of time for Gen. Caleb Akandwanaho aka Salim Saleh to join 
Cabinet… Although sometimes at the centre of scandals leading to inquiries, he has 
always sailed ashore. His non-bossy grassroots politics, in many cases posturing as 
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a pro-poor man and liberator has endeared him to the people and thus recruited 
supporters for the NRM. 
750
 
 
Even the Daily Monitor, a privately owned newspaper usually critical of the NRM, 
acknowledges Saleh‘s popularity, describing him as a ―generally likeable person known to 
be popular with the common man and the rank and file in the army.‖751 Charles Onyango 
Obbo, journalist, columnist and formerly a political commentator on Uganda‘s Capital 
Gang Radio Talk Show hosted by 91.3 Capital FM, also castigates Saleh for his role in 
corruption scandals, whilst simultaneously acknowledging his likeability and 
popularity.
752
 Thus, Saleh‘s complex hero-villain personae is the epitome of the 
contradictions of anti-corruption policy in Uganda.. 
 
Even Jim Muhwezi, who was Minister for health at the time of the global fund scandal is 
highly regarded, especially by his constituents in Rujumbura County for which he has 
been MP since 1996. During the Global Fund Inquiry proceedings, the Uganda Herbalists 
and Traditional Healers Association issued a press statement in his defence, saying he had 
done a lot for the country and should be treated fairly.
753
 When he was arrested in 2007 for 
his involvement in the misappropriation of GAVI funds, his constituents sent a delegation 
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752 Onyango-Obbo, C. (1998). ―Vacancy; Only Thieves Need Apply.‖ The Monitor. Kampala, Monitor Publications 
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of elders to see the President at State House so as to plead for his release. One of the 
respondents to this study is a member of the constituency and put it thus: 
Jim is well liked and highly respected because he cares for his people. He attends 
our funerals, has built us a school and contributes to all our fundraising efforts. 
 
It was reported in the news that when Muhwezi recently announced that he was going to 
quit politics in 2011, some of his constituents shed tears and he reassured them saying ―I 
know you like me very much for what I have done for you… but I will not keep very far 
from you even if I am not an MP.‖754  Muhwezi has since reneged on his statement  and 
was re-elected this year. The incident illustrates the point that the government can risk 
airing its dirty linen in public through an inquiry, because it has a limited, if any,  impact 
on the support and loyalty of the rural voters who are the majority. We saw in chapter 3 
that corruption is accountability, because a significant portion of stolen funds is spent on 
extending personal generosity to individuals or the community. These acts of personal 
generosity legitimate corruption and enable Salim Saleh and Jim Muhwezi to be positively 
regarded by their constituents and to escape being prosecuted despite being implicated in 
corruption by inquiries. Thus, commissions of inquiry play a crucial role in the symbolic 
approach to anti-corruption that preserves the patronage system.   
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The analysis so far reveals that the NRM regime is the winner in the political 
game/strategy of symbolic anti-corruption.  However, it is important to emphasise some of 
the positive factors that emerge from the study. Despite the prognosis,  the findings can be 
interpreted to emphasise that commissions of inquiry have sown the seeds for more 
democratic and accountable governance in Uganda.  
 
6.6 Commissions of inquiry, accountability and resistance 
The discussion so far paints  a negative picture of anti-corruption and governance in 
Uganda, and risks falling into the trap of ―afro-pessimism.‖  Despite the fact that the NRM 
is the apparent winner in the political games that are being played, there are spaces within 
the political space for resistance and the struggle for more accountable governance in 
Uganda. Indeed, one of the short-comings of the neo-patrimonial theory that I have used to 
explain why the Uganda government subverts anti-corruption, is that does not adequately 
account for the portion of the population that is not strongly linked to the patronage and 
clientelistic networks.  These include the professional elite, especially journalists, lawyers, 
judges, academics and many other professionals in various disciplines who are employed 
in the private sector, particularly banking and telecommunications that have greatly 
expanded with the advent of neo-liberal economic policies. It also includes a small corps 
of professional ―development workers‖ employed in the NGO sector, who have taken up 
the mandate of ―civil society‖ to criticise the government and lobby and advocate for 
better governance. Even more numerically and politically significant are the young people 
who have benefitted from Universal Primary Education, have been unable to complete 
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their education, and are mostly unemployed or self-employed in the informal sector in 
urban areas as Taxi and boda-boda drivers and conductors, hair-dressers or petty traders 
who constituted one of my FGDs. Many members of these groups are not directly 
beholden to the ruling elite and are becoming more politically astute and aware, and 
therefore able to directly and indirectly resist and oppose ―bad governance.‖  Indeed,  
Mwenda observes that: 
Our country enjoys a rare paradox. On one hand, (the) President seems to have 
centralized and personalized power at State House. Nothing of significance 
happens in this country without the president‘s personal involvement. Yet on the 
other hand, power is also distributed among diffuse fragments of our political 
structure.
755
 
 
While Erdmann, one of the proponents of neo-patrimonial theory, acknowledges that neo-
patrimonial power ―does not take exclusive control over the legal-rational logic‖ he does 
not elaborate on how legal rational logic survives under the sway of neo-patrimonial 
forces. I suggest that the good governance agenda has played a significant role in ―path-
breaking,‖ by providing spaces for legal-rationality to carry the day on some occasions. It 
is because of the good governance agenda that there is a relatively free media and 
academy, a fairly independent judiciary, a growing body of un-co-opted professional 
elites, semi-literate urban dwellers employed in the informal sector and similar groups 
who can and do demand transparency and accountability from the government.  
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Hence I propose that when viewed within the larger political, economic and social context, 
Commissions of Inquiry constitute or embody an intense democratic moment in Uganda, 
where the public, participating passively by watching, following and commenting on the 
inquiry; and actively through the judge chairing the inquiry, are able to call public officials 
to account for their actions, to exercise their right to participate in government, as well as 
their right to freedom of expression and freedom of the media. The phenomenon of 
commissions of inquiry as democratic moments therefore enables us to view them not just 
as cunning political strategies for regime consolidation; but as sites for resistance that have 
played a key role in the struggle for democracy, accountability and the rule of law in 
Uganda. This is especially pertinent when we recall from chapter 4, that the enduring 
popularity of commissions of inquiry is, in part, due to their ability to serve as a form of 
―truth as justice.‖756  It has also been emphasised that the ability to name and shame public 
officials in such extensively publicised proceedings was a new phenomenon in Ugandan 
public life and therefore a significant development.   
 
Commissions of inquiry have provided confirmation of corruption in the regime, which 
has left a stain on the NRM‘s legacy and proved to be a rallying point for those opposed to 
it. Indeed, in the 2006 and 2001 elections, many of the Opposition Candidates‘ Manifestos 
cited the corruption of the NRM as one of the main reasons why they should be voted out 
of power. The Uganda People‘s Congress Party Manifesto of 2006 says: 
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Under the NRM, Uganda has been consistently ranked among the 15 most corrupt 
countries out of a total of 145 worldwide, scoring less than 3 out of possible 10 
points under the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by the renowned Transparency 
International. In Uganda today, corruption is a cause of frustration to potential 
investors; obstacle to sustainable development and economic growth; a cause of 
loss of public funds needed to provide social services such as education and health 
etc. and an additional cost for doing business. Some reports of the numerous 
commissions of inquiry into cases of corruption have not been published, and the 
recommendations of those that have been published have either not been acted 
upon or have been used to victimise certain individuals.
757
 
 
In the same vein, the following excerpts from Dr. Besigye‘s Manifesto further illustrate 
the centrality of corruption to resistance efforts: 
For 25 years under the current Government hope has been lost and the challenges 
we face are immense. Our public sector is overwhelmed by misuse of public 
resources, our social fabric is shattered. The political system and politicians have 
all betrayed the people and the cause they intended to serve.... For 25 years public 
funds have stolen by some leaders of NRM. The government has nurtured 
corruption as a way of life in Uganda. It has now reached alarming levels in the 
public sector and yet those who steal public funds are unpunished and even 
promoted.
758
 
 
Similarly,  the Democratic Party Manifesto appears to take cognisance of the public‘s 
disillusionment with the result of Commissions of Inquiry by promising: 
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We will undertake legal reform to ensure that any public official charged of 
corruption is immediately relieved of their responsibilities and interdicted till the 
case is fully determined and once convicted dismissed and assets sold to recover 
public funds.
759
 
 
Aside from opposition politics, elements of popular resistance can also be gleaned from 
the songs and plays that decry corruption by various Ugandan artists, already discussed in 
Chapter 3. Furthermore, Ugandans who criticise the regime for its anti-corruption failure, 
writing about various aspects of corruption on their blogs or on facebook are ―cyber-
dissidents‖ engaging in resistance.760 Inquiries have provided the confirmation – the facts, 
that the regime is corrupt.   
 
We can see therefore that inquiries, even though intended by the government as a regime 
consolidation tool, have turned into subversive instruments by enabling anti-corruption 
discourse that encapsulates resistance towards the regime. The NRM may have instituted 
them for politically symbolic reasons hoping to temporarily assuage public disquiet, but 
the strategy has not worked in the long term.  The failure to implement inquiry 
recommendations by failing to prosecute the culprits has itself become a core factor in 
delegitimizing the regime and has become a rallying point for the opposition and its 
sympathisers.  Accordingly, even though there has been limited success with criminal 
prosecutions for corruption, the highly publicised process of inquiry has been one of the 
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ways through which norms and practices that encourage corruption are challenged and 
devalued, hence allowing the internalisation of anti-corruption norms and values.  
Inquiries as sites for resistance has been made possible not so much by inquiry reports, 
which are not widely disseminated, as by the highly publicised process of cross-examining 
public officials involved in corruption. Justice Sebutinde‘s ―withering‖ and ―abrasive‖ 
style, admired by some and reviled by others, is the essence by which the Ugandan public 
expresses its disapproval of corrupt and unaccountable government.  
 
 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
 
Commissions of inquiry in Uganda have played a complex and multi-faceted role. They 
have been used to legitimate the NRM government as a ―good governor‖ within the 
context of international development discourse. On the domestic scene, they have 
legitimated the NRM as a government that is tolerant of criticism, and therefore different 
from past tyrannical regimes. Nevertheless, they have also served as sites for the people, 
acting through the media and the judiciary, to express resistance towards corrupt and 
unaccountable leadership.  
 
7.1 Commissions of inquiry: multifaceted tools of governance 
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In chapter two, it was argued that global anti-corruption policy, despite its high sounding 
ideals, falls short of its stated aims mainly due to the failure to enforce good governance 
conditionality. The proliferation of inquiries into corruption in Uganda from the late 1990s 
to the present is part of Uganda‘s on-going democratic transition and the manifestation 
and result of the implementation of good governance in Uganda during this period. From 
the mid 1990s, revelations of grand corruption in Uganda‘s privatisation process 
threatened to undo its rosy international image as a post-conflict economic recovery 
success story.  Commissions of inquiry then came on to the scene as a political strategy, 
not only to deflect attention away from this embarrassing issue, but also as a way of 
showing off the NRM‘s democratic credentials in a situation where the continued ban on 
political party activity was raising eyebrows amongst the donor community.  Commissions 
of inquiry were an ideal way to do this because they encapsulate the ideals of good 
governance - judicial independence, participation, transparency and accountability - in one 
process and institution. 
 
Although donors have since expressed dissatisfaction with the failure to implement the 
recommendations of commissions of inquiry, it would be naive to assume that they 
expected a more successful outcome than that which has come to pass. After all, we saw in 
chapter two that they have other interests to protect, particularly, geo-strategic alliances in 
the war against terror. Despite rhetoric about cutting aid due to failure to implement the 
recommendations of inquiries, it is possible to speculate that the Uganda government still 
receives significant amounts of aid, especially from the US government, because of its 
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role in Somalia, where it is keeping the peace and fighting on behalf of the USA. When 
one considers the fact that defence accounts remain outside the jurisdiction of anti-
corruption agencies such as the Auditor General, then the speculation that the threat to cut 
aid is mere rhetoric becomes more pertinent. Thus, as a symbolic response to anti-
corruption,  inquiries flow from this contradiction in international anti-corruption policy. 
 
In chapter three, we saw that the contradictions in global anti-corruption spill over onto 
the domestic scene, where the government of Uganda has mastered the art of ―being a 
good governor without undermining its support base.‖ Uganda‘s local power base is based 
on a system of patronage and clientelism, a cheap and convenient way of harnessing 
ethnically fragmented constituencies. Through this system, the majority of the elite have 
been co-opted into the regime and are co-conspirators in the execution or cover up of 
corrupt deals. In this way, the government has been able to able to maintain an anti-
corruption framework which is ―near perfect‖ and yet undermine in it in so many ways as 
to render it impotent. 
 
The government justifies inquiries as an attempt to bridge the gap between anti-corruption 
policy and practice, ―particularly where the situation is not amenable to conventional 
methods of audit and investigation.‖ However, when the recommendations to prosecute 
the culprits are not implemented, inquiries then turn out to be a mere extension of the 
strategy of having a ―near perfect‖ institution, which is nevertheless impotent to deal with 
corruption. I suggest that the government was able to pursue this glaringly hypocritical 
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strategy because it was confident of its domestic support base, where most of the elites are 
directly or indirectly co-opted into the patronage system and civil society is weak and 
disorganised. Dissenting voices such as those of respondents to this study constitute an 
electorally insignificant minority. The insignificance of anti-corruption is revealed in the 
fact that key figures in corruption scandals such as Gen. Salim Saleh and Brig. Jim 
Muhwezi have retained their political positions and have never been punished. Because 
―corruption is the glue that holds the coalition together‖ and enforcement would be 
inimical to regime survival, commissions of inquiry prove to be an ideal solution to the 
dilemma of being a good governor and a powerful patron.  
 
Commissions of inquiry are the ideal mechanism to bridge the gap between anti-
corruption rhetoric and practice because of their institutional structure. In Chapter 4 we 
saw that as quasi-judicial bodies that utilise a public inquisitorial process to establish facts 
and make non-binding recommendations, they  have for a long time, been attractive to 
governments all over the world as tools of legitimation following crises in governance. 
The public too, is enamoured by them because they are able to participate actively in a 
process of accountability where the State is put on trial. I looked at various theories that 
have emerged regarding the role of inquiries, and agreed with the most recent scholarship 
which casts inquiries as devices for political legitimation. In Uganda, an aid-dependent 
developing country, the qualities of commissions of inquiry render them an ideal 
legitimation tool which can showcase good governance without compromising its 
corruption-reliant support base. 
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Hence in chapter five, we saw how the Uganda government used four commissions of 
inquiry, appointed between 1999-2005, to show off that it was a ―good governor.‖ This 
was done mainly through the ensuing show of public accountability, democratic practice, 
judicial independence and media freedom that went hand-in-hand with these commissions 
of inquiry. The police inquiry was pertinent because it redefined commissions of inquiry 
from mundane governmental processes in which few people were interested, into national 
items of mass consumption via the news media, thanks mainly to Justice Sebutinde‘s no-
nonsense approach to cross examining public officials.  
 
In chapter five, we saw that most of the respondents regard inquiries as useless public 
relation stunts. Yet, this view appears simplistic when one takes other factors into 
consideration. Accordingly, I suggested that the unstated political purpose of inquiries is 
to legitimate the NRM government as a ―good governor,‖ that tolerates public criticism 
and allows for an independent judiciary and a free media. However, the government‘s 
winning strategy is being able to do this and whilst ensuring that key members of its 
patronage power structure will not face successful prosecution as the result of the findings 
of a commission of inquiry. In ensuring this, it may rely on underhand methods such as the 
―vicious cycle of investigation,‖  greatly aided by the lack of evidence to prove a criminal 
case of corruption beyond a reasonable doubt. This shows how the law and legal 
institutions can be easily manipulated to suit the needs of the rulers.  
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The fact that there have been very few successful prosecutions as a result of the findings 
of commissions of inquiry shows how they have played a role in reproducing and 
maintaining the global and local power relationships in which they are birthed.  They 
reproduce the discourse and practice of good governance in a manner that reflects its 
hypocrisy, inconsistencies and double standards. Yet, one cannot completely write off the 
good governance project, which has succeeded in an oblique way by creating spaces and 
opportunities that the Uganda people have and are utilising to participate in democracy 
and engage in resistance to corrupt and unaccountable government. 
 
7.2 “Going out of style” – the end of the commissions of inquiry era? 
Commissions of inquiry were a “style.” They had become very popular because 
they are useful for reducing political discontent on certain issues. However, they 
are going out of style now because the public is becoming disillusioned with 
them.
761
  
 
From the 2005 inquiry into the mismanagement of the global fund, it has taken a while for 
the government of Uganda to appoint a commission of inquiry into corruption. The recent 
appointment of a Commission of Inquiry into the mismanagement of Universal Primary 
and Secondary Education Funds chaired by Justice Ezekiel Muhanguzi breaks a long spell. 
This is a definite change from the previous years, where inquiries were the order of the 
day and there was always one going on; beginning with the Police Inquiry (1999), the 
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Junk Helicopters Inquiry(2000), the inquiry into the Closure of Commercial Banks (2001) 
the URA Inquiry (2002), the Inquiry into UPDF activities in the Congo(2003) and lastly, 
the Global Fund Inquiry(2005). Whether or not the newly appointed inquiry will have a 
similar impact to previous ones remains to be seen. 
 
During the dry spell, the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament (PAC) has filled the 
gap as the institution that has taken the place of commissions of inquiry as the forum 
where corruption in government is exposed, and where public officials are held 
accountable for their actions. This is definitely worth further research. It could be argued 
that the government would prefer that its dirty linen be aired by the PAC than by a 
commission of inquiry because of several reasons. Firstly, the NRM ruling party can 
exercise greater control over PAC proceedings and reports  because of their parliamentary 
majority . Indeed, the NRM used this majority to stifle accountability in the National 
Social Security Fund (NSSF) Temangalo scandal, where the PAC report was altered to 
exonerate Security Minister and close confidant of President Museveni, Amama Mbabazi. 
The NRM tried but failed to use the same tactic in the CHOGM matter. Such underhand 
tactics would be more difficult to implement with an independent judicial inquiry chaired 
by a judge. Secondly, PAC, as a Standing Committee of Parliament, generally lacks the 
status and significance that an ad hoc commission of inquiry would command. Judges in 
Uganda are respected by both the public and politicians - for example, no politician called 
to appear before a judicial inquiry has ever failed to make an appearance, whereas a 
number of ministers have openly defied summons to appear before PAC and have made 
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derogatory statements about the status, integrity and qualifications of the PAC 
members.
762
   
 
What does the lapse in the appointment of the judicial inquiries signify? It is my opinion 
that since it is apparent that the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee has taken over 
the role previously played by inquiries, we can infer that the latter were used to fill in the 
accountability gap during the pre-2006 ―Movement‖ era before the return of multi-party 
politics to Uganda. With the return of multi-party politics, the Opposition in Parliament is 
supposed to be able to provide some horizontal accountability to the executive, thereby 
lessening the need for it to be done on an ad hoc basis by the judiciary. Indeed, corruption 
revelations continue to come out of the Auditor General‘s reports and the  PAC. The latest 
such revelations concern the misuse of funds and abuse of procurement procedure by 
various Ministries and Departments for the Commonwealth Heads of State and 
Government Meeting (CHOGM) which Uganda hosted in late 2007. Many top 
government officials including President Museveni himself, Vice President Gilbert 
Bukenya, Foreign Affairs Minister Sam Kutesa and others were implicated in influence 
peddling. The government attempted to use its parliamentary majority to suppress the 
report, but these attempts were unsuccessful largely because the Head of PAC is a member 
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 See for example, Minister for Tourism Sarapio Rukundo who was quoted as saying: ―These PAC members are just 
funny. Really, what wrong did I do? I am not like these beginners who have not worked anywhere. I have a great 
reputation and these people want to spoil my name just like that;‖ in  David Tash Lumu and Stephen Kibuuka, 
―Kutesa to sue over CHOGM report,‖ The Observer, Sunday 09 May 2010.  Also recall that even President Museveni 
has testified before the Junk Helicopters inquiry, but has never graced the PAC with his presence. 
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of the opposition. Indeed, PAC members of the NRM declined to sign the report.
763
 In any 
case, the government has not taken any steps to hold those who were implicated 
accountable; as neither criminal nor disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against 
any of the officers who were implicated. 
 
The government‘s inaction over CHOGM has sparked the donors into enforcing 
conditionality, with donors announcing that they were withholding 80 billion Uganda 
shillings out of a total of 360 billion of planned joint budget support for the 2010-11 
financial year in protest against the lack of concrete government action in respect of the 
CHOGM report. 
764
 To many Ugandans, these actions by the donors are ―too little, too 
late‖ as these same donors have for many years turned a blind eye to rampant corruption 
by the NRM government. Moreover, donor funding to the Uganda Government‘s budget 
has been steadily decreasing over the years, from over 50% in the late 1990s to about 30% 
at present. The decrease in donor funding is not necessarily because Uganda is becoming 
more self-sufficient, but because it has found alternative sources of funding such as China, 
whose aid has no conditions attached. This may provide an alternative explanation for the 
apparent decline in accountability implied by the non-appointment of commissions of 
inquiry over the past few years and is also an area that is worth further research.
765
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 Anonymous Reporter ―Tension as NRM succeeds to block CHOGM report presentation, the Daily Monitor, May 
11, 2010. See also Musoke, Cyprian, CHOGM report not on agenda – Kadaga, The New Vision Monday 17th May 
2010.  It would appear that the report was leaked to the media even before it was tabled before Parliament.  
764
 Mugerwa, Yassin, ―Donors want CHOGM officials punished,‖ The Daily Monitor 9 May 2010 
765
 See, Guloba, M., N. Kilimani and W. Nabiddo (2010) The Impact of China-Africa Aid Relations: The Case of 
Uganda,  Nairobi: Africa Economic Research Consortium, available at  http://www.aercafrica.org/documents/china-
africa-policybriefs/UgandaPB10.pdf  See also, ―China gives Uganda $77 million aid to boos development,‖ Xinhua 
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In any case, the threats to cut aid as well as the cuts themselves have had no impact 
whatsoever, as no one has been arrested in respect of CHOGM to-date.
766
 It is also 
plausible that the government is no longer eager to show off its democraticness to the 
donors because of the fact that Uganda is on the verge of becoming an oil exporting 
country and will no longer be dependent on foreign aid. Significant reserves of oil have 
been known to exist in the Western Rift Valley area of Uganda since colonial days, but it 
is only in the past decade that drilling has begun and it is hoped that exportation will begin 
in the next couple of years.  When this happens, the Uganda government will presumably, 
no longer be beholden to the donors. This does not bode well for accountability and 
transparency, but only time will tell. 
 
To sum up, I would say that despite the limitations that have arisen from the failure to 
implement their recommendations, commissions of inquiry have constituted significant 
moments in the history of Uganda.  They have constituted ―good governance in action,‖ 
not only by holding government officials to account in a public forum, a completely new 
phenomenon in Uganda‘s post-independence history, but also by exhibiting judicial 
                                                                                                                                                               
News Agency, 14 January 2009, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/14/content_10653285.htm, last 
accessed 11 April 2011. 
766
 Mubatsi Asinja Habati (2010) ―Hitting Them Where it Hurts?‖  The Independent, 25 August 2010. Ugandans‘ 
disillusionment with donors can be seen in comments made below a newspaper article on this story of aid cuts, where 
one comment said: ―Donors just speak to show they are tough. Even after a stolen election victory they will just 
endorse the "winner" as long as s/he can guarantee their own interests. Ugandans should not wait for donors for fight 
our own war against government corruption. We should rise against thieves and make their lives hell.‖ See Comments 
below Kibuuka Stephen and Richard M. Kavuma, ―Angry Donors Threaten Aid Cut,‖ The Observer, 3 March 2010, 
at http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7517&Itemid=59, last accessed 28 
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independence, media freedom and public participation, however contrived it may have 
seemed.  Most important of all, they have provided confirmation of the corruption of the 
current regime, which in turn has enabled them to act as sites for resistance in the struggle 
for more accountable government in Uganda.  
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Appendix  
 
Commissions of Inquiry in Uganda (1962- present) 
 
YEAR SUBJECT/ TERMS OF REFERENCE CHAIR 
 
1962 To review the boundary between the Districts of 
Bugisu and Bukedi and to make such 
recommendations for its adjustment as may appear to 
the Commission to be desirable on political and 
administrative grounds 
Kennedy O‘Connor 
1962 To inquire into and report to the Governor on the F.G. Sembeguya 
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underlying reasons for the recent disturbances 
amongst the Baamba and Bakonjo people of Toro 
District and to make recommendations in light of their 
investigations 
1968 To inquire into the allegations of the breach of the 
constitution of the Uganda Labour Congress by the 
Executive Board, the bad management and financial 
affairs of the Congress generally 
Godfrey Lukongwa 
Binaisa, Q.C. 
1970 To inquire into all aspects of the disappearance and 
reappearance of Mr. Brian Alistair Lea, First 
Secretary in the British High Commission (believed 
to have been kidnapped by persons unknown) 
Mr. Justice Robert 
Ernest Gordon 
Russell 
1971 To inquire into the management, workings and 
financial condition and all aspects of trading activities 
of the National Trading Corporation  
Mr. Justice Y.V. 
Phadke 
1971 To inquire into the management, workings and 
financial condition of the Coffee Marketing Boards 
and the Coffee Industry generally in Uganda 
Mr. Justice E.E. 
Youds 
1971 To inquire allegations of corruption in all its aspects 
by any person notified by the Commissioners to be a 
person possessing property which he is believed to 
have acquired by corrupt means or which he obtained 
from or is holding for or on behalf of or for the 
benefit of a person who acquired it by corrupt means 
in the discharge of the public affairs or business of the 
Government  
Mr. G.B. Slade 
1971 To inquire into the constitution, management and 
objects of the General Service Department  
Mr. Justice P. 
Saldanha 
1971 To inquire into all aspects of the disappearance of Mr. 
Nicholas Stroth (freelance journalist) and Mr. Robert 
Siedle (university lecturer), both American citizens  
Mr. Justice David 
Jeffreys Jones 
1971 To inquire into the various complaints and allegations 
made by the employees and workers of Kampala City 
Council regarding the conduct, administration and 
management of that Council by its officers 
Mr. Peter Austin 
Philip Jermyn Allen, 
Chief Magistrate 
1971 To inquire into all matters pertaining to land owned, 
possessed, acquired or otherwise held by the Church 
of Uganda or any diocese thereof  
Mr. Justice Saldanha 
1972 To inquire into the management and workings of and 
the services and facilities provided to the public by 
Mulago Hospital Kampala 
Hon. Justice John 
William Mead 
1973 To inquire into all matters pertaining to the 
assessment of compensation on the Bukoloto-Njeru 
Mr. E.K. Mutyabule 
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Road 
1974 To inquire into allegations of missing persons in 
Uganda  
Mr. Justice 
Mohamed Saied 
1974 To inquire into all matters pertaining to the 
assessment of compensation arising from the 
construction of Bukoloote-Njeru Road, Kayunga-
Nabuganyi Road and Kayunga-Bbaale Road 
Mr. E.K. Mutyabule 
1975 To inquire into all matters pertaining to the 
management, development, working conditions, 
finances and all aspects of business activities of the 
Uganda Transport Corporation.  
Col. Isaac 
Maliyamungu 
1975 To inquire into all matters pertaining to the 
management of Kilembe Mines Ltd 
Dr. Adriko 
1975 To inquire into all matters pertaining to the 
management, finance, development, and all other 
aspects of business activities of Uganda Airlines 
Hon . A. Oboth-
Ofumbi 
1976 To inquire into all matters pertaining to the 
management and administration of medical services 
and facilities in Uganda 
Col. Ibrahim 
1976 To inquire into all matters pertaining to Makerere 
University 
Professor B.W. 
Langlands 
1977 To inquire into the disappearance of the Twin Otter 
Plane (Type D.H.C. 6/200) Registration No. 5x-UVL 
, which occurred on Sunday 1 January 1977 
Hon. 
H.K.M.Kyemba 
1977 To inquire into the circumstances surrounding the 
aviation incident involving the crash of Bell 
Helicopter 212, Registration No. 5X-UWF 
Lieutenant-Colonel 
C. Gore 
1978 To inquire into all matters pertaining to the 
management, finance and all other aspects of business 
of Uganda Airlines Corporation 
Eng. Eric Adriko 
1980 To inquire into all matters pertaining to the 
management and operations of Uganda Hotels Ltd, 
including allegations of nepotism, terms of service of 
staff and directors, accounting systems etc 
Mr. Tamale Ssali 
1980 To inquire into all matters pertaining to the 
management and administration of the National 
Council of Sports 
Mr. Luutu Mukasa 
1980 To inquire into the circumstances surrounding and 
leading to the incident at Kibuli Village which 
resulted into the killing of a number of persons 
including a Tanzanian Security Officer, on 16
th
 and 
17
th
 days of March 1980 
Mr. Justice D.K. 
Lubogo 
1981 To inquire into all matters pertaining to the handling Hon. David 
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of donations towards the President‘s Liberation War 
Veterans, Widows and Orphans Charity Fund 
including allegations of misappropriations and 
embezzlement 
Kanyeihamba 
1983 To inquire into all matters appertaining to the 
financial management of Kampala City Council 
including allegations of corruption in the purchase 
and utilisation of supplies and equipment, as well as 
allegations of embezzlement on the Council‘s funds 
by staff 
Hon.  G.S. Kasajja-
Byakika, M.P. 
1986 To inquire into the cause and all circumstances 
surrounding the escape of 27 remand prisoners from 
the Murchison Bay Prison, Luzira on the night of 27
th
 
February 1986 
Mr. Justice Matthew 
Opu 
1986 To inquire into all allegations of corruption and 
financial mismanagement in all aspects, in 
government departments, and other public bodies 
Mr. Besweri K.L. 
Mulondo 
1986 To inquire into all aspects of violation of human 
rights, breaches of the rule of law and excessive 
abuses of power committed against persons in 
Uganda by the regimes in government during the 
period from 9 October 1962 to 25 January 1986 
Justice Arthur Oder 
1986 To investigate and inquire into the present system of 
local administration with a view to improving and 
reforming the Local Administrations system 
Prof. Mahmood 
Mamdani 
1987 To review, examine and inquire into the present 
health system and policy in Uganda including the 
public, private and traditional systems 
Prof. Raphael Owor 
1987 To inquire into all matters pertaining to the financial 
management of Rutembe and Rushororo Water 
Supply Project , the repair of Ishaka-Katunguru Road 
Project and the Tea Factories Project at Kyenjojo, 
Mityana and Buhweju including allegations of 
mismanagement and corrupt practices therein 
Mr. Onegi-Obel 
1987 To inquire into all the setting up, management and 
working of government ranches with a view to 
effecting reforms and improving efficiency thereof 
Prof. Mugerwa, 
Faculty of 
Agriculture 
1988 To inquire into all the problems, complaints and 
allegations of corruption, misappropriation, coercion, 
embezzlement and general mismanagement of 
finances, property and staff of Uganda Tourist 
Development Corporation 
Mr. Henry Muganwa 
Kajura 
1989 To inquire into complaints and allegations of Mr. David Nyende,  
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corruption, mismanagement and abuse of office in 
Uganda Police Force 
1991 To inquire into the Makerere University Incident of 
10
th
 December 1990 that resulted into the death or 
injury of certain persons at the University Camous  
and the conduct of the Police with regard to shooting 
and other acts carried out by the Police on that 
occasion 
Jon. Mr. Justice Platt 
1991 To inquire into all matters pertaining to the financial 
management of the East African Steel Corporation 
and in particular, allegations of widespread 
embezzlement of funds 
Mr. Peter Jemba-
Kaggwa 
1992 To inquire into all matters pertaining to the proper 
functioning of the Uganda Posts and 
Telecommunications Corporation and in particular, 
allegations of corruption, malpractice and 
racketeering by the management 
Mr. Justice Egonda-
Ntende 
1993 To inquire into the allegations of mismanagement on 
the investigation, prosecution and trial or criminal 
cases by the Criminal Investigations Department of 
the Police Force, the Director of Public Prosecutions 
and the Courts of law 
Justice D.C. Porter 
1994 To inquire into all matters pertaining to the proper 
administration and functioning of the Judiciary 
including court fee, case management, rules of 
procedure, cash bail funds and staffing and training 
needs of the Judiciary 
Justice Harold Platt 
1995 To inquire into complaints and allegations of 
anomalies and corruption in the allocation of plots in 
Mbarara Municipal Council 
Mr. Amos 
Twinomujuni 
1996 To inquire into the allegation of suspected frauds in 
Graduated Tax Administration in Mbarara District 
Justice Kibuuka 
Musoke 
1996 To inquire into complaints and allegations of 
misappropriation and misapplication of monies 
intended for the provision of services in Tororo and 
Pallisa Districts 
Justice Musoke - 
Kibuuka 
1998 To inquire into allegations of impropriety concerning 
the privatisation of Uganda Commercial bank 
Justice James 
Ogoola 
1999 To generally investigate allegations of corruption 
within the Police force and where necessary, make 
recommendations for the purpose of improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the Police Force 
Justice Julia 
Sebutinde 
1999 To examine the primary causes of the failure and Justice James 
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subsequent closure of the International Credit Bank, 
the Greenland Bank and the Cooperative Bank 
Ogoola 
2000 To inquire into all the circumstances pertaining to the 
procurement, purchase, acceptance, delivery and 
payment for MI-24 helicopters for the army 
Justice Julia 
Sebutinde 
2001 To review the Constitution of 1995 Prof Frederick 
Sempebwa 
2001 To inquire into Allegations of Illegal Exploitation of 
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
Justice David Porter 
2001 To inquire into leasing of the Constitution Square by 
Kampala City Council to a Private Company 
Lt. Col. Chris 
Mudoola 
2002 To inquire into Allegations of Corruption in Uganda 
Revenue Authority 
Justice Julia 
Sebutinde 
2005 To inquire into the matters pertaining to the proposal 
for creation of a New District from Tororo County  
Professor Foster 
Byarugaba 
2005 To investigate the direct and indirect causes of the 
collision between the Uganda Railways Corporation 
vessels, MV Kabalega and MV Kaawa on Lake 
Victoria which took place on 8
th
 May 2005 
Mr. Bart Katureebe 
2005 To inquire into Allegations of Mismanagement of the 
Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
Justice James 
Ogoola 
2005         To inquire into the sale, lease and purchase of land in 
Kampala City by the City Authorities Notice 2005 
Prof James Katorobo 
2006 To inquire into the land issue of Bunyoro region and 
the inter-tribal relationship of the communities living 
there 
Dr. Ruth Mukama 
2007 To inquire into allegations of Financial and 
Administrative Irregularities in Kampala Central 
Division 
Ms Irene Ovonji-
Odida 
2008 To inquire into Serulanda/Ssesamirembe Free Trade 
Zone Activities 
 
2008 To inquire into the Management of the Public Affairs 
of Makindye and Kawempe City Division Councils 
and Mbarara Municipal Council 
Mr. Jacob Oulanyah 
2010 To inquire into the destruction of the Kasubi Royal 
Tombs (World Heritage Site) Fire  
Justice Steven 
George Engwau 
2011 To inquire into the mismanagement of funds for 
Universal Primary and Secondary Education  
Justice Ezekiel 
Muhanguzi 
   
 
